The Choice of International Monetary Regimes in a Context of Repeated Games

A game theoretic and incentive approach is used to explain an international monetary regime. Decisions concerning a fixed exchange rate regime are difficult because they involve cooperation among participants, but decisions concerning defections from a fixed exchange rate regime are relatively easy because they are taken unilaterally. This may explain the difficulties for the completion of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) in Europe well as the instability recently observed in the quasi-fixed exchange regimes of the Asian countries. EMU is now in full force. The perception of political benefits by national leaders has been the driving force of currency unification in Europe. The cost of a monetary union is the loss of monetary control by each participating nation. If countries cannot contain their desire to deviate from the common monetary expansion, then the currency could potentially be under speculative attack. After January 1, 1999, theoretically each EMU country can no longer deviate from the common norm; but the question remains how to implement this mode of conduct. Even the country in the center, Germany, may find a cost associated with the loss of its leadership role.     

A national-security argument for trade protection

This paper constructs a two-period model in which a domestic monopoly firm produces a good given an amount of import of the good. In the second period, the monopoly firm faces a capacity constraint with regard to its production level. The production level in the first period sets the maximum quantity for the second period. We investigate the effects of quotas on welfare to examine the economic rationale of the national-security argument for trade protection. Under decreasing marginal costs of a monopoly firm, tightening the import quota may increase the domestic consumer surplus and the social welfare.     

Growth Effects of Bubbles in an Endogenous Growth Model

This paper examines the possibility of the existence of bubbles and their effects on the growth rate by using an endogenous growth model. A necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of steady-state equilibrium with bubbles is provided. If non-zero rates of the useless asset supply are allowed, a steady-state equilibrium with bubbles exists even if the growth rate of the bubbleless equilibrium is lower than the market interest rate. The growth rate in the steady state with bubbles depends positively on the supply rate of the useless asset. Dynamic properties of bubbles are also analysed.
JEL Classification Numbers: E52, O41, O42.     

LAND TAXATION AND ITS IMPACT ON LAND PRICE: The Case of Japan in the 1990s

The multifold increases in land prices in Tokyo, at first, and in other major cities of Japan, later, during the last half of the 1980s brought forth government proposals to strengthen the land holding taxes which were very low in the past. This paper analyzes the background of these developments as well as their rationales, and looks at possible consequences of planned increases in land holding taxes. It is argued that the rivalry between the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Local Autonomy is leading to a situation in which unexpectedly heavy land holding taxes will be imposed in the near future, lowering the price of land to much less than half of what it was in the past.     

Comparative analyses of fiscal sustainability of the budgetary policy rules

We construct a continuous-time overlapping generations model with an endogenous growth structure and consider fiscal sustainability under two fiscal rules: (i) the government fixes the budget deficit-to-GDP ratio and (ii) the government fixes the primary balance-to-GDP ratio. Under the constant budget deficit-to-GDP rule, fiscal sustainability is ensured when the initial public debt-to-GDP and budget deficit-to-GDP ratios are sufficiently small. Under the constant primary balance-to-GDP rule, it is difficult to ensure fiscal sustainability when the primary balance is in deficit or zero. However, fiscal sustainability is ensured when the primary balance is in surplus and the initial government debt-to-GDP ratio is sufficiently small.