On the determinants of credit rationing: Firm-level evidence from transition countries

Using survey data for firms from Eastern European transition economies we investigate the determinants of credit rationing. Our rationing definition incorporates firms whose loan application was rejected, but also ‘discouraged’ potential borrowers. We employ a bivariate probit with censoring, approach that accounts for the underlying selectivity since rationed firms are a subset of those without a loan. We include firm-specific attributes related to the alleviation of informational asymmetries, and therefore expected to affect credit rationing. We find that credit rationing depends on firm size, profitability, sales growth, ownership type, legal status, sectoral heterogeneity and the country-specific level of domestic credit.     

Forecasting UK GDP growth and inflation under structural change. A comparison of models with time-varying parameters

Evidence from a large and growing body of empirical literature strongly suggests that there have been changes in the inflation and output dynamics in the United Kingdom. The majority of these papers base their results on a class of econometric models that allows for time-variation in the coefficients and volatilities of shocks. While these models have been used extensively for studying evolving dynamics and for structural analysis, there has been little evidence that they are useful for forecasting UK output growth and inflation. This paper attempts to fill this gap by comparing the performances of a wide range of time-varying parameter models in forecasting output growth and inflation. We find that allowing for time-varying parameters can lead to large and statistically significant gains in forecast accuracy.     

Size and momentum in European equity markets: empirical findings from varying beta Capital Asset Pricing Model

We use securities listed on 13 European equity markets to form size and momentum portfolios. We find limited evidence of a size premium but significant momentum returns in eight sample markets. We find that these premia may not constitute an anomaly because they are consistent with a varying‐beta Capital Asset Pricing Model. We also show that systematic risk is related to the business cycle. Furthermore, the results suggest that although size and especially momentum returns are significant, it would be difficult to exploit them in the short to medium run, because they are positive and sizeable in very few years in our sample.     

Customer information sharing among rival firms

The recent rapid growth of the Internet as a medium of communication and commerce, combined with the development of sophisticated software tools, are to a large extent responsible for producing a new kind of information: Databases with detailed records about consumers’ preferences. These databases have become part of a firm's assets, and as such they can be sold to third parties. This possibility has raised numerous concerns from consumer privacy advocates and regulators, who have entered into a heated debate with business groups and industry associations about whether the practice of customer information sharing should be banned, regulated, or left unchecked. This paper investigates the incentives of rival firms to share their customer-specific information and evaluates the welfare implications if such exchanges are banned, in the context of a perfect price discrimination model.     

Economics of export subsidies under costly and imperfect enforcement

The present paper builds on the published literature on agricultural policy analysis under costly and imperfect enforcement by introducing enforcement costs and misrepresentation into the economic analysis of export subsidies. Specifically, the present paper examines the economic causes of cheating on export subsidies and the consequences of enforcement costs and misrepresentation for the welfare effects and the transfer efficiency of this policy instrument. Policy design and implementation is modelled as a sequential game between a government that designs and enforces the policy and the recipients of the payments. Two alternative policy implementation scenarios are considered. In the first scenario, export subsidies are paid to private trading firms while in the second scenario subsidies are paid directly to the producers of the subsidised commodity. Analytical results show that the introduction of enforcement costs and cheating changes the welfare effects of export subsidies and their efficiency in redistributing income to producers. The analysis also shows that, contrary to what is traditionally believed, the incidence of export subsidies depends on the group that is subsidised to export the surplus quantity – the way the policy is implemented. The results provide additional support for the contention that the economic consequences of cheating are highly policy-specific. Finally, the analysis reveals that when the government faces restrictions on either the volume or the value of export subsidies, cheating reduces the distortionary effects of the policy on international markets. This is true irrespective of whether subsidies are paid to trading firms or to producers.     

A note on trust in the ECB in the era of sovereign debt crisis

We employ Eurobarometer data on trust in the ECB, exploring whether trust is affected by sovereign credit rating episodes and the participation in economic adjustment programmes (EAPs) (bailout schemes). Controlling for several sociodemographic factors and macroeconomic conditions, we document a substantial negative impact on trust in ECB for countries experiencing downgrade episodes and participating in EAPs.     

Do U.S. Insurance Firms Offer the “Wrong” Incentives to Their Executives?

We examine the relation between executive compensation and market‐implied default risk for listed insurance firms from 1992 to 2007. Shareholders are expected to encourage managerial risk sharing through equity‐based incentive compensation. We find that long‐term incentives and other share‐based plans do not affect the default risk faced by firms. However, the extensive use of stock options leads to higher future default risk for insurance firms. We argue that this is because option‐based incentives induce managerial risk‐taking behavior, which seeks to maximize managerial payoff through equity volatility. This could be detrimental to the interests of shareholders, especially during a financial crisis.     

Integrated Resort Development: The Case of Cavo Sidero,Crete

Many governments have encouraged integrated resort development in an attempt to improve the well-being of the local population by generating jobs and increasing income, and because of the easier control of tourism activities within their boundaries. However, most research reports various adverse environmental and social impacts. Because of the difficulty of assessing the impacts that may result from the construction of integrated resorts, the majority of research has been conducted after their construction. This study is an impact assessment carried out prior to a large-scale development that examines whether an integrated resort proposed for development at Cavo Sidero, Crete, will result in positive impacts for the destination and the local community, and it investigates whether any conflicting interests have arisen within stakeholder groups. Through primary research examining various stakeholder groups it is revealed that economic impacts are perceived as mostly positive, while social and environmental impacts, in many cases, are viewed as negative, and that conflicting interests have arisen between different stakeholder groups.