Developing Countries as Plaintiffs and Defendants in GATT/WTO Trade Disputes

Developing countries have been increasing their participation in the formal institutions and proceedings of the multilateral trading system. A prominent example is their more frequent involvement as defendants and plaintiffs in GATT/WTO trade disputes. This paper provides an initial economic appraisal of developing country performance in the GATT/WTO dispute settlement system. We measure the economic resolution of these disputes through trade liberalisation gains, and our results suggest that developing country plaintiffs have had more success under WTO disputes than was the case under the GATT. We also document evidence on potential determinants of this success: the capacity for plaintiffs to make credible retaliatory threats and the guilty determinations by GATT/WTO panels. Finally, there is also some evidence that developing countries have recognised the importance of retaliatory threats and have responded by changing their pattern of dispute initiation under the WTO to better take advantage of the instances in which they have sufficient leverage to threaten retaliation and induce compliance with GATT/WTO obligations.     

Polynomial approximations in cross-sectional models

The time-series distributed lag techniques of econometrics can be usefully applied to cross-sectional, spatial and cross-section time-series situations. The application is perfectly natural in cross-section, time-series models when regression coefficients evolve systematically as the cross-section grouping variable changes. The evolution of such coefficients lends itself to polynomial approximation or more general smoothing restrictions. These ideas are not new, Gersovitz and McKinnon (1978) and Trivedi and Lee (1981) providing two of the earliest applications of cross-equation smoothing techniques. However, their applications were in the context of coefficient variation due to seasonal changes and this may account for the non-diffusion of these techniques. The approach here is illustrated in the context of age-specific household formation equations based on census data, using Almon polynomials when the regression coefficients vary systematically by age group. A second application is provided, using spatial data, explaining the incidence of crime, by region; using polynomial and geometric smoothing to model distance declining regional effects.     

Cognitive processing models in performance appraisal: evidence from the Malaysian education system

The effectiveness of the decision‐making process in appraisal has been of long‐standing interest. This paper reports the results of research exploring the extent to which those undertaking appraisals apply systematic processes to their decision‐making, represented in terms of the cognitive processing models applied by appraisers. Results of 22 cognitive mapping interviews exploring appraisal practice, undertaken with appraisers in the Malaysian education system, are described. The resultant cognitive maps have been explored for what they tell us about the cognitive processing models underlying appraisers' decision‐making. Results suggest that the practice of appraisal evidenced in interviews demonstrates the presence of cognitive processing that reflects theoretical cognitive processing models, although some differences are observed between less experienced and experienced appraisers' models. Implications from the interview findings for the practice of appraisal are identified.     

Exact Ruin Probabilities and the Evaluation of Program Trading On Financial Markets

For a compound Poisson process with negative drift and jump distribution consisting of a mixture of exponentials on [0) and on (-, 0), an exact expression is derived for the probability of hitting the level c, c > 0. the problem is motivated by modeling the returns from trading on financial markets.     

THE EFFECTS OF THE INSIDER TRADING SANCTIONS ACT OF 1984: THE CASE OF SEASONED EQUITY OFFERINGS

Previous empirical research indicates that corporate insiders tend to increase (decrease) their shareholdings before events that increase (decrease) firm value. More recent evidence suggests, however, that passage of the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984 (ITSA) may have deterred this behavior. Our results indicate that before passage of the ITSA, insiders exploited their access to nonpublic information by selling shares before the announcement of equity issues. However, after passage of the ITSA insiders no longer displayed this behavior. We conclude the ITSA has a deterrent effect, which is more heavily concentrated on insiders at the highest level of the firm who are most visible to regulators and other market participants.     

Are differences in firm size transitory or permanent?

An Erratum for this article has been published in Journal of Applied Econometrics 18(2) 2003, 249 Previous empirical work on corporate growth rates using cross‐section or short‐panel econometric techniques suggests that growth rates are random but that some degree of mean reversion exists. This means that size differences between firms are transitory. Another, more natural way to explore the long‐run distribution of firm sizes is to examine data on the growth of particular firms over long periods of time. Using a sample of 147 UK firms observed continually for more than 30 years, our conclusions are that growth rates are highly variable over time and that differences in growth rates between firms do not persist for very long. Further, firms show no tendency to converge to either a common size or to a pattern of stable size differences over time. These results are compared and contrasted with standard approaches that suggest that firms reach and maintain stable positions in a skewed size distribution. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Sustaining Collusion in Growing Markets

The impact of demand growth on the collusion possibilities is investigated in a Cournot supergame where market growth may trigger future entry and the collusive agreement is enforced by the most profitable ‘grim trigger strategies’ available. It is shown that even in situations where perfect collusion can be sustained after entry, coping with a potential entrant in a market which is growing over time may completely undermine any pre‐entry collusive plans of the incumbent firms. This is because, before entry, a deviation and the following punishment phase may become more attractive thanks to their additional effect in terms of delaying entry.     

Towards a complete real-time electricity market design

The general design for the real-time electricity market presented in this paper optimizes and prices both real and reactive power simultaneously in an AC setting, where all assets—generation, load and transmission—are allowed to bid and are financially settled at the locational price times energy consumed or produced. The result is that transmission lines are compensated for both capacity and admittance, providing incentives for efficient operation of transmission-related assets such as FACTS devices, if price-taking behavior is assumed. Losses are incorporated into the design and become an operating cost for transmission. The market design is shown to be revenue neutral and, under some assumptions, nonconfiscatory.