THE TIME‐SERIES PROPERTIES OF UK INFLATION: EVIDENCE FROM AGGREGATE AND DISAGGREGATE DATA

This paper contrasts the time‐series properties of aggregate and disaggregate UK inflation. While aggregate inflation is found to be non‐stationary, unit root rejection frequencies are increasing when we use more disaggregate data. Structural break analysis suggests that structural shifts in monetary policy could alter inflation persistence. Additionally, panel evidence indicates that the unit root hypothesis can be rejected for sectoral inflation rates. Finally, we compare the persistence properties of UK inflation, finding statistically significant differences between aggregate and disaggregate series. Our analysis suggests that aggregation matters, which has important implications for econometric analysis and the conduct of monetary policy.     

Cross-sectional and time-series momentum returns and market dynamics: evidence from Japan

We test the behavioural theories of overconfidence and underreaction on cross-sectional (CS) and time-series (TS) momentum returns in the Japanese stock markets. Both CS and TS momentum returns are large and significant when the market continues in the same state and turns into losses when the market transitions to another state, consistent with the overconfidence but not the underreaction model. We find that TS conditional momentum returns exceed conditional CS momentum returns because of its active position since TS takes a net long (short) position following UP (DN) markets while CS is a zero-cost strategy irrespective of the market state. Finally, we find no relation between idiosyncratic volatility (IV) and momentum returns which is not supportive of either the overconfidence or underreaction model but implies that IV is not a significant limit to arbitrage in Japan.     

Competition and Public Policy in the Nursing Home Industry

A theory of property needs to give an account of the whole lifecycle of a property right: How it is initiated, transferred, and terminated. Economics has focused on the transfers in the market and almost completely neglected the question of initiation and termination of property in normal production and consumption (not in some original state or in the transition from common to private property). The institutional mechanism for the normal initiation and termination of property is an invisible hand function of the market — the market mechanism of appropriation. Does this mechanism satisfy an appropriate normative principle? The standard normative juridical principle is to assign or impute legal responsibility according to de facto responsibility. It is given a historical tag of being "Lockean," but the basis is contemporary jurisprudence, not historical exegesis. Then, the fundamental theorem of the property mechanism is proven, which shows that if "Hume's conditions" (no transfers without consent and all contracts fulfilled) are satisfied, then the market automatically satisfies the Lockean responsibility principle — i.e., "Hume implies Locke." As a major application, the results in their contrapositive form, "Not Locke implies Not Hume," are applied to a market economy based on the employment contract. I show that the production based on the employment contract violates the Lockean principle (all who work in an employment enterprise are de facto responsible for the positive and negative results), and thus Hume's conditions must also be violated in the marketplace (de facto responsible human action cannot be transferred from one person to another — as is readily recognized when an employer and employee together commit a crime).¹     

OPTIMAL RULES FOR PATENT RACES*

There are two important rules to patent races: minimal accomplishment necessary to receive the patent and the allocation of the innovation benefits. We study the optimal combination of these rules. A planner, who cannot distinguish between competing firms in a multistage innovation race, chooses the patent rules by maximizing either consumer or social surplus. We show that efficiency cost of prizes is a key consideration. Races are undesirable only when efficiency costs are low, firms are similar, and social surplus is maximized. Otherwise, the optimal policy involves a race of nontrivial duration to spur innovation and filter out inferior innovators.     

Why Punish? Social reciprocity and the enforcement of prosocial norms

Recently economists have become interested in why people who face social dilemmas in the experimental lab use the seemingly incredible threat of punishment to deter free riding. Three theories with evolutionary microfoundations have been developed to explain punishment. We survey these theories and use behavioral data from surveys and experiments to show that the theory called social reciprocity in which people punish norm violators indiscriminately explains punishment best.JEL Classification: C91, C92, D64, H41 Correspondence to: Jeffrey P. CarpenterWe thank Carolyn Craven, Corinna Noelke and two referees for comments, and Middlebury College for financial assistance. In addition, Carpenter acknowledges the support of the National Science Foundation (SES-CAREER 0092953).     

Homotopy methods to compute equilibria in game theory

This paper presents a survey of the use of homotopy methods in game theory. Homotopies allow for a robust computation of game-theoretic equilibria and their refinements. Homotopies are also suitable to compute equilibria that are selected by various selection theories. We present the relevant techniques underlying homotopy algorithms. We give detailed expositions of the Lemke–Howson algorithm and the van den Elzen–Talman algorithm to compute Nash equilibria in 2-person games, and the Herings–van den Elzen, Herings–Peeters, and McKelvey–Palfrey algorithms to compute Nash equilibria in general n-person games. We explain how the main ideas can be extended to compute equilibria in extensive form and dynamic games, and how homotopies can be used to compute all Nash equilibria.     

Mokken scale analysis for polychotomous items: theory,a computer program and an empirical application

This paper contains three subjects. First, an extension of Mokken's nonparametric item response models from dichotomous items to items with two or more ordered answer categories is proposed. Second, a computer program to analyze multicategory item scores is presented. This program is called MSP. The analyses by means of MSP are based on the multicategory extension of Mokken's theory. Finally, an application of MSP to empirical multicategory test data is presented in order to illuminate its possibilities.