Why Firms Engage in Corruption: A Top Management Perspective

This study builds upon the top management literature to predict and test antecedents to firms’ engagement in corruption. Building on a survey of 341 executives in India, we find that if executives have social ties with government officials, their firms are more likely to engage in corruption. Further, these executives are likely to rationalize engaging in corruption as a necessity for being competitive. The results collectively illustrate the role that executives’ social ties and perceptions have in shaping illegal actions of their respective firms.     

Can I live with you after I retire? Retirement,old age support and internal migration in a developing country

This study provides causal evidence on the impact of retirement on internal migration in a developing country. Using a fuzzy regression discontinuity design, combined with a nationally representative sample of 228,855 older Chinese adults, we find that retirement leads to an increase in the probability of being a migrant by 12.9 percentage points (an 80% increase in migration). Approximately 38% of the total migration effects can be attributed to intertemporal shifts. The impact is more pronounced for the lower-educated, those who have restricted access to health insurance and pension and those who come from origins with high accommodation costs. Relying on old age support from adult children in migration is a likely mechanism. Lifting migration restrictions and improving government-provided benefits for retirees could be helpful to cope with population aging in a developing country.     

Insider ownership, ownership concentration and investment performance: An international comparison

This article makes two important contributions to the literature on the incentive effects of insider ownership. First, it presents a clean method for separating the positive wealth effect of insider ownership from the negative entrenchment effect, which can be applied to samples of companies from the US and any other country. Second, it measures the effects of insider ownership using a measure of firm performance, namely a marginal q, which ensures that the causal relationship estimated runs from ownership to performance. The article applies this method to a large sample of publicly listed firms from the Anglo-Saxon and Civil law traditions and confirms that managerial entrenchment has an unambiguous negative effect on firm performance as measured by both Tobin's (average) q and our marginal q, and that the wealth effect of insider ownership is unambiguously positive for both measures. We also test for the effects of ownership concentration for other categories of owners and find that while institutional ownership improves the performance in the USA, financial institutions have a negative impact in other Anglo-Saxon countries and in Europe.     

Banking Competition and Capital Ratios

Empirical studies provide evidence that bank capital ratios exceed regulatory requirements. But why do banks maintain capital levels above regulatory requirements? We use data for more than 2,600 banks from 10 European countries to test recent theories suggesting that competition incentivises banks to maintain higher capital ratios. These theories also predict that banks that engage in arm's length lending have lower capital ratios, and that shareholder rights and deposit insurance characteristics affect capital ratios. Consistent with these theories, our evidence robustly indicates that competition increases capital holdings. Banks that lend at arm's length exhibit lower capital ratios, whereas banks in countries with strong shareholder rights operate with higher capital ratios. We also show some evidence that generous deposit protection schemes that exclude non‐deposit creditors are associated with higher capital ratios. Our results have important policy implications. First, while the traditional view suggests imposing restrictions on bank activities in order to restrain competition, our analysis indicates the opposite, even after adjusting the regressions for risk‐taking. Second, weak shareholder rights undermine market forces that would otherwise encourage banks to hold higher capital ratios.     

Estimating cost of capital in firm valuations with arithmetic or geometric mean – or better use the Cooper estimator?

We test the extent and determinants of bias effects of the arithmetic as well as the geometric mean estimator and the estimator of Cooper [1996. Arithmetic versus geometric mean estimators: Setting discount rates for capital budgeting. European Financial Management 2 (July): 157–67] regarding discount rate estimation for firm valuation by way of a bootstrap approach for 13 different countries. The Cooper estimator is superior to both the geometric and the (conventional) arithmetic mean estimator. However, a ‘truncated’ version of the arithmetic mean estimator leads generally to better estimation outcomes than the Cooper estimator. This means that, in order to reduce problems of upward-biased firm value estimates, expected cash flows beyond a certain time horizon are completely neglected in terminal value estimation. Such an approach seems particularly reasonable for the valuation of young growth companies as well as for companies from quickly developing countries such as Brazil, China, or Thailand, because the bias in terminal value estimation is increasing in the growth rate of future expected cash flows.     

ON INDUSTRY MOMENTUM STRATEGIES

In this article, we investigate industry momentum strategies. We find that industry portfolios that outperformed in the previous month generate on average significantly higher returns in the holding period than those that underperformed. Plain and risk-managed strategies using this short-run industry momentum are not subject to optionality effects. Also, the tail risks of these strategies are uncorrelated with traditional industry momentum strategies. The spread associated with the risk-managed strategy both meets necessary conditions as a risk factor and is significantly priced in the cross-section of U.S. industry portfolios.     

A utopian view of R&D functions

Technology management research appears to have a much longer history than is commonly assumed. In this short paper attention is drawn to some of Francis Bacon's writings which appeared in the early seventeenth century, and which contain ideas on laboratory organization that still have relevance today. In fact, it is only recently that the same broadness of laboratory functions described in the earlier text has been re–discovered.