Purchasing professionals in state government: How ethical are they?

A survey of purchasing professionals in the Arizona state government was conducted to determine how familiar the buyers were with the Arizona laws regarding ethical conduct, what ethical standards they followed in purchasing, and what types of ethical dilemmas they faced in their work. The findings indicate that no serious ethical problems exist among the respondents. Employees in the centralized purchasing office seemed to act somewhat more ethically than buyers in peripheral offices, however. Laura B. Forker is a doctoral candidate in the Department of Purchasing, Transportation, and Operations at Arizona State University. She has published in the Journal of Purchasing and Materials Management and Comparative Economic Studies.     

Autocorrelation and masked heterogeneity in panel data models estimated by maximum likelihood

In a panel data model with random effects, when autocorrelation in the error is considered, (Gaussian) maximum likelihood estimation produces a dramatically large number of corner solutions: the variance of the random effect appears (incorrectly) to be zero, and a larger autocorrelation is (incorrectly) assigned to the idiosyncratic component. Thus heterogeneity could (incorrectly) be lost in applications to panel data with customarily available time dimension, even in a correctly specified model. The problem occurs in linear as well as nonlinear models. This article aims at pointing out how serious this problem can be (largely neglected by the panel data literature). A set of Monte Carlo experiments is conducted to highlight its relevance, and we explain this unpleasant effect showing that, along a direction, the expected log-likelihood is nearly flat.     

Investigating the limits of competitive intelligence gathering: is mystery shopping ethical?

In this article we take further the debate on the ethics of competitive intelligence gathering, which until now has been very limited. Drawing on empirical research from a mobile telephone company in the United Kingdom, we present the case that while mystery shopping is not the worst activity in which an organization might be involved, it is basically unethical. Mystery shopping involves deception and the obtaining of competitive information under false pretences. Common arguments are that 'everyone is doing it' and that the information is in the public domain. Neither of these points convincingly justifies the requirement for an employer to ask an employee to lie and deceive others on behalf of the company. The use of students and those in low power positions in the organization is a further concern.     

What is the role of legal systems in financial intermediation? Theory and evidence

We develop a theory’ and empirical test of how the legal system affects the relationship between venture capitalists and entrepreneurs. The theory uses a double moral hazard framework to show how optimal contracts and investor actions depend on the quality of the legal system. The empirical evidence is based on a sample of European venture capital deals. The main results are that with better legal protection, investors give more non-contractible support and demand more downside protection. These predictions are supported by the empirical analysis. Using a new empirical approach of comparing two sets of fixed-effect regressions, we also find that the investor’s legal system is more important than that of the company in determining investor behavior.     

Food Stamp Benefits and Child Poverty

In 2000, 8.8 million children lived in households participating in the Food Stamp Program, making this assistance program a crucial component of the social safety net. Despite its importance, little research has examined food stamps' effect on children's overall well-being. Using the Current Population Survey from 1989 to 2001, we consider the impact of food stamps on three measures of poverty—the headcount, the poverty gap, and the squared poverty gap. We find that in comparison to the headcount measure, food stamp benefits lead to large reductions in the poverty gap and squared poverty gap measures.     

The conservative equal costs rule, the serial cost sharing rule and the pivotal mechanism: asymptotic welfare loss comparisons for the case of an excludable public project

We examine the asymptotic behavior of two strategyproof mechanisms discussed by Moulin for public goods – the conservative equal costs rule (CER) and the serial cost sharing rule (SCSR) – and compare their performance to that of the pivotal mechanism (PM) from the Clarke–Groves family. Allowing the individuals’ valuations for an excludable public project to be random variables, we show under very general assumptions that expected welfare loss generated by the CER, as the size of the population increases, becomes arbitrarily large. However, all moments of the SCSR’s random welfare loss asymptotically converge to zero. The PM does better than the SCSR, with its welfare loss converging even more rapidly to zero.