Why do security prices change? A transaction-level analysis of NYSE stocks

This article develops and tests a structural model of intradayprice formation that embodies public information shocks andmicrostructure effects. We use the model to analyze intradaypatterns in bid-ask spreads, price volatility, transaction costs,and return and quote auto-correlations, and to construct metricsfor price discovery and effective trading costs. Informationasymmetry and uncertainty over fundamentals decrease over theday, although transaction costs increase. The results help explainthe U-shaped pattern in intraday bid-ask spreads and volatility,and are also consistent with the intra-day decline in the varianceof ask price changes.     

Insurance Derivatives: A New Asset Class for the Capital Markets and a New Hedging Tool for the Insurance Industry

The number and severity of natural catastrophes has increased dramatically over the last decade. As a result, there is now a shortage of capacity in the property catastrophe insurance industry in the U.S. This article discusses how insurance derivatives, particularly the Chicago Board of Trade's catastrophe options contracts, represent a possible solution to this problem. These new financial instruments enable the capital markets to provide the insurance industry with the reinsurance capacity it needs. The capital markets are willing to perform this role because of the new asset class characteristics of securitized insurance risk: positive excess returns and diversification benefits.
The article also demonstrates how insurance companies can use insurance derivatives such as catastrophe options and catastrophe-linked bonds as effective, low-cost risk management tools. In reviewing the performance of the catastrophe contracts to date, the authors report promising signs of growth and liquidity in these markets.     

Managerial Entrenchment and Capital Structure Decisions

We study associations between managerial entrenchment and firms' capital structures, with results generally suggesting that entrenched CEOs seek to avoid debt. In a cross-sectional analysis, we find that leverage levels are lower when CEOs do not face pressure from either ownership and compensation incentives or active monitoring. In an analysis of leverage changes, we find that leverage increases in the aftermath of entrenchment-reducing shocks to managerial security, including unsuccessful tender offers, involuntary CEO replacements, and the addition to the board of major stockholders.     

PDMA Success Measurement Project: Recommended Measures for Product Development Success and Failure

Success is not just elusive; it is also multifaceted and difficult to measure. A firm can assess the success or failure of a development project in any (or all) of many terms, including customer satisfaction, financial return, and technical advantage. To complicate matters, success may be measured not only at the level of the individual project, but also at the program level. With so many variables to consider and so many stakeholders involved, managers face a difficult challenge just deciding which measures are useful for measuring product development success. Recognizing that no single measure suffices for gauging the success of every product development project, Abbie Griffin and Albert L. Page hypothesize that the most appropriate set of measures for assessing project-level success depends on the project strategy. For example, the objectives (and thus, the success criteria) for a new product that creates an entirely new market will differ from those of a project that extends an existing product line. Similarly, they hypothesize that the appropriate measures of a product development program's overall success depend on the firm's innovation strategy. For example, a firm that values being first to market will measure success in different terms from those used by a firm that focuses on maintaining a secure market niche. To test these hypotheses, product development professionals were presented with six project strategy scenarios and four business strategy scenarios. For each project strategy scenario, participants were asked to select the four most useful measures of project success. For each business strategy scenario, participants were asked to choose the set of four measures that would provide the most useful overall assessment of product development success. The responses strongly support the idea that the most appropriate measures of project-level and program-level success depend on the firm's project strategy and business strategy, respectively. For example, customer satisfaction and customer acceptance were among the most useful customer-based measures of success for several project strategies, but market share was cited as the most useful customer-based measure for projects involving new-to-the-company products or line extensions. At the program level, firms with a business strategy that places little emphasis on innovation need to focus on measuring the efficiency of their product development program, while innovative firms need to assess the program's contribution to company growth.     

Why Do Firms Adopt Profit-Sharing and Employee Ownership Plans?

Profit-sharing and employee ownership in companies have attracted considerable interest, yet there has been little research on factors predicting the adoption and maintenance of these plans. This study uses new data from a survey of 500 US public companies, and panel data on corporate financial variables, to examine factors predicting the presence and adoption of profit- sharing and employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs) in the 1975–91 period. Several findings support productivity-related motivations for such plans (including higher R&D levels among old profit-sharing firms, and recent adoption of job enrichment programmes among new profit-sharing firms), while others support flexibility-related motivations (including higher variance in profits prior to the adoption of profit-sharing plans and ESOPs). Unionized firms were less likely to have either type of plan in 1975, but equally likely to adopt them subsequently (often in concessionary contracts). Comparisons of cross-sectional and panel results illustrate advantages of panel data in disentangling the causes and effects of profit-sharing and ESOPs.     

Pricing and hedging power options

In this paper we study the pricing and hedging of options whose payoff is a polynomial function of the underlying price at expiration; so-called ‘power options’. Working in the well-known Black and Scholes (1973) framework we derive closed-form formulas for the prices of general power calls and puts. Parabola options are studied as a special case. Power options can be hedged by statically combining ordinary options in such a way that their payoffs form a piecewise linear function which approximates the power option's payoff. Traditional delta hedging may subsequently be used to reduce any residual risk.     

Capital mobility,wage bargaining,and social insurance policies in an economic union

In a two-country model with mobile capital we analyse decentralized social insurance policies. These policies are a compromise between the preferences of workers and capital owners. Due to wage bargaining, worker-based social insurance contributions are borne by capital owners. These contributions affect the profitability of investment, and consequently the direction and size of capital flows. Countries will take account of these effects in determining social insurance policy. Noncooperative decision making results in tax competition and an underprovision of social insurance. In addition, increasing economic integration, represented by increasing capital mobility, could imply a divergence of social insurance levels in the two countries.     

Forbearance: An empirical analysis

Several recent articles have analyzed conditions under which allowing capital-deficient banks to continue to operate may be optimal policy. This article examines the performance of banks admitted into the FDIC's Capital Forbearance Program between 1986 and 1989 and finds that, for the majority of these banks, there was no substantial improvement in their capital ratios. We use a logit regression analysis to attempt to identify those banks whose financial condition improved with forbearance and find that banks which did improve are not clearly identifiable from pre-forbearance financial data. Instead, the banks which improved did so due to infusions of new capital, extraordinary income, and improvements in the local economies, factors which are not easily identifiable ex ante by regulators. The conclusion is that, while some grants of forbearance may result in large saving to the FDIC, in the majority of cases granting forbearance to troubled banks is unlikely to reduce the expected loss to the deposit insurer.University of HoustonUniversity of HoustonCooperative Bank of Taiwan, Taipei, Taiwan     

Does the cost of capital differ across countries? An agency perspective*

In this keynote speech, I ask the question: Does the cost of capital differ for firms located in different countries? I argue that there are two ways to look at the cost of capital. First, there is the neoclassical perspective, which assumes that there are no agency problems. In integrated markets, the neoclassical cost of capital is the same in every country. Second, there is the agency perspective. Agency costs increase the cost of capital understood as the expected rate of return necessary for an investment to leave the value of the firm unaffected. Adjusting the cost of capital for agency costs, I argue that it differs across countries because of differences in corporate governance. I then provide a comparison of the agency-adjusted cost of capital between Japan and the US.