Emergence of anti-coordination through reinforcement learning in generalized minority games

In this paper we propose adaptive strategies to solve coordination failures in a prototype generalized minority game model with a multi-agent, multi-choice environment. We illustrate the model with an application to large scale distributed processing systems with a large number of agents and servers. In our set up, agents are assigned responsibility to complete tasks that require unit time. They request servers to process these tasks. Servers can process only one task at a time. Agents have to choose servers independently and simultaneously, and have access to the outcomes of their own past requests only. Coordination failure occurs if more than one agent simultaneously requests the same server to process tasks at the same time, while other servers remain idle. Since agents are independent, this leads to multiple coordination failures. In this paper, we propose strategies based on reinforcement learning that minimize such coordination failures. We also prove a null result that a large category of probabilistic strategies which attempts to combine information about other agents’ strategies, asymptotically converge to uniformly random choices over the servers.

     

Relative Social Status and Conflicting Measures of Poverty: A Behavioral Analytical Model

Journal of Quantitative Economics - We consider a situation where the relatively ‘poor’ are concerned about their relative income status with respect to a relevant reference group. Such...     

Political connections and bank behaviour

Using disaggregated data on Indian state-owned banks, we study how political connections influence their lending behaviour. The findings indicate an overall credit expansion of 10% during election years for banks with political connections, driven by increased lending to agriculture and Small and Medium Enterprises. Further disaggregation reveals cycles in such lending driven by electoral considerations, primarily for banks with political connections. In turn, there is a gradual weakening in the asset quality of these banks. The net effect is manifest in lower productivity. The key policy implication is that electoral manipulation exerts significant economic costs.     

The Effect of Legal Environment and Regulatory Structure on Performance: Cross-Country Evidence from REITs

The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics - We study the relationship between international REIT regulatory structures and real estate returns and find that the legal requirements that REITs...     

Innovations in financing: The impact of anchor investors in Indian IPOs

In 2009, the Securities Exchange Board of India allowed qualified institutional investors to anchor initial public offerings (IPOs) by participating in the issue at a price and allocation publicly disclosed preceding the issue. We study anchor investors (AIs) in Indian IPOs during 2009–2017. We find the share allotment and the number of AIs separately have significant impacts on valuation and underpricing; however, the net effect is nonsignificant. Further, AIs significantly influence other institutional investors' participation in the IPO and induce lower aftermarket volatility. Overall, our evidence suggests that AIs boost demand for and mitigate ex ante information uncertainty of IPOs.     

Communication Cost,Skilled-Unskilled Wage,and Informality

Journal of Quantitative Economics - This paper establishes an interesting link between informality and time zone differences in a general equilibrium trade model for small open economy. Trading...     

The effect of exogenous product familiarity on endogenous consumer search

When a consumer is familiar with one product but not its competitor, she is faced with a decision: either buy what she knows, or engage in search to learn more. When search is costly, competing firms may attempt to encourage or discourage search by adjusting prices. In this paper we consider how competitive dynamics between two quality differentiated firms are affected if one product enjoys a familiarity advantage. Familiarity is defined as a consumer’s ex-ante knowledge of fit for a particular product. An increase in the level of familiarity for one product allows a firm to charge higher prices since there are more consumers with information on that product relative to the competition. We call this the direct effect of familiarity. However, an increase in familiarity also has an indirect effect, since it gives the rival firm a stronger incentive to decrease price in order to encourage searching, in turn increasing overall competition. The effect of familiarity on profits depends on the magnitudes of these effects, and it is moderated by the level of quality differentiation between products. For very high or very low levels of differentiation, the results are relatively straightforward. However, when the level of differentiation is moderate, the results are more nuanced, with the higher-quality firm realizing higher profits from more familiarity, even if it must lower prices due to the indirect effect. We also find that, contrary to conventional wisdom, overall competition may be higher when firms are more quality differentiated. This is driven by the fact that higher quality differences bolster the indirect effect, with a lower quality firm providing deeper price cuts to counter increased familiarity of a high quality rival. We conclude by examining how changes in the cost of searching impact equilibrium outcomes.