Standards vs. labels with imperfect competition and asymmetric information

I demonstrate that providing information about product quality is not necessarily the best way to address asymmetric information problems when markets are imperfectly competitive. In a vertical differentiation model I show that a Minimum Quality Standard, which retains asymmetric information, generates more welfare than a label, which provides full information.     

Home country effects of foreign direct investment: From a small economy to a large economy

Previous studies on home country effects mainly focused on FDI from large developed economies to other countries. But today's super recipient is a relatively larger economy than its investors and many of these investors are not classified as “developed economies.” A simple Ak type model implies that a small and more developed country investing in a large and less developed country will experience decreases in both employment and income disparity (compared to the recipient country) as the less-developed recipient country gains the higher technology of production through FDI inflows. The empirical results for the Four Tigers (source countries) and China (recipient country) are consistent with our theoretical model of FDI outflows. We also find that FDI outflows to China decrease the ratio of exports to GDP only for small source countries, even though a higher investment in China raises the share of these countries' exports-to-China to China's total imports.     

多伦多大学的OTA:历史及一个核心问题的讨论

多伦多大学的OTA（教学促进办公室）成立于2002年1月,其职责是改变多伦多大学传统的科研主宰型文化、帮助教师开发教学技能、并通过科学的晋升和薪酬机制确保科研型大学的教师在教学和科研之间建立有效的平衡。这必然涉及到一个最根本的问题：在高级职称的晋升中,卓越的教学业绩是否能与一流的科研成果相提并论？对这一问题,学生、教师、管理层持有不同的观点,西欧、澳洲、北美地区也有不同的做法。     

Building long-term orientation in buyer–supplier relationships: The moderating role of culture

This research investigates buyer–supplier relationships in international markets. Research and practice have shown that buyer–supplier relationships benefit when partners to the relationship exhibit a long-term orientation. The extant literature suggests that a buyer's trust of a supplier and the supplier's performance affect the buyer's long-term orientation toward the relationship. We propose that the relative effects of trust and performance on long-term orientation are moderated by culture – specifically the individualism/collectivism dimension. Hypotheses are tested on data from two individualist and two collectivist cultures, using responses from over 600 purchasing professionals in the United States, Anglophone Canada, Francophone Canada and Mexico. Taken together, empirical findings suggest that cultural differences warrant consideration in developing successful purchasing strategies.     

Effect of supervisor–subordinate guanxi on supervisory decisions in China: an empirical investigation

As China is becoming an important market and there are a lot of foreign ventures operating there, different lines of research have been providing useful information for foreign ventures to manage effectively in China. In this paper, we discuss one of the critical factors leading to successful management of Chinese subordinates, i.e. building and maintaining good guanxi (i.e., interpersonal connection) with them. We conducted an empirical investigation to illustrate (1) the supervisor-subordinate guanxi concept is different and unique when compared to other similar concepts in the Western literature such as leader-member exchange (LMX) and commitment to supervisor; (2) the supervisor-subordinate guanxi will affect the Chinese supervisor's administrative decisions; (3) guanxi can be measured by concrete behaviour/activities. Data on 189 supervisor-subordinate dyads were collected in the People's Republic of China (PRC). Results indicated that supervisor-subordinate guanxi is a distinct concept from LMX and commitment to supervisor. It also has additional explanatory power over supervisory decisions on promotion and bonus allocation after controlling for performance. Implications for foreign ventures and expatriates are discussed.     

Empirical Implications of Equilibrium Bidding in First-Price, Symmetric, Common Value Auctions

This paper studies federal auctions for wildcat leases on the Outer Continental Shelf from 1954 to 1970. These are leases where bidders privately acquire (at some cost) noisy, but equally informative, signals about the amount of oil and gas that may be present. We develop tests of rational and equilibrium bidding in a common values model that are implemented using data on bids and ex post values. We also use data on tract location and ex post values to test the comparative static prediction that bidders may bid less aggressively in common value auctions when they expect more competition. We find that bidders are aware of the "winner's curse" and their bidding is largely consistent with equilibrium.