ARDA AND POVERTY — LESSONS IN DEVELOPMENTAL PLANNING*

Rapid changes in the social and economic environment are creating problems which require new forms of government intervention. This paper explores the reason for this, the needs and the difficulties within our present institutional structure and based on experience to date in implementing the ARDA and FRED legislation, outlines a possible process through which government intervention in these new areas can be made more effective. ARDA ET LA PAUVRETÉ— LEÇONS DANS LA PLANIFICATION ET l'ÉVOLUTION: La rapidité des changements dans le milieu social et économique créent des problèmes qui demandent une nouvelle formule dans l'intervention gouvernementale. Cette dissertation explore les raisons pour cela, les besoins et les difficultés au sein, de notre présente structure et en se baseant sur l'expérience à date dans la législation ARDA et FRED, souligne une méthode possible à trovers lequel, une intervention gouvernementale dans ces nouvelles régions pourrait être plus efficace.     

Undesirable competition

We show that the entry of private profit-maximising firms makes the consumers worse off compared to having a nationalised monopoly. Such entry increases the nationalised firm’s profit, industry profit, and social welfare, at the expense of the consumers. Our result is important for competition policy.     

Domestic entry, optimum-welfare and maximum-revenue tariffs

In this paper, we examine the ranking of the maximum-revenue tariff and the optimum-welfare tariff under a linear Cournot oligopoly model without and with free entry of domestic firms. We demonstrate that in a regulated entry oligopoly with asymmetric costs, when the marginal cost of the domestic firms exceeds a critical value, the maximum-revenue tariff is higher than the optimum-welfare tariff. We then show that under free entry of domestic firms with asymmetric costs, when the fixed cost gets larger and the domestic firms become fewer, the difference between the optimum-welfare tariff and the maximum-revenue tariff becomes larger.     

Origins of regional divergence: economic growth in socialist Yugoslavia†

Relative to western Europe, we know very little about the determinants of economic growth at the regional level within socialist Europe. This is somewhat unusual, given that socialist policy-makers have put great emphasis on equitable regional development. This article analyses the regional patterns of growth and divergence in socialist Yugoslavia. New estimates of output and inputs are constructed, and an analysis of output growth, factor accumulation, structural modernization, and productivity is provided. Two novel empirical findings are uncovered. The first is that the sources of growth across the regions were fundamentally different. Total factor productivity was a much more important source of growth in the richer regions than it was in the poorer ones. The second finding is that the source of the regional income divergence lies in the failure of the less developed regions to converge towards the employment rates and total factor productivities of the more developed regions. These failures are interpreted, at least partially, as symptoms of the governing objective and the soft budget constraint of the labour-managed firms that operated in Yugoslavia. It is argued that Yugoslavia's development model was less suited to the pre-conditions that prevailed in the less developed parts of the country.     

Cover's universal portfolio,stochastic portfolio theory,and the numéraire portfolio

Cover's celebrated theorem states that the long‐run yield of a properly chosen “universal” portfolio is almost as good as that of the best retrospectively chosen constant rebalanced portfolio. The “universality” refers to the fact that this result is model‐free, that is, not dependent on an underlying stochastic process. We extend Cover's theorem to the setting of stochastic portfolio theory: the market portfolio is taken as the numéraire, and the rebalancing rule need not be constant anymore but may depend on the current state of the stock market. By fixing a stochastic model of the stock market this model‐free result is complemented by a comparison with the numéraire portfolio. Roughly speaking, under appropriate assumptions the asymptotic growth rate coincides for the three approaches mentioned in the title of this paper. We present results in both discrete and continuous time.     

The Theory of Planned Behavior in the Context of a Food and Drink Event: A Case Study

The present case study seeks to contribute to the culinary event management literature, investigating key motivators among participants to the Derbyshire Food and Drink Fair, United Kingdom. A questionnaire, which was partly based on predictors related to the theory of planned behavior was designed and distributed; 308 usable responses were collected. The validity and impact of attitude toward the behavior, perceived behavioral control, and subjective norms on behavioral intention was confirmed. Additionally, several motivators, such as “commitment and perceived importance,” “consumption and entertainment,” “attendance and discovery,” and “joining others” were identified as key factors. Finally, statistically significant differences were noticed among various participating groups, namely, in terms of age, gender, or distance traveled to the event. The findings have important implications for event managers and organizers, in terms of promotion, and addressing the needs and wants of various segments of food festival attendees.     

Indirect taxation with shadow cost of public funds in mixed oligopoly

We adopt a mixed oligopoly model, where a state-owned welfare-maximizing public firm competes with a profit-maximizing private firm, to compare the welfare effects of the specific and ad valorem tax in the presence of the shadow cost of public funds. Following the assumption of most previous literature that total output is constant under specific and ad valorem taxation, we find that, when the shadow cost of public funds exists, the tax policy must be adjusted according to the privatization level of the public firm; if the privatization level is low (medium, high), the government needs to adopt ad valorem (specific, ad valorem) tax. Moreover, the private firm will earn a higher (lower) profit under ad valorem tax than under specific tax, if the public firm is not fully privatized and the shadow cost of public funds is high (low).     

Instructional Manipulation Checks: A longitudinal analysis with implications for MTurk

Instructional Manipulation Checks (IMCs) assess respondent behavior by, for example, asking participants not to answer a trick question. We find IMCs can be used to detect problematic response behavior in longitudinal surveys. This is important because a Latent Class Analysis based on IMC-failure in the two reported studies reveals that between 9% and 12% of respondents can be labelled Inattentive Stayers at the first survey-wave and between 13% and 17% at the third wave. The tendency of Inattentive Stayers to remain in the panel is particularly relevant for online panel services such as MTurk, with workers participating in many surveys over longer time-periods. We find IMC-failure to be mitigated by a warning to respondents that their attention will be checked early in the survey, but not by repeated exposure to IMCs, or a timer leaving questions on the screen longer. Respondent personality also plays a role in IMC-failure, which implies persistency of undesirable respondent behavior.     

Corporate political strategies and firm performance: indications of firm‐specific benefits from personal service in the U.S. government

Firms employ a variety of political strategies (e.g., lobbying, contributions) in an attempt to gain influence or access to the public policy process. A variety of benefits may accrue to firms that are successful in creating a linkage with the government: information, access, influence, reduced uncertainty and transaction costs, etc. However, the direct benefits of such strategies are difficult to observe. One political strategy is studied here—personal service (having a firm representative serve in a political capacity). Event‐study methodology results show that such linkages with the government positively affect firm value. These findings indicate that firm‐specific benefits may result from political strategies. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.