Estimating global bank network connectedness

We use LASSO methods to shrink, select, and estimate the high‐dimensional network linking the publicly traded subset of the world's top 150 banks, 2003–2014. We characterize static network connectedness using full‐sample estimation and dynamic network connectedness using rolling‐window estimation. Statically, we find that global bank equity connectedness has a strong geographic component, whereas country sovereign bond connectedness does not. Dynamically, we find that equity connectedness increases during crises, with clear peaks during the Great Financial Crisis and each wave of the subsequent European Debt Crisis, and with movements coming mostly from changes in cross‐country as opposed to within‐country bank linkages.     

Discretionary Accruals and Auditor Behaviour in Code-Law Contexts: An Application to Failing Spanish Firms

This study examines the relationship between earnings management and auditor behaviour in the pre-bankrupt client segment of the Spanish audit market. As proxies for auditor behaviour, we use type of audit firm (Big N/non-Big N) and type of audit report. In contrast to the USA, audit reports in Spain often include modifications other than a going-concern opinion. This allows us to study the relationship in more detail than is possible with US data. The results of our study show that discretionary accruals are negatively related to going-concern opinions but are positively related to reports modified for reasons other than going-concern problems. However, unlike Butler et al. (Journal of Accounting and Economics, 37, pp. 139–165, 2004) the negative relationship is explained not by liquidity survival tactics but by auditor conservatism. We find this conservatism not only in the value of discretionary accruals but also in the qualifications that accompany a going concern. In these cases GAAP violations have a much greater income effect and a stronger relationship with the reversal of manipulation accumulated over the years than with the manipulation introduced during the last year. Finally, our results suggest that Big N differentiation in a code-law country is context-specific and depends on the business risk parameter of the ‘audit risk model’. In particular, for high-risk firms, Big N auditors show a significantly lower level of discretionary accruals and a greater propensity to issue a going-concern opinion.     

A regularity theory of causality for the social sciences

Quality & Quantity - This article discusses a regularity theory of causality (RTC) for the social sciences. With RTC, causality is a relationship between X and Y characterized by three...     

The effect of economic policy uncertainty on investor information asymmetry and management disclosures

Investor uncertainty about firm value drives investors’ information collection and trading activities, as well as managers’ disclosure choices. This study examines an important source of uncertainty that likely cannot be influenced by most managers and investors: uncertainty about government economic policy. We find that this uncertainty is associated with increased bid-ask spreads and decreased stock price reactions to earnings surprises. Managers respond to this uncertainty by increasing their voluntary disclosures, but these disclosures only partly mitigate the bid-ask spread increase. We conclude that government economic policy uncertainty is an important component of firms’ information environments and managers’ voluntary disclosure decisions.     

Performance Reporting under Fair Value Accounting

Abstract

This paper compares performance measurement under fair value accounting vs. U.S. GAAP accounting. As illustrated in the paper, the main difference between fair value accounting and U.S. GAAP accounting lies in the treatment of gains and losses on both assets and liabilities. Fair value accounting would report all gains and losses on both assets and liabilities in the period in which they arise. U.S. GAAP on the other hand, recognizes gains and losses over the life of the block of business (or at the time of a transaction). When net gains and losses on assets and liabilities are immaterial, the pattern of earnings under both systems can be quite similar. However, If a company is generating significant gains or losses on its net book of business (such as in the case of an asset/liability mismatch), fair value accounting will reveal this much sooner than U.S. GAAP. When the full impact of its actions (including gains and losses) is reported in the current period, management is in a better position to understand how the value of the company is changing and adjust its decisions accordingly. This is one of the main reasons for moving to a fair value system and is expected to be a major benefit if fair value accounting is ultimately adopted.     

Motives for sharing in social networks

What motivates people in rural villages to share? We first elicit a baseline level of sharing using a standard, anonymous dictator game. Then using variants of the dictator game that allow for either revealing the dictator's identity or allowing the dictator to choose the recipient, we attribute variation in sharing to three different motives. The first of these, directed altruism, is related to preferences, while the remaining two are incentive-related (sanctions and reciprocity). We observe high average levels of sharing in our baseline treatment, while variation across individuals depends importantly on the incentive-related motives. Finally, variation in measured reciprocity within the experiment predicts observed ‘real-world’ gift-giving, while other motives measured in the experiment do not predict behavior outside the experiment.     

Does One Size Fit All? A currency union with asymmetric transmissions and a stability pact

The theory of optimal currency areas stresses that a single currency zone should have symmetry across shocks and structures. What happens if the monetary transmission mechanisms differ so that a common monetary policy has different effects in different places? Using a fully specified econometric model, we find that such asymmetries are likely to destabilise the business cycle and put countries out of phase with each other in a way that cannot be corrected by deficit-constrained national fiscal policies. Market discipline, however, could achieve this. Hence, the question is whether the markets would create sufficient discipline on their own.     

MORE THAN A FEELING: CONFIDENCE,UNCERTAINTY, AND MACROECONOMIC FLUCTUATIONS

Economists, observers, and policy-makers often emphasize the role of sentiment as a potential driver of the business cycle. In this paper, we provide three contributions to this debate. First, we give an overview of the recent literature on the nexus between sentiment (considering both confidence and uncertainty) and economic activity. Second, we review existing empirical measures of sentiment, in particular consumer confidence, stock market volatility (SMV) and Economic Policy Uncertainty (EPU), on monthly data for 27 countries, 1985–2016. Third, we identify some new stylized facts based on international evidence. While different measures are surprisingly lowly correlated on average in each country, they are typically highly positively correlated across countries, suggesting the existence of a global factor or sizeable international spillovers of sentiment. Consumer confidence has the closest co-movement with economic and financial variables, and most of the correlations are contemporaneous or forward-looking, consistent with the view that economic sentiment is indeed a driver of activity.     

The Relation between Stakeholder Management,Firm Value,and CEO Compensation: A Test of Enlightened Value Maximization

Whether firms pursue shareholder value maximization or the maximization of stakeholder welfare is a controversial issue whose outcomes seem irreconcilable. We propose that firms are likely to compensate their executives for pursuing the firm's goal be it shareholder value maximization or the maximization of stakeholder welfare. In this paper, we examine the correlation between firm value, stakeholder management, and compensation. We find that stakeholder management is positively related to firm value. However, firms do not compensate managers for having good relationships with its stakeholders. These results do not support stakeholder theory. We also find an endogenous association between compensation and firm value. Our results are consistent with Jensen's (2001) enlightened value maximization theory. Managers are compensated for achieving the firm's ultimate goal, value maximization. However, managers optimize interaction with stakeholders to accomplish this objective.