The Effects of Public Ownership and Regulatory Independence on Regulatory Outcomes

We examine the effects of public ownership and regulatory agency independence on regulatory outcomes in EU telecommunications. Specifically, we study regulated interconnect rates paid by entrants to incumbents. We find that public ownership of the incumbent positively affects these interconnect rates, and suggest that governments influence regulatory outcomes in favor of incumbents in which they are substantially invested. However, we also find that the presence of institutional features enhancing regulatory independence from the government mitigates this effect. In order to study regulatory independence, we introduce a new cross-country time-series database—the European Union Regulatory Institutions (EURI) Database. This database describes the development of institutions bearing on regulatory independence and quality in telecommunications in the 15 founding EU member states from 1997 to 2003 *We thank Laurent Pipitone for superb research assistance. Geoff Edwards thanks the Sasakawa Foundation and the Institute of Management, Innovation and Organization at the Haas School of Business for generous financial assistance, and London Business School for non-financial support. Leonard Waverman thanks the Global Communications Consortium for support     

Neighborhood price externalities of foreclosure rehabilitation: an examination of the Neighborhood Stabilization Program

The federally funded, HUD-administered Neighborhood Stabilization Program (NSP) was enacted in the wake of the financial recession to mitigate the underlying adverse neighborhood effects associated with foreclosed properties. We examined the neighborhood price impacts of NSP-funded foreclosure rehabilitation undertaken by Habitat for Humanity in Dallas County, Texas, using a difference-in-difference framework. Foreclosure rehabilitation projects in Dallas County produced an average 15% increase in neighborhood home prices that sold up to 30 months after the rehabilitated property sale and within 0.1 miles of the rehabilitated property. Foreclosure rehabilitation that involved significant exterior repairs was associated with the largest estimated effect sizes. Results suggest that NSP funding in Dallas County effectively targeted homes that had the potential to have the most severe neighborhood impacts and that rehabilitation was an effective means of reversing neighborhood price externalities associated with blighted foreclosed properties.     

A comparative analysis of multiattribute attitude models

In the consumer behavior context, multiattribute attitude models used to predict consumer choice in multiple criteria decision making situations have produced mixed results. Prediction of consumer behavior from attitudes, consequently, has been highly debated in recent years with researchers using beliefs-only, full, and extended multiattribute attitude models. The research underlying this paper was designed to compare the predictive superiority of the beliefs-only model, the full multiattribute attitude model, and a new representation identified as the combined multiattribute/determinant attribute attitude model. Data concerning patronage of fast-food chains were collected from a student panel for seven weeks. Predictive superiority was determined by average adjusted R² using the patronage behavior dependent variable. All models were tested in aggregated and disaggregated form.     

Origins of regional divergence: economic growth in socialist Yugoslavia†

Relative to western Europe, we know very little about the determinants of economic growth at the regional level within socialist Europe. This is somewhat unusual, given that socialist policy-makers have put great emphasis on equitable regional development. This article analyses the regional patterns of growth and divergence in socialist Yugoslavia. New estimates of output and inputs are constructed, and an analysis of output growth, factor accumulation, structural modernization, and productivity is provided. Two novel empirical findings are uncovered. The first is that the sources of growth across the regions were fundamentally different. Total factor productivity was a much more important source of growth in the richer regions than it was in the poorer ones. The second finding is that the source of the regional income divergence lies in the failure of the less developed regions to converge towards the employment rates and total factor productivities of the more developed regions. These failures are interpreted, at least partially, as symptoms of the governing objective and the soft budget constraint of the labour-managed firms that operated in Yugoslavia. It is argued that Yugoslavia's development model was less suited to the pre-conditions that prevailed in the less developed parts of the country.     

REFLECTIONS ON MANAGEMENT AGREEMENTS FOR CONSERVATION OF EXMOOR MOORLAND

The impact of grant aid schemes and modern farm technology is considered in relation to the Study of Exmoor carried out by Lord Porchester. The development in the last three years of an administrative system based on voluntary notification using a moorland map, policies for protection of areas of special landscape value and financial guidelines for compensation is described. The conservation objectives behind management agreements are discussed and present practices with examples are illustrated. Future hazards facing successful use of management agreements are discussed with special reference to problems of funding, misuse of the system and the philosophy of progressive farming.     

ACTION,AGENCIES, ADVOCACY,AND ANALYSTS1

Generally speaking, human beings dislike admitting flaws in their actions. The complexities of regional development provide ample opportunity for flawed action. As public intervention in the process of economic and social development is on the upswing, serious attention must be paid to evaluations in order to minimize flaws in the programs. This paper examines three constraints to evaluation: friction generated by data collection; absence of precise goals and modus operandi coupled with continuous program modification; and role conflict within the evaluation team. The difficulties with data lie in the definition of regional boundaries and hostility of the people resulting from normlessness and government involvement. Regional survey research centers are suggested to mitigate the problem. The second conistraint exists because of the sensitivity of program administrators to critical evaluation. They react with vague, general, and illusory goals, discounting and negation of results, and the concept of a pilot study from which “lessons learned always justify a program.” Long-run conditioning and public relations may be the only effective policies to relieve this constraint. The third constraint of role conflict has always existed but is particularly important when changes in programs derive from their evaluations. The solution is for our professions to insist on full public disclosure of results coupled with triyearly turnover of evaluation personnel. De façon générale, les humains détestent avouer leurs fautes. he dévelop-peraent régional étant trés complexe, beaucoup ?actions enterprises pourront s'avérer défectueuses ou néfastes. intervention publique dans le processus de développement économique et social se faisant peu fréqtiente, une attention spéciale et constante doit être apportée aux évaluations visant. à minimiser les erreurs dans les programmes. Cet article eiamine trois contraintes propres à?évaluation: obstacles crées par la cueilette des données; absence de buts prés et de modus operandi joints à une modification continuelle du programme; et conflit de rôle dans ?équipe ?évaluation. Les difficultés avec les données sont liées à la délimitation des régions et à?hostilityé des gens résultant de ?absence compléte de normes et de ?ingérence gouvernementale dans la vie privée. Pour résoudre le probléme, on suggére des centres ?enquétes et de recherches régionaux. La seconde contrainte vient du fait que les administrateurs de programme sont sensibles à une évaluation critique. lis répondent avec des buts vagues, généraux et illusoires; Us ne nient pas les résultats mais n'acceptent pas le concept ?une étude pilote óu “Les resultats obtenus justifient toujours un plan ?amélioration.” Un conditionnement à long terme et des relations extérienres peuvent être les settles politiques efficaces pour parer à cette contrainte. La troisiéme, due au conflit de rôle, a toujours existé mais elle est particu-liérement importante quand les modifications de programme dérivent de leurs évaluations. La solution serait que les associations professionnelles insistent sur une divulgation compléte des réstultats au public ainsi qu'un renouueUement du personnel ?évaluation tous les trois ans.     

Currency devaluation and the Cooper paradox in the open-economy macro-disequilibrium model

Zusammenfassung Abwertung und das Cooper-Paradox im Modell einer offenen Volkswirtschaft mit Makro-Ungleichgewicht. - In diesem Aufsatz wird das Cooper-Paradox im Rahmen eines IS-LM-BT-Ungleichgewichtsmodells überprüft. Die Analyse wird dadurch angereichert, da der monet?re “spillover”-Effekt einer Abwertung integriert wird in das Modell einer offenen Volkswirtschaft mit Makro-Ungleichgewicht, in dem unechter Handel zum Ungleichgewichtspreis stattfinden kann. So k?nnen sich die “spillover”-Effekte in der gesamten Volkswirtschaft über die Marktverflechtung verbreiten. Es wird gezeigt, da\ unabh?ngig von der Marshall-Lerner Bedingung die heimische Volkswirtschaft schrumpfen wird, obwohl die Abwertung die Handelsbilanz verbessert (Cooper-Paradox). Au\erdem wird gezeigt, da\ dann, wenn die Marshall-Lerner-Bedingung erfüllt ist, die Abwertung sowohl zu einer Verschlechterung der Handelsbilanz als auch zu einer Expansion der heimischen Volkswirtschaft führen kann. Dieses Ergebnis widerspricht dem, was Cooper in den Entwicklungl?ndern mit einer Abwertung beobachtet hat.

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Resumen Devaluación monetaria y la paradoja de Cooper en un modelo macroeconómico de desequilibrio de una economía abierta. - En este trabajo se estudia la paradoja de Cooper dentro del contexto de un modelo IS-LM-BT de desequilibrio de ?spillover? separable. Se enriquece el análisis mediante la integración del efecto ?spillover? monetario de una devaluación al modelo macroeconómico de desequilibrio de una economía abierta, en el cual se permite el comercio a precio de desequilibrio; el efecto ?spillover? resultante se propaga a toda la economía atraves de los eslabonamientos entre los mercados. Se demuestra que la economía nacional se contrae, a pesar de que la devaluatión favorece al balance comercial (paradoja de Cooper), independientemente de que se satisfaga o no la condición de Marshall y Lerner. Asimismo, se muestra que si se satisface la condición de Marshall y Lerner la devaluación puede dar lugar tanto a una deteriorización del balance comercial como a una expansión de la economía national. Este resultado contrasta con lo observado por Cooper en países en desarrollo que han devaluado.

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Résumé Dévaluation et le Cooper-paradoxe dans un modèle macro-déséquilibre d’une économie ouverte. - Dans cet article l’auteur examine le paradoxe de Cooper en cadre d’un modèle IE-LM-BT. L’analyse est enrichie par l’intégration de l’effet monétaire ?spillover? d’une dévaluation dans un modèle macro-déséquilibre d’une économie ouverte dans lequel le commerce faux peut se passer en prix déséquilibre. C’est pourquoi les effets de ?spillover? peuvent propager dans l’économie entière par les relations d’intermarché. Il est démontré qu’indépendant de la condition de Marshall-Lerner l’économie locale se contracte même si la dévaluation améliore la balance commerciale (le paradoxe de Cooper). Il est aussi démontré que si la condition de Marshall-Lerner est satisfaite une dévaluation peut détériorer la balance commerciale et stimuler l’économie locale en même temps. Ce résultat est contraire à l’expérience de Cooper qui a observé les pays en voie de développement qui dévaluaient leurs monnaies.