Earnings Non‐Synchronicity and Voluntary Disclosure

Earnings non‐synchronicity reflects the extent to which firm‐specific factors determine a firm's earnings. Prior research suggests that high earnings non‐synchronicity impedes corporate outsiders' ability to process information. This study examines the impact of earnings non‐synchronicity on managers' decisions to provide earnings forecasts. We propose that high earnings non‐synchronicity motivates managers to issue earnings forecasts to reduce information asymmetry between managers and investors and to preempt costly information acquisition by outsiders. Consistently, we find a positive relation between earnings non‐synchronicity and managers' propensity to issue earnings forecasts, particularly long‐horizon forecasts. This positive relation is weaker when earnings are easier to predict based on the firm's earnings history and is stronger when the firm has higher institutional ownership and greater analyst following. We also find that the market's reaction to management forecasts increases with earnings non‐synchronicity. Overall, the evidence suggests that managers voluntarily provide earnings forecasts to alleviate the adverse consequences of earnings non‐synchronicity. These findings provide a more complete picture about the impact of earnings non‐synchronicity on a firm's information environment, and highlight the effect of the nature of information asymmetry on voluntary disclosures.     

The impact of economic geography on wages: Disentangling the channels of influence

This paper evaluates the role of economic geography in explaining regional wages in China. It investigates the extent to which market proximity can explain the evolution of wages, and through which channels. We construct a complete indicator of market access at the provincial level from data on domestic and international trade flows; this is introduced in a simultaneous-equations system to identify the direct and indirect effect of market access on wages. The estimation results for 29 Chinese provinces over 1995–2002 suggest that access to sources of demand is indeed an important factor shaping regional wage dynamics in China. We investigate three channels through which market access might influence wages beside direct transport-cost savings: export performance, and human and physical capital accumulation. A fair share of benefits seems to come from enhanced export performance and greater accumulation of physical capital. The main source of influence of market access remains direct transport costs.     

Flood Risk and Salience: New Evidence from the Sunshine State

A growing literature finds evidence that flood risk salience varies over time, spiking directly following a flood and then falling off individuals' cognitive radar in the following years. In this article, we provide new evidence of salience exploiting a hurricane cluster impacting Florida that was preceded and followed by periods of unusual calm. Utilizing residential property sales across the state from 2002 through 2012, our main estimate finds a salience impact of ?8%, on average. The salience effect persists when we base estimation only on spatial variation in prices to limit confounding from other simultaneous changes due to shifting hedonic equilibria over time. These effects range from housing prices decreases of 5.4–12.3% depending on the year of sale. Understanding flood risk salience has important implications for flood insurance and disaster policy, the benefits transfer literature, and, more broadly, our understanding of natural disaster resilience. JEL Classification: Q51, Q54, R21     

On the Equivalence between the APV and the wacc Approach in a Growing Leveraged Firm

While in a steady state framework the choice between the wacc approach ( Modigliani‐Miller, 1963 ) and the adjusted present value (APV) approach ( Myers, 1974 ) is irrelevant since the two approaches provide the same result, however, in a growing firm context the wacc equation seems to be inconsistent with the APV result. In this paper we propose a simple model to evaluate the tax savings in a growing firm in order to show under which assumptions the two approaches lead to the same results. We demonstrate that the use of the wacc model in a steady‐growth scenario gives rise to some unusual assumptions with regard to the discount rates to be used in calculating tax shields. We show that the widely used wacc formula, if used, as it is in most cases, in a growth context, implies that a) debt tax shield related to already existing debt are discounted using k_d; b) debt tax shield related to new debt, due to company's growth, are discounted, according to a mixed procedure, using both k_u and k_d. We discuss the inconsistency of such a discounting procedure and the preferred features of the APV approach.     

Does a Switch of Budget Regimes Affect Investment and Managerial Discretion of State-Owned Enterprises? Evidence from Italian Firms

We investigate the investment decisions of Italian state-owned enterprises (SOEs) across budget constraint regimes and carry out a natural experiment that exploits a regime switch in 1987. Drawing on the theory of capital market imperfections, we apply an empirical framework for investment analysis to a panel of manufacturing SOEs in competitive industries. We identify parallels between SOEs and widely held, quoted companies afflicted by agency problems, managerial discretion, and overinvestment. We argue that, in the case of SOEs, the soft budget regime increases managerial discretion, facilitates collusion with vote-seeking politicians, and results in wasteful investment. Consistent with our predictions, we find that the regime switch disciplines SOE's investment behavior. Following a hardening of the budget constraint, managers lose discretion to indulge in collusion and overinvestment. J. Comp. Econ., June 2002 30(4), pp. 787–811. London School of Economics and Political Science, Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE, United Kingdom; and CERIS–CNR, Institute for Economic Research on Firms and Growth, National Research Council, Via Avogadro, 8, 10121 Turin, Italy. © 2002 Association for Comparative Economic Studies. Published by Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved.Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: E32, G31, G32, L32, M40.     

Sovereign Debt Capacity and the Distribution of Domestic Wealth: A Common Agency Model*

This paper proposes a stylized two‐period, two‐country model illustrating the role of distribution of domestic wealth in determining a country's level of access to international lending. We model sovereign debt redemption policy in a common agency framework. Within this framework, policy is the outcome of the interaction between government and local and foreign interest groups with conflicting preferences on debt repayment. Our main result is that in full lobby competition, when all interests are represented, the only equilibrium solution is repudiation and the consequent inability of government to access international capital markets. Conversely, when the ability to lobby depends on wealth, governments can access international credit up to a given maximum external debt capacity, determined by the skew in the distribution of domestic wealth.     

Tracking Agricultural Economics Professionals

In 1998, a survey of the American Agricultural Economics Association was conducted by the Committee on Women in Agricultural Economics. The survey was the first in an ongoing tracking system, funded by the American Agricultural Economics Association Foundation, designed to track the progress of agricultural economics professionals over time, examine factors that influence their professional development, and investigate changes over time in the composition of the profession and issues influencing change. This study provides the background and objectives of the tracking system, the survey procedure, and basic demographics of the American Agricultural Economics Association and survey respondents.     

Sovereign debt disputes: A database on government coerciveness during debt crises

This paper measures “debt disputes” between governments and foreign private creditors in periods of sovereign debt crises. We construct an index of government coerciveness, consisting of 9 objective sub-indicators. Each of these sub-indicators captures unilateral government actions imposed on foreign banks and bondholders. The results provide the first systematic account of debt crises that goes beyond a binary categorization of default versus non-default. Overall, government behavior and rhetoric show a strong variability, ranging from highly confrontational to very smooth crisis resolution processes. In a preliminary analysis on the determinants of coercive behavior, we find political institutions to be significant, while economic and financial factors play a lesser role. These results open up an agenda for future research.