The New Economy is dead,long live the information economy

The arrival of the 2001–2003 recession caused many to suppose that the so-called “New Economy” was now defunct. This article addresses a number of related issues, including the question of the durability and viability of business cycles in the face of the technological developments of the information age. It asks what went wrong with the New Economy and examines its characteristics as well as its remaining possibilities and prospects for the future. Finally, it considers the spread of the Information Economy to Europe, especially to Germany, the country that one might expect to be the leading European player, but which is not at present actually a strong competitor for that role.     

Globalization frustrated: The case of white goods

This paper challenges the common view that mature industries are always ripe for global strategies. Based on data from the European Domestic Appliance industry, this paper shows how changing economic conditions can diminish the value of global strategies. Critical in these shifts were simultaneous rises in demand for variety (that eroded the benefits of scale and continental market share) and decreases in manufacturing scale (that permitted new supply options), which reduced the extent of the strategic market to national dimensions. They added complexity that decreased the profitability of the global players and increased that of national strategies. The fluctuating fortunes of leading firms are shown to have been caused primarily by choices of strategy, not by national factor costs.     

Changes in the EC licensing environment and their effect on licensing as a strategy for Europe 1992

The further integration of the European Community (EC) is intended to create one large, integrated market and a semistandardized business environment throughout the member countries. This study investigates the current status of the technology licensing environment in the EC and analyzes the returns that a licensor can achieve by locating a licensee in each of the EC countries. This analysis may be important to any firm which has chosen a licensing strategy as its approach to operating in the EC, because locational choice of licensee can affect a licensor's financial returns.     

Approximating unanimity orderings: An application to Lorenz dominance

Stochastic dominance and Lorenz dominance are examples of orderings which require unanimous agreement among an infinite set of indices. This paper considers various subsets of inequality measures that respect Lorenz dominance, and assesses the extent to which a small number of indices can reproduce the Lorenz ordering. Using income data for 80 countries, our results suggest that Lorenz dominance can be predicted with 99% accuracy using just 3 or 4 inequality measures, as long as two of them focus on the extreme upper and lower tails of the distribution. In contrast, confining attention to the index families and parameter ranges normally considered may fail to detect the majority of occasions when Lorenz curves intersect. These results lead us to question the faith placed in procedures based on a finite set of inequality indices, and to suggest that similar lessons will apply to other types of unanimity orderings.     

Information Disclosure to Employees and Rational Expectations: a Game-Theoretical Perspective: a Comment

In this comment we identify the key features of the Frantz and Walker (1997) game theoretic model that drive the non-disclosure equilibrium result in their paper. We argue that, although technically correct, their model fails to capture certain aspects of real-world wage bargaining that will be important in determining optimal disclosure strategies in practice. However, Frantz and Walker's paper illustrates the potential of analytical techniques to contribute to the employee disclosure debate.     

Decentralization and Pay Reform in Central Government: a Study of Three Countries

Over the past decade central governments of the UK, Sweden and Australia have been engaged in significant reforms in the way they pay their employees. These reforms have generally taken the form of the decentralization of pay bargaining and the individualization of pay. This paper details the policies that have been implemented in central government in these countries and presents some preliminary results on the effects of these. While the actual implementation has varied quite substantially across the countries and the analysis of the outcomes must be regarded as preliminary, there is some evidence that the reforms have led to an increase in earnings dispersion.