Component efficient solutions in line-graph games with applications

Recently, applications of cooperative game theory to economic allocation problems have gained popularity. We investigate a class of cooperative games that generalizes some economic applications with a similar structure. These are the so-called line-graph games being cooperative TU-games in which the players are linearly ordered. Examples of situations that can be modeled like this are sequencing situations and water distribution problems. We define four properties with respect to deleting edges that each selects a unique component efficient solution on the class of line-graph games. We interpret these solutions and properties in terms of dividend distributions, and apply them to economic situations. This research has been done while the third author was visiting Tinbergen Institute at the Free University, Amsterdam. The research is part of the Research Programme “Strategic and Cooperative Decision Making” at the Department of Econometrics. Financial support from the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO) in the framework of the Russian-Dutch programme for scientific cooperation, is gratefully acknowledged. The third author also appreciates partial financial support from the Russian Leading Scientific Schools Fund (grant 80.2003.6) and Russian Humanitarian Scientific Fund (grant 02-02-00189a). We thank three anonymous referees for their valuable comments.     

Community-Based Tradable Permits for Localized Pollution

This paper considers the assignment of tradable permits—representing property rights of an environmental good—to community members who are harmed by pollution generated by firms. These community members can in turn sell permits to polluters according to their personal preferences. For a special case with a sole household, market transactions between the household and polluters achieve an efficient pollution level. However, for a group of households, the decentralized market solution fails to yield social efficiency because of competitive consumption of the environmental goods. We design a revenue-sharing mechanism akin to unitization, under which market transactions also achieve efficient resource allocation. Importantly, in some cases, efficiency can be achieved even when regulators are ignorant of the private valuation of the environmental good.     

Policy Discrimination with and without Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility

Can the Pareto criterion guide policymakers who do not know the true model of the economy? If policymakers specify ex ante preferences for agents, then Pareto improvements from a distorted status quo are usually possible, and with more commodities than states, one can implement almost every Pareto optimum. Unlike the standard second welfare theorem, planners cannot dictate allocations: agents must trade. Unfortunately ex ante preferences impose interpersonal comparisons. If policymakers merely aim to maximize some social welfare function then optimal policies form an open set; hence small changes in the environment do not necessitate any policy response. Planners with symmetric information about agents can sometimes intervene without making interpersonal comparisons.     

Does a factor Phillips curve help? An evaluation of the predictive power for U.S. inflation

This article evaluates various models’ predictive power for U.S. inflation rate using a simulated out-of-sample forecasting framework. The starting point is the traditional unemployment Phillips curve. We show that a factor Phillips curve model is superior to the traditional Phillips curve, and its performance is comparable to other factor models. We find that a factor AR model is superior to the factor Phillips curve model, and is the best bivariate or factor model at longer horizons. Finally, we investigate a New Keynesian Phillips curve model, and find that its forecasting performance dominates all other models at the longer horizons.     

How does the design of international environmental agreements affect investment in environmentally-friendly technology?

In this paper, we investigate how the design of international environmental agreements (IEAs) affects the incentives for the private sector to invest in environmentally-friendly technology. The givens are a transboundary pollution problem involving two asymmetric countries in terms of benefits arising from global abatement. There is a single polluting firm in each country. We account for two types of IEAs: an agreement based on a uniform standard with transfers and an agreement based on differentiated standards without transfers. To carry out this study, we use a two-stage game where the private sector anticipates its irreversible investment given the expected level of abatement standards resulting from future negotiations. Our findings indicate that the implementation of the agreement based on a uniform standard with transfers may be preferable for the two countries, as it creates greater incentives for firms to invest in costly abatement technology. This result arises when this technology’s level of the sunk cost of investment is low. If this level is sufficiently high, the implementation of the same agreement is not beneficial to countries, because it takes away the incentive of each firm to invest in new abatement technology. Moreover, this agreement is not able to generate any positive gains for either country through cooperation, thus no country is motivated to cooperate.     

Environmental Policy and the International Diffusion of Cleaner Energy Technologies

Technology transfer is an important channel of technological change and sustainable development for countries with less innovative ability than technological leaders. This paper studies whether domestic environmental policies affect the inward technology transfer of cleaner innovation from abroad. We focus specifically on the power sector, for its important role in the decarbonization process, by looking at zero-carbon (renewable) and carbon-saving (efficient fossil) technologies for energy production. Using data on cross-country patent applications, we provide evidence that environmental policy contributes to attracting foreign cleaner technology options to OECD markets but not to non-OECD markets. We show that this is due to the nature of the implemented policy instruments. Market-based approaches positively impact technology transfer to both OECD and non-OECD economies, while non-market based approaches have at best only a weak effect in OECD countries. Domestic environmental policies may provide too weak a signal for foreign innovators in countries off the technological frontier. This calls for a strengthening of policy incentives for technology transfer in light of pressing climate change objectives.     

Poor institutions as a comparative advantage

Classic theories of comparative advantage point to factor productivity and factor abundance as determinants of specialization and trade. Likewise, geography and topography can determine trade patterns. Institutions, however, are increasingly seen as important sources of comparative advantage. A global drug prohibition regime implies that institutional quality matters more than traditional sources in the drug trade. This paper theoretically models trade patterns of illicit goods and confirms the role of institutions empirically with respect to the drug trade. In particular, illicit enterprises gain force in countries where resources are scarce, drug enforcement is uncertain, and institutions are weak in absolute terms and relative to neighboring countries. I propose several policy alternatives that emphasize economic opportunity for the poor and institutional quality that complement drug prohibition.     

Do casinos pay their customers to become risk-averse? Revising the house money effect in a field experiment

The house money effect predicts that individuals show increased risk-seeking behavior in the presence of prior windfall gains. Although the effect’s existence is widely accepted, experimental studies that compare individuals’ risk-taking behavior using house money to individuals’ risk-taking behavior using their own money produce contradictory results. This experimental field study analyzes the gambling behavior of 917 casino customers who face real losses. We find that customers who received free play at the entrance showed not higher but significantly lower levels of risk-taking behavior during their casino visit, expressed through lower average wagers. This study thus provides field evidence against the house money effect. Moreover, as a result of lower levels of risk seeking, endowed customers yield better economic results in the form of smaller own-money losses when leaving the casino.     

Exchange rate volatility and bilateral exports of Malaysia to Singapore,China, Japan,the USA and Korea

This study examines the impact of exchange rate volatility on bilateral exports of Malaysia to Singapore, China, Japan, the USA and Korea. Exchange rate volatility is estimated by an autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity model. The Johansen cointegration method and the dynamic ordinary least squares estimator are used in the estimations. There is some evidence of exchange rate volatility to have significant impact on real total exports in the long run, but more evidence of exchange rate volatility is found to have significant impact on sub-categories of real total exports in the short run. The impact of exchange rate volatility differs across bilateral exports. The impact of exchange rate volatility on exports can be negative or positive. Generally, exchange rate volatility is not harmful to bilateral exports of Malaysia.     

A strategic analysis of surging Chinese manufacturers: The case of Galanz

Recent years have witnessed the surging of Chinese manufacturers, as China has become the world’s factory floor. This paper presents a case study of one of the most successful manufacturers in China, the Galanz Group, now the world’s largest microwave manufacturer. Based on theories of multinational corporations from emerging economies, the paper examines the process of Galanz’s integration into the global market. The company has developed unique competitive strategies that have made it a great success within China and in overseas markets. The Galanz model suggests strong strategic implications for both Chinese firms and incumbent multinational corporations.