Exploiting moral wiggle room: experiments demonstrating an illusory preference for fairness

This paper explores whether generosity in experiments is truly evidence of concern for desirable social outcomes. We conduct an experiment using a binary version of the dictator game. We introduce several treatments in which subjects are able to leave the relationship between their actions and resulting outcomes uncertain, either to themselves or to another subject influenced by those actions, thus giving subjects the moral “wiggle room” to behave self-interestedly. We find significantly less generous behavior in these manipulations, relative to a baseline in which the relationship between actions and outcomes is transparent. We conclude that many subjects behave fairly in the baseline case mainly because they intrinsically dislike appearing unfair, either to themselves or others. We thank Cristina Bicchieri; Iris Bohnet; Colin Camerer; Robyn Dawes; Ernst Fehr; George Loewenstein; John Patty; Charlie Plott; Matthew Rabin; seminar participants at Carnegie Mellon, Berkeley, Cornell, Emory, and Princeton; participants at the 2003 Public Choice, 2003 ESA, 2003 SJDM, and 2004 BDRM meetings; and anonymous referees for helpful comments and suggestions. We greatly appreciate the access to resources at the Pittsburgh Experimental Economics Laboratory (PEEL) at the University of Pittsburgh. This research was funded by a Carnegie Mellon Berkman Faculty Development Grant to Weber and a Russell Sage Behavioral Economics Small Grant to Dana.     

广西港航强桂战略研究

文章认为,实施港航强桂战略,加快港航业发展壮大港口经济,是未来十年广西经济持续快速健康发展的新主动力,是广西经济新一轮加速发展的新增长点,是广西北部湾经济区全面开放开发的突破口、切入点和关键点,是广西赶超跨越发展的潜力所在、优势所在、希望所在。广西应不失时机地实施港航强桂战略,走出一条北部经济区迅速崛起的新路子。文章提出了广西港航强桂战略的战略定位、战略目标、战略重点、新思路、新举措及要正确处理好的几个关系。     

Shared interest and honesty in budget reporting

This study uses two experiments to investigate the honesty of managers’ budget reports when the financial benefit resulting from budgetary slack is shared by the manager and other non-reporting employees. Drawing on moral disengagement theory, we predict that the shared interest in slack creation makes misreporting more self-justifiable to the manager and, therefore, leads to lower honesty. Consistent with our prediction, the results of our first experiment show that managers report less honestly when the benefit of slack is shared than when it is not shared, regardless of whether others are aware of the misreporting. Our second experiment investigates whether the preferences of the beneficiaries of the slack affect managers’ honesty. We predict that managers’ honesty will be improved when the beneficiaries of the slack have a known, higher-order preference for truthful reporting. Consistent with our prediction, the results show that managers report more honestly when other employees have a known preference for honesty than otherwise. The implications of our findings for management accounting research and practice are discussed.     

跨国化工公司的技术创新及其经济业绩

分析世界上若干著名跨国化工公司的科研、经营、发展状况,阐述了跨国化工公司的技术创新与其经济业绩的关系。     

中国乡村债务问题形成机理与化解对策--以山东聊城区的4个乡村为例

从2000年开始的农村税费改革在改变农村税费现状、理顺农村分配关系、促进农村经济发展和提高农民收入方面发挥着积极的作用,是国家在农村推行的一项强制性的制度变迁.然而在肯定税费改革取得阶段性成果的同时,必须正视改革中暴露出来的乡村债务巨额增长的问题.本文以山东聊城市4个乡村的债务状况为例,对乡村政府过度负债问题的形成机理进行分析,并试图寻找有效的化解措施.     

我国碳金融发展问题探析

碳金融在促进低碳经济发展的同时,也为金融体系提供了新的发展空间,是人类社会可持续发展的必然选择。分析我国碳金融发展的现状和存在的问题,针对碳金融的发展前景提出相应对策。     

In the Shadow of the United States: The International Transmission Effect of Asset Returns

We examine how fluctuations in financial and housing markets in the United States affect asset returns and GDP in Hong Kong. In contrast to studies using linear specifications, which find that the United States and Hong Kong are virtually delinked in terms of the asset markets, our regime‐switching models indicate that an unexpected change in US stock returns, followed by the TED spread, has the most significant effect on Hong Kong asset returns and GDP, typically in a regime of high return and low volatility. For in‐sample one‐step‐ahead forecasting, the US term spread is the best predictor.     

Credit Constraint and the Asymmetric Monetary Policy Effect on House Prices

We study the possible asymmetric effect of monetary policy on house prices under different credit regimes. We first derive the implications of a theoretical model in which agents may be collateral‐constrained. We then empirically examine the implications of the model using the threshold vector autoregression model. Two different measures reflecting the tightness of the credit market are computed to serve as the threshold variable. We find that house prices react to a monetary shock initially more strongly but the effect is less persistent in a credit boom regime than in a normal credit regime. This result is consistent with the findings of our theoretical model.     

提高认证机构服务质量的管理学分析

本文在对服务的基本特征、服务质量的特性、服务的可感知性进行探讨的基础上分别阐述了对认证机构的相应要求,并对提高认证机构的服务质量提出了建议.     

The Interplay of Wage and Exchange Rate Policies in Singapore: A Case of Collective Bargaining in Macroeconomic Management

This article analyzes an optimization model of the policy game between Singapore's National Wage Council and the Monetary Authority of Singapore and further simulates the model over policy rules (Nash game versus non-Nash game), economic scenarios, and the game players' preference and bargaining power. The results indicate that the exchange rate appreciation and wage growth act as substitutes under the Nash rule of policy responses, whereas they act as complements under the non-Nash rule. Under the Nash rule, the exchange rate appreciation tends to be procyclical and wage growth countercyclical; union workers' bargaining power relative to employers' strengthens the procyclical appreciation uniformly but reinforces the countercyclical wage growth only when the economy undergoes a downturn. Both the Nash and non-Nash rules call for more moderate appreciation and more flexible wage adjustments than their actual movements. (JEL E64 , E61 , F41 )