Humberto Charles‐Leija  Gilberto Aboites  Ignacio Llamas 《The Australian economic review》2019,52(2):200-211

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Nejat Anbarci  Richard Dutu  Ching‐Jen Sun 《International Economic Review》2019,60(1):447-472

In most macroeconomic models inflation tends to be harmful. In this article, we show that by simply changing the timing of production decisions by firms from “on demand” to “in advance,” some inflation can boost welfare as long as goods are sufficiently perishable. The main conclusion from this research is that by effectively hiding the strategic interaction between supply and demand, assuming production on demand is not without loss of generality.  相似文献   

How Do Crime Rates Affect Property Prices?     

Melek Cigdem‐Bayram  David Prentice 《The Economic record》2019,95(Z1):30-38

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Yongsung Chang  Sun‐Bin Kim  Kyooho Kwon  Richard Rogerson 《International Economic Review》2019,60(1):3-24

We study business cycle fluctuations in heterogeneous agent general equilibrium models featuring intensive and extensive margins of labor supply. A nonlinear mapping from time devoted to work to labor services generates operative extensive and intensive margins. Our model captures the salient features of the empirical distribution of hours worked, including how individuals transit within this distribution. We study how various specifications influence labor supply responses to aggregate technology shocks and find that abstracting from intensive margin adjustment can have large effects on the volatility of aggregate hours even if fluctuations along the intensive margin are small.  相似文献   

    

Tai‐Wei Hu  Neil Wallace 《International Economic Review》2019,60(4):1469-1487

Following ideas in Hume, monetary shocks are embedded in the Lagos‐Wright model in a new way: There are only nominal shocks accomplished by individual transfers that are sufficiently noisy so that realizations of those transfers do not permit the agents to deduce much about the aggregate realization. Assuming that the distribution of aggregate shocks is almost degenerate, aggregate output increases with the growth rate of the stock of money—our definition of the Phillips curve. This almost degeneracy assumption is far from being necessary; under some mild conditions, the Phillips curve result holds for a large class of distributions.  相似文献   

    

Kui Ou‐Yang 《Review of Income and Wealth》2019,65(3):657-674

A measure of social inequality is essentially a rational ordering over a space of social distributions. However, different measures, including the most popular ones, may provide very different rankings over the same set of typical distributions. We thus propose an axiomatic approach to inequality measurement mainly based on the Hammond principle, a natural generalization of the Pigou‐Dalton principle, attempting to clarify the true nature of social inequality: the rich get richer and the poor get poorer. Under the standard assumptions of anonymity and scale independence, we show that a social inequality ordering is the leximinimax measure if and only if it satisfies the first Hammond principle, and it is the leximaximin measure if and only if it satisfies the second Hammond principle.  相似文献   

    

David Austen‐Smith  Wioletta Dziuda  Brd Harstad  Antoine Loeper 《Theoretical Economics》2019,14(4):1483-1534

Why do rational politicians choose inefficient policy instruments? Environmental regulation, for example, often takes the form of technology standards and quotas even when cost‐effective Pigou taxes are available. To shed light on this puzzle, we present a stochastic game with multiple legislative veto players and show that inefficient policy instruments are politically easier to repeal than efficient instruments. Anticipating this, heterogeneous legislators agree more readily on an inefficient policy instrument. We describe when inefficient instruments are likely to be chosen, and predict that they are used more frequently in (moderately) polarized political environments and in volatile economic environments. We show conditions under which players strictly benefit from the availability of the inefficient instrument.  相似文献   

    

Jos Heleno Faro  Jean‐Philippe Lefort 《Theoretical Economics》2019,14(1):1-14

We characterize prior‐by‐prior Bayesian updating using a model proposed by Gilboa, Maccheroni, Marinacci, and Schmeidler (2010) that jointly considers objective and subjective rationality. These rationality concepts are subject to the Bewley unanimity rule and maxmin expected utility, respectively, with a common set of priors and the same utility over consequences. We use this setup with two preference relations to develop a novel rationale for full Bayesian updating of maxmin expected utility preferences.  相似文献   

    

Yiwei Dou  Ole‐Kristian Hope  Wayne B. Thomas  Youli Zou 《Journal of Business Finance & Accounting》2016,43(7-8):872-902

Using a large hand‐collected sample of all blockholders (ownership ≥ 5%) of S&P 1500 firms for the years 2002–2009, we first document significant individual blockholder effects on earnings management (accrual‐based earnings management, real earnings management, and restatements). This association is driven primarily by these large shareholders influencing rather than selecting firms’ financial reporting practices. Second, the market's reaction to earnings announcements suggests that investors recognize the heterogeneity in blockholders’ influence on earnings management. The results highlight the highly individualized effects of blockholders and a mechanism through which shareholders impact reported earnings.  相似文献   

    

John Becker‐Blease  Susan Elkinawy  Christopher Hoag  Mark Stater 《The Financial Review》2016,51(4):527-557

We estimate a hazard model of the probability of top corporate executives exiting their firms over the period 1996–2010. Our main findings are that: (1) female executives have greater likelihoods of exit than males, (2) the likelihood of exit increases with the independence of the board and decreases with the fraction of the board that is female and the average age of board members, and (3) a higher percentage of independent directors on the board lowers the probability of exit more for females than for males. Further, controlling for exit risk reduces the well‐documented compensation differential between men and women.  相似文献