Say-on-Pay Votes: The Role of the Media

Abstract

We investigate the association between the media coverage of firms’ CEO pay packages and subsequent shareholder voting on say-on-pay resolutions, and find that negative media coverage is able to predict shareholder discontent over say on pay. When we divide media coverage into coverage in the financial and business press versus coverage in the general press, we find that shareholder voting on say-on-pay resolutions is mainly associated with the articles from the financial and business press. This suggests that the media cannot be considered a homogeneous information source that is equally able to predict shareholders’ voting behaviors. As such, our findings have important implications for studies on the role of the media in corporate governance.     

Endogenous timing,strategic tariff game and bilateral trade in vertical oligopoly

This paper builds an observable delay game in endogenous timing to study the possible occurrence of trade wars in a vertical, bilateral trade model. It examines the effects of production cost differences and order of moves on optimal tariffs, market equilibria, dumping margin and social welfare in both fixed timing and endogenous timing games. In a fixed timing game, it shows that price dumping in the intermediate good market arises from differences in country-specific final good production costs. Different from Bernhofen (1995; Journal of International Economics), trade costs resulting from reciprocal tariffs in upstream markets can reverse the price dumping under certain conditions. In an endogenous timing game, this paper finds that the magnitude of cost differences significantly influences countries’ decisions on the order of moves in a strategic tariff-making game. Both countries want to be the first movers under a small cost difference and consequently reach a simultaneous equilibrium result. This demonstrates that the second-best equilibrium proceeds under certain conditions. Under a large cost difference, sequential policy-making is the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. If the cost difference is sufficiently large, both countries have an incentive to launch a trade war as a multiple equilibrium game.     

Does obfuscating excessive CEO pay work? The influence of remuneration report readability on say-on-pay votes

This paper assesses whether reducing ‘readability’ is an effective obfuscation strategy for influencing the level of shareholder say-on-pay voting dissent in firms with excessive CEO pay. Based on a sample of UK-listed firms, our results indicate that in cases of excessive CEO pay, a less readable remuneration report is associated with reduced say-on-pay voting dissent. However, the effect of the obfuscation strategy diminishes as institutional ownership increases. Using obscurely written remuneration reports may even backfire (i.e. associated with increased voting dissent) when a firm’s majority shares are held by institutional investors. Our results are robust to controlling for compensation contract complexity as well as other alternative explanations. The results are also robust to various controls for endogeneity including a two-stage instrumental variable approach and propensity-score matching. Our findings offer regulatory implications that regulators could minimize the use of ‘obfuscation’ in pay-related disclosures by prescribing how information is to be presented.     

The Effect of Organizational Climate on Sell-side Analyst Turnover and Performance

This paper investigates whether and how organizational climate (OC) in brokerage firms affects analyst turnover and performance. We find that firms with a lower-rated OC have a higher likelihood of analyst turnover. Also, when analysts leave and switch brokerage firms, they are more likely to move to a firm with a higher-rated OC and will deliver more accurate forecasts after switching firms. However, the performance improvements in better-rated OC firms are significant only for the initial years of the analysts’ employment in the new firms. We also show that OC-related analyst turnover negatively affects the performance of incumbent analysts, especially for those non-All-Star incumbent analysts, while these adverse performance effects are also transitory and last for two years only. Thus, our findings indicate that OC only has a short-lived effect on the behaviour of both leaving and remaining analysts, which challenges the long-held assumption that investments in a positive OC will always be associated with lower employee turnover and higher individual performance. We explain our results as arising from the high levels of labour mobility within the brokerage industry and the transparency of analyst forecasts as a public performance measure.     

基于事件史分析的高校毕业生工作搜寻持续时间研究

高校毕业生工作搜寻持续时间具有明显的时间分布特征,并且受到人力资本、社会资本和工作搜寻三个方面因素的影响。我们一方面可以通过分析这些影响因素最终造成搜寻时间长短的不同来评判工作搜寻行为,另一方面也可以通过分析这些影响因素导致的工作搜寻质量上的不同来衡量高校毕业生的工作搜寻行为。     

人民币汇率的微观结构与外汇储备管理

本文从汇率微观结构理论的视角,对人民币汇率形成机制的改革进行了探讨。在未来的人民币汇率定价过程中,中央银行的作用将逐步减弱,而且外汇干预的方式将发生很大改变,这无疑会对外汇储备的增长方式有深远的影响。本文试图从外汇做市商库存控制的角度,分析中央银行在人民币汇率管理过程中的表现,并且从中央银行与外汇做市商的互动关系出发,对完善人民币汇率管理的方向进行了探讨。     

探广东产业转移中行业商会的作用

广东的粤北山区和东西两翼地区,毗邻珠三角,是承接珠三角地区边际产业转移的理想场所。珠三角企业实施产业转移的过程中,行业商会的作用不可忽视。本文以基于行为的企业迁移理论为依据,阐明了行业商会引导、协调企业搬迁,与政府沟通的职能。结合珠三角产业转移过程中遇到的一些问题,对行业商会在促进产业转移方面的方面提出一些见解。     

基于电子商务环境下的供应链构建研究

随着电子商务的不断发展,企业物流和供应链运作发生了翻天覆地的变化。这种变化越来越反映在以电子商务为基础的信息化、集成化的供应链管理,提出了在现代电子商务环境下企业供应链构建必要性,以及电子商务环境下供应链构建的特点、原则和构建方法。企业只有在电子商务环境下构建适合自身的供应链,不断优化整个链条来提高整体效率,才能提高市场反应能力和综合竞争力。     

农地流转影响要素市场发育的机理与实证研究——基于面板中介效应模型的论证

[目的]要素市场化改革在我国农村市场化改革中相对滞后,农地流转作为完善要素市场发育的重要手段之一,其如何影响要素市场化水平是值得深入研究的问题,通过构建农地流转与要素市场化水平的分析框架,实证检验其中的作用机理。[方法]文章基于2005—2019年的省际面板数据,引入劳动力市场与农业资本市场的间接作用,运用面板中介效应模型进行实证分析。[结果]农地流转有利于提高要素市场化水平,农地流转率每上升1个百分点,要素市场化指数相应提高0.108,但存在显著的地域性差异。其中,劳动力市场在农地流转提高要素市场化水平过程中发挥部分中介效应作用,中介效应占比约为44.21%,农业资本市场发挥“遮掩效应”作用,遮掩效应占比约为3.72%。[结论]我国各要素市场是一个相互联动的交易体系,农地市场的发育水平能够影响劳动力市场与农业资本市场的发育水平。因此,需稳步推进农村各要素市场协同发展,尤其关注劳动力市场与农村金融市场的发育水平,发挥“1+1>2”的资源整合效应。     

风险投资与战略性新兴企业外部购买创新投资

研究了风险投资对战略性新兴企业外部购买创新投资的影响.结果发现:风险投资机构参与管理能降低了战略性新兴企业的外部购买创新投资的可能性;风险投资持股比例越大,战略性新兴企业的外部购买创新投资越小;战略性新兴企业的自主研发投资与其外部购买创新投资正相关,战略性新兴企业的自主研发投资与其外部购买创新投资是互补关系.