Institutional investors and the limits of arbitrage

The returns and stock holdings of institutional investors from 1980 to 2007 provide little evidence of stock-picking skill. Institutions as a whole closely mimic the market portfolio, with pre-cost returns that have nearly perfect correlation with the value-weighted index and an insignificant CAPM alpha of 0.08% quarterly. Institutions also show little tendency to bet on any of the main characteristics known to predict stock returns, such as book-to-market, momentum, or accruals. While particular groups of institutions have modest stock-picking skill relative to the CAPM, their performance is almost entirely explained by the book-to-market and momentum effects in returns. Further, no group holds a portfolio that deviates efficiently from the market portfolio.     

A skeptical appraisal of asset pricing tests

It has become standard practice in the cross-sectional asset pricing literature to evaluate models based on how well they explain average returns on size-B/M portfolios, something many models seem to do remarkably well. In this paper, we review and critique the empirical methods used in the literature. We argue that asset pricing tests are often highly misleading, in the sense that apparently strong explanatory power (high cross-sectional R²s and small pricing errors) can provide quite weak support for a model. We offer a number of suggestions for improving empirical tests and evidence that several proposed models do not work as well as originally advertised.     

Financial strategy: Planning and managing the corporate leverage position

Among the important elements of a company's strategic plan is its decision about the degree of financial leverage it elects to imbed in its capital structure. A simple operational framework that can assist in framing that decision, which concentrates on the likelihood of being unable to meet fixed financial charges, is presented. The model is tested empirically, and support for its potential usefulness in the financial planning process is found.     

Executive stock option compensation: The corporate reporting decision

New regulations instituted in 1992 by the SEC require that estimates of the values of executive stock option grants now be included in proxy statement reports on senior executive compensation. We examine the character of firms' reporting choices under the new rules, from a large sample of the first round of proxy statements issued. We find that the majority of firms have elected a reporting approach that provides little additional information to investors, and appear at least in part to have done so because the alternative approach would have caused them to report above-average stock option compensation amounts for their executives.