Corporate Giving Behavior and Decision-Maker Social Consciousness

This paper investigates why some companies give to charity and others do not. The study uncovers a strong relationship between the personal attitudes of the charitable decision maker and the firm's giving behavior. This relationship indicates that the human element of personal attitudes may interact and play a very important role in a firm's decision to become involved with philanthropic activities. The study also shows that firms who have a history of giving to charity cite altruistic motives for their behavior. On the other hand, firms that do not give to charity tend to use business reasons to explain their non-involvement.     

Experimental tests of the Somatic Marker hypothesis

Damasio's [Descarte's Error: Emotion, Rationality and the Human Brain. Putnam (Grosset Books), New York, 1994] Somatic Marker hypothesis posits that emotion-generated mental markers influence our decisions and, in particular, tend to curb inherent tendencies to seek risk, to be impatient and to be callous in social situations. Ventromedial (VM) prefrontal cortex damage interferes with this marking process, resulting in risk seeking behavior, impatience and socially inappropriate behavior. In the present study, we present 27 normal controls and 17 patients with prefrontal cortex lesions with batteries of questions designed to probe their attitudes toward risk, intertemporal preferences and behavior in social contexts. The results demonstrate that VM patients are no more risk seeking, impatient, or prone to behavior in socially inappropriate manners than normal subjects. Indeed, we find no significant differences of any sort between the two groups of subjects on any the dimensions investigated. We discuss why VM cortex damage in humans appears to influence decisions in certain circumstances but not in others.     

On dynamic investment strategies

This paper presents a new approach for analyzing dynamic investment strategies. Previous studies have obtained explicit results by restricting utility functions to a few specific forms; not surprisingly, the resultant dynamic strategies have exhibited a very limited range of behavior. In contrast, we examine what might be called the inverse problem: given any specific dynamic strategy, can we characterize the results of following it through time? More precisely, can we determine whether it is self-financing, yields path-independent returns, and is consistent with optimal behavior for some expected utility maximizing investor? We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for a dynamic strategy to satisfy each of these properties.     

Project Turis—coastal tourism development in Southern Brazil

Dr Nicholls undertook field research at a number of the Brazilian Atlantic Ocean tourist destinations in December 1981–January 1982. The main focus of the research was on the development of coastal tourism within Project Turis—a major state-funded tourism development project. This article reports on the progress of the project, and was prepared for delivery at the annual meeting of the Travel and Tourism Research Association in Miami, FL, USA, 13–16 June 1982.     

Can the Trade-off Theory Explain Debt Structure?

We examine the optimal mixture and priority structure of bankand market debt using a trade-off model in which banks havethe unique ability to renegotiate outside formal bankruptcy.Flexible bank debt offers a superior trade-off between tax shieldsand bankruptcy costs. Ease of renegotiation limits bank debtcapacity, however. Optimal debt structure hinges upon whichparty has bargaining power in private workouts. Weak firms havehigh bank debt capacity and utilize bank debt exclusively. Strongfirms lever up to their (lower) bank debt capacity, augmentwith market debt, and place the bank senior. Therefore, thetrade-off theory offers an explanation for: (i) why young/smallfirms use bank debt exclusively; (ii) why large/mature firmsemploy mixed debt financing; and (iii) why bank debt is senior.The trade-off theory also generates predictions consistent withinternational evidence. In countries in which the bankruptcyregime entails soft (tough) enforcement of contractual priority,bank debt capacity is low (high), implying greater (less) relianceon market debt.