National Health Service Boards of Directors and Governance Models

Abstract

This article reports the findings of a year-long research project focused on the activity of boards of directors of twenty-two trusts from the British National Health Service (NHS). The evidence gathered through the use of semi-structured interviews, focus groups, workshops, feedback questionnaires and document analysis indicates that the behavioural dynamics of boards, affected by the dominance of the expert model, act as antecedents of their statutory functions and the implementation of different governance models. Only a portion of the boards involved has effectively incorporated in its modus operandi post-New Public Management (post-NPM) principles of governance.     

Assessing Preference Change on the US Supreme Court

The foundation upon which accounts of policy-motivated behaviorof Supreme Court justices are built consists of assumptionsabout the policy preferences of the justices. To date, mostscholars have assumed that the policy positions of Supreme Courtjustices remain consistent throughout the course of their careersand most measures of judicial ideology—such as Segal andCover scores—are time invariant. On its face, this assumptionis reasonable; Supreme Court justices serve with life tenureand are typically appointed after serving in other politicalor judicial roles. However, it is also possible that the worldviews,and thus the policy positions, of justices evolve through thecourse of their careers. In this article we use a Bayesian dynamicideal point model to investigate preference change on the USSupreme Court. The model allows for justices' ideal points tochange over time in a smooth fashion. We focus our attentionon the 16 justices who served for 10 or more terms and completedtheir service between the 1937 and 2003 terms. The results arestriking—14 of these 16 justices exhibit significant preferencechange. This has profound implications for the use of time-invariantpreference measures in applied work.     

Common Agency and Partial Cooperation

A modified common agency model is used to investigate the impact of partial cooperation on agent incentives. In the case where principals move simultaneously, it is shown that partial cooperation is self-defeating from the organizing principals' perspective despite a strengthening of agent incentives and effort. In the second scenario, where the organizing principals have a first-mover advantage, it is demonstrated that not only are individual cooperating principals better off but the outcome in terms of agent incentives and effort is constrained Pareto efficient. This latter scenario illustrates the possibility that partial cooperation, when coupled with a strategic advantage, improves efficiency.     

Individual heterogeneity in the returns to schooling: instrumental variables quantile regression using twins data

Considerable effort has been exercised in estimating mean returns to education while carefully considering biases arising from unmeasured ability and measurement error. Recent work has investigated whether there are variations from the “mean” return to education across the population with mixed results. We use an instrumental variables estimator for quantile regression on a sample of twins to estimate an entire family of returns to education at different quantiles of the conditional distribution of wages while addressing simultaneity and measurement error biases. We test whether there is individual heterogeneity in returns to education and find that: more able individuals obtain more schooling perhaps due to lower marginal costs and/or higher marginal benefits of schooling and that higher ability individuals (those further to the right in the conditional distribution of wages) have higher returns to schooling consistent with a non-trivial interaction between schooling and unobserved abilities in the generation of earnings. The estimated returns are never lower than 9 percent and can be as high as 13 percent at the top of the conditional distribution of wages but they vary significantly only along the lower to middle quantiles. Our findings may have meaningful implications for the design of educational policies.     

Optimal investment sequence

Summary. This paper investigates the optimal order in which a collection of projects should be taken on if only one project can be done at a time. We associate a number called priority value with each project and show that one should order the projects in decreasing priority values. We also show that this priority value rule is equivalent to the replication rule in the literature. Finally, we compare the rankings given by the priority value rule and the ordinary present value rule.     

Asset price bubbles in Arrow-Debreu and sequential equilibrium

Summary. Price bubbles in an Arrow-Debreu equilibrium in an infinite-time economy are a manifestation of lack of countable additivity of valuation of assets. In contrast, the known examples of price bubbles in a sequential equilibrium in infinite time cannot be attributed to the lack of countable additivity of valuation. In this paper we develop a theory of valuation of assets in sequential markets (with no uncertainty) and study the nature of price bubbles in light of this theory. We define a payoff pricing operator that maps a sequence of payoffs to the minimum cost of an asset holding strategy that generates it. We show that the payoff pricing functional is linear and countably additive on the set of positive payoffs if and only if there is no Ponzi scheme, provided that there is no restriction on long positions in the assets. In the known examples of equilibrium price bubbles in sequential markets valuation is linear and countably additive. The presence of a price bubble means that the dividends of an asset can be purchased in sequential markets at a cost lower than the asset's price. We present further examples of equilibrium price bubbles in which valuation is nonlinear, or linear but not countably additive.     

An experimental study of strategic information transmission

Summary We examine strategic information transmission in an experiment. Senders are privately informed about a state. They send messages to Receivers, who choose actions resulting in payoffs to Senders and Receivers. The payoffs depend on the action and the state. We vary the degree to which the Receivers' and the Senders' preferences diverge. We examine the relationship between the Senders' messages and the true state as well as that between actions and the true state and contrast the ability of different equilibrium message sets to explain the data.When preferences are closely aligned Senders disclose more. We assess two comparative statics: (i) as preferences diverge, state and action are less frequently matched, and (ii) messages tend to become less informative as preferences diverge. The first result is weakly confirmed for adjacent treatments but is considerably stronger when non-adjacent treatments are compared. We find that as preferences diverge messages become less informative. While the ex-ante Pareto-optimal Bayesian Nash Equilibrium does not explain our conditions, the equilibrium message sets supported by the data are similar to the ex-ante Pareto Optimal message sets.We would like to thank seminar participants at the Economic Science Association meetings, the University of Iowa, the University of Minnesota, Northwestern University and the Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory meetings for their comments. We would like to thank Beth Allen, Joyce Berg, Robert Forsythe, Yong-Gwan Kim, Antonio Merlo, Leonard Mirman, In-Uck Park, Charles Plott, Jennifer Reinganum and an anonymous referee for their suggestions. Financial support from the Accounting Research Center at the University of Minnesota is also acknowledge.     

Development by Decree: The Limits of ‘Authoritarian Modernization’ in the Russian Federation

The apparent success of state‐managed market economies has challenged the conventional wisdom that liberal democracy is the norm around which all capitalist countries tend to converge. If the link between democracy and development is more tenuous than we often think, the authoritarian variety of capitalism is not without its own problems, especially with respect to political legitimacy, innovation and regional development. This article explores these issues through the prism of ‘authoritarian modernization’ in Russia. We argue that this strategy is unlikely to succeed, even in its own terms, because (1) the political system fails to create favourable institutional conditions for modernization; (2) the economic system is beset by deeply embedded structural problems; and (3) the regional policy apparatus is torn between the goals of spatial equalization and spatial agglomeration. The article focuses on the Skolkovo Innovation Centre, the main symbol of Russian modernization, to demonstrate the territorial repertoire of the mega‐project, a state‐sponsored development strategy to create innovation clusters from above because they cannot emerge from below.     

On the real effects of inflation and inflation uncertainty in Mexico

We estimate an augmented multivariate GARCH-M model of inflation and output growth for Mexico at business cycle frequencies. The main findings are: (1) inflation uncertainty has a negative and significant effect on growth; (2) once the effect of inflation uncertainty is accounted for, lagged inflation does not have a direct negative effect on output growth; (3) However as predicted by Friedman and Ball, higher average inflation raises inflation uncertainty, and the overall net effect of average inflation on output growth in Mexico is negative. That is, average inflation is harmful to Mexican growth due to its impact on inflation uncertainty. (4) The Mexican Presidential election cycle significantly raises inflation uncertainty both during the year of the election and the year following the election which has correspondingly negative effects on output growth.