Oligopolies with (Somewhat) Environmentally Conscious Consumers: Market Equilibrium and Regulatory Intervention

We consider a horizontally differentiated duopoly where consumers care about the product's “greenness.” Firms can be asymmetric: they may differ in the product's intrinsic value and may also differ in their chosen level of greenness. We examine the choice of greenness and the implications of various policy interventions. We show that (i) the choices of product greenness are strategic substitutes, (ii) the high‐intrinsic quality firm produces the greener product, (iii) the low‐quality firm's greenness may increase with the cost of its provision or decrease with consumer willingness to pay for it, (iv) a minimum quality standard (MQS) leads the greener firm to lower its environmental quality and can even reduce average quality, (v) greenness is underprovided even if consumers fully internalize the externality, and (v) an MQS can reduce welfare if the greenness of the high‐quality firm exceeds the MQS, even when environmental quality is underprovided. The effects of policy interventions on profits differ qualitatively across polices and firms: A firm that lobbies for one type of intervention may lobby against another similar one, and a firm may lobby for an intervention while its competitor may lobby against it. A subsidy for the development costs of a green product can financially hurt both firms.     

Buyers' and sellers' agents in the housing market

We explain why buyers in the housing market use an agent employed by the seller. Such agents reduce buyers' search costs so that more buyers search a particular house. This increases the probability of the sale of the house and possibly also its selling price. However, since the selling price increases, if at all, by less than the fee paid by the seller to the agent, both buyers and sellers are better off. We identify two characteristics that give rise to sellers' agents and show that markets that do not have such agents are missing at least one of these characteristics.     

CONVERGENCE OF AMERICAN OPTION VALUES FROM DISCRETE- TO CONTINUOUS-TIME FINANCIAL MODELS1

Given a sequence of discrete-time option valuation models in which the sequence of processes defining the state variables converges weakly to a diffusion, we prove that the sequence of American option values obtained from these discrete-time models also converges to the corresponding value obtained from the continuous-time model for the standard models in the finance/economics literature. the convergence proof carries over to the case when the limiting risky asset price process follows a diffusion, except it pays discrete dividends on some fixed dates.     

Optimal contracting with moral hazard and cascading

In this article I identify optimal incentive contracts for managersof firms competing in the product market. Such firms often confrontsimilar decisions and uncertainties. Managers can improve decisionquality by generating private signals through costly effort.However, since signals are likely to be correlated, firms thatdecide later get additional information from the actions ofearlier firms. This impacts effort choice. Decision qualityis also affected if later managers disregard their own signalsand blindly imitate preceding decisions. In a competitive environment,such cascading hurts profits. Contracts that solve both moralhazard and cascading problems typically put more weight on firmprofits, making them expensive. Contacts with more weight ondecision quality are less expensive but result in cascades.Shareholders choose contracts that maximize their net surplus.This results in testable implications about which industriesmay have more convergence in investment choices, greater pay-for-profitsensitivity, larger differences in observed contracts, moreinnovation, larger-size firms, and potential for overcompensation.     

Independent directors' dissent on boards: Evidence from listed companies in China

Research summary: Although opinion conformity is believed to be commonly used by corporate elites to invoke reciprocity, it is hard to study in the context of corporate boards since boards are typically “black boxes.” Focusing on publicly traded companies in China, where disclosure of dissent is mandated, we show that dissent is associated with a breakdown of the social exchange relationship within boards. Specifically, dissent is more likely to occur when the board chair who appointed the independent director has left the board, or when the board “game” is reaching its last round, defined as a 60‐day window before departure of the board chair or the director herself. Our findings lend considerable support to conceptualization of boards as a social exchange device. Managerial summary: With a novel dataset from China we ask the question of whether the social norm of reciprocity compromises independent directors' decisions. Our results lend considerable support to the hypothesis that independent directors would generally defer to top management as they feel indebted for being offered a director position and in exchange independent directors provide support. We identified two instances in which independent directors are more likely to dissent due to a breakdown of social exchange relationships: (1) when the board chair who appointed the independent director has left the board, and (2) when the board “game” was reaching its last round, that is, either the board chair or the director herself is leaving the board. © 2015 The Authors. Strategic Management Journal published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Methods for multicountry studies of corporate governance: Evidence from the BRIKT countries

We discuss empirical challenges in multicountry studies of the effects of firm-level corporate governance on firm value, focusing on emerging markets. We assess the severe data, “construct validity”, and endogeneity issues in these studies, propose methods to respond to those issues, and apply those methods to a study of five major emerging markets—Brazil, India, Korea, Russia, and Turkey. We develop unique time-series datasets on governance in each country. We address construct validity by building country-specific indices which reflect local norms and institutions. These similar-but-not-identical indices predict firm market value in each country, and when pooled across countries, in firm fixed-effects (FE) and random-effects (RE) regressions. In contrast, a “common index”, which uses the same elements in each country, has no predictive power in FE regressions. For the country-specific and pooled indices, FE and RE coefficients on governance are generally lower than in pooled OLS regressions, and coefficients with extensive covariates are generally lower than with limited covariates. These results confirm the value of using FE or RE with extensive covariates to reduce omitted variable bias. We develop lower bounds on our estimates which reflect potential remaining omitted variable bias.     

Doing battle with short sellers: The conflicted role of blockholders in bear raids

If short sellers can destroy firm value by manipulating prices down, an informed blockholder has a powerful natural incentive to protect the value of his stake by trading against them. However, he also has a potentially conflicting incentive to use his information to generate trading profits. We show that a speculator can exploit this conflict and force the blockholder to buy a disproportionately large amount to prevent value destruction. This is costly for the blockholder because the trades must sometimes be executed at inflated prices. Given reasonable constraints on short sellers, a sufficiently large blockholder will have the incentive to absorb these losses and prevent a bear raid. However, conditions exist under which outside intervention may be warranted.     

Diasporas and Domestic Entrepreneurs: Evidence from the Indian Software Industry

This study explores the importance of cross‐border social networks for entrepreneurs in developing countries by examining ties between the Indian expatriate community and local entrepreneurs in India's software industry. We find that local entrepreneurs who have previously lived outside India rely significantly more on diaspora networks for business leads and financing. This is especially true for entrepreneurs who are based outside software hubs—where getting leads to new businesses and accessing finance is more difficult. Our results provide micro‐evidence consistent with a view that cross‐border social networks play an important role in helping entrepreneurs to circumvent the barriers arising from imperfect domestic institutions in developing countries.     

Land use and economic effects of alternative biofuel policies in Brazil and the United States

Being the two largest ethanol producers in the world, biofuel policies in Brazil and the United States affect both their domestic markets and the global food and biofuel economy. In this article we develop a price endogenous mathematical programming model to simulate and analyze the impacts of biofuel mandates and trade distortions on land use, agricultural commodity and transportation fuel markets, and global environment. We find that an 80% increase in total biofuel production from its 103 billion liter baseline level to the mandated 183 billion liter level in 2022 can be achieved with less than 2% increase in total cropland use in both countries. In the United States, this would occur with cellulosic biofuels meeting nearly half of the biofuels consumed and produced largely on cropland pasture and corn ethanol meeting the rest of the mandate and resulting in a 2% increase in corn price. In Brazil, the expansion in sugarcane production would be achieved by reducing land under pasture and a marginal increase in intensification of livestock production. In the aggregate, biofuel policies increase economic surplus in both countries by 1% and redistribute the benefits from agricultural consumers to agricultural producers and the fuel sector. Finally, we also find that full implementation of the mandates in North America, China, and the European Union would reduce the global life‐cycle global greenhouse gas emissions by about 5%.     

Is Voluntary Pollution Abatement in the Absence of a Carrot or Stick Effective? Evidence from Facility Participation in the EPA’s 33/50 Program

We examine whether voluntary pollution abatement programs in which there is no program-specific participation incentive are effective in reducing emissions below what they would have been otherwise. We use data on facility participation in the 33/50 Program and emissions reported to the US EPA’s toxic releases inventory (TRI) between 1991 and 1995 for a sample of facilities whose parent firms committed to the program. By focusing on participation by individual facilities we avoid the influence of firm level incentives under the program. The mandatory disclosure of emissions data to the TRI avoids the potential bias evident in voluntarily disclosed data. We find that while facilities with larger total emissions were more likely to participate, there is no evidence of greater participation by facilities that account for a higher share of a parent firm’s 33/50 emissions. Although emissions of the 33/50 chemicals fell over the years, we find that participation in the program was not associated with the decline in the 33/50 releases generated by these facilities and the reductions seemed to have occurred for reasons unrelated to the program.