Information on sellers and buyers characteristics: added value to explain price formation at primary fish markets in managed French scallop fisheries

The aim of this article is to explore, through a hedonic approach, the factors that might explain the price variability for the French-managed fishery of scallop at primary fish markets. In addition to factors classically identified in the current literature like intrinsic product characteristics or markets situation, the characteristics of operators are tested. The relationships of loyalty between sellers and buyers, and market assiduity are notably considered.     

Evidence of Stock Returns and Abnormal Trading Volume: A Threshold Quantile Regression Approach

This paper presents a capital asset pricing model‐based threshold quantile regression model with a generalized autoregressive conditional heteroscedastic specification to examine relations between excess stock returns and “abnormal trading volume”. We employ an adaptive Bayesian Markov chain Monte Carlo method with asymmetric Laplace distribution to study six daily Dow Jones Industrial stocks. The proposed model captures asymmetric risk through market beta and volume coefficients, which change discretely between regimes. Moreover, they are driven by market information and various quantile levels. This study finds that abnormal volume has significantly negative effects on excess stock returns under low quantile levels; however, there are significantly positive effects under high quantile levels. The evidence indicates that each market beta varies with different quantile levels, capturing different states of market conditions.     

Politically stable pay-as-you-go pension systems: When the social-insurance budget is too small in a democracy

The essay analyzes in an overlapping-generations model, to which extent a pay-as-you-go pension system will be the outcome of majority voting, given specific institutional set-ups. Clearly, the vote of an active person depends on his expectations about how the present decision (i.e., his contribution) is linked to the future (i.e., his benefits), when he will be retired. In the paper we employ the assumption of a basic social contract where each active voter's future benefits are positively related to his contributions. It is shown that in this framework a steady-state with a positive (though lower than optimal) level of the pension system exists, even if a new majority decision about the system takes place every period.