互联网金融规制与市场有效性改善*——来自中国网络借贷行业的证据

中国的互联网金融经历了一个先创新发展后监管规制的过程，本文通过对网络借贷行业的实证研究，分析监管规则的出台实施对新型互联网融资市场有效性的影响。实证结果表明，网络借贷平台资金的银行存管、持有ICP证等强制性规定缓解了投资者、平台企业与借款人之间的信息不对称，对克服早期平台间通过竞相承诺高回报率来吸引投资者导致的“柠檬市场”问题、对解决网贷市场上缺乏平台风险性高低有效信号的问题都起到了正向作用，有助于互联网融资市场的有效性提高。     

跨越竞争丛林与范式重构：全球治理改革进程中的疫苗产业创新治理

疫苗作为新冠疫情防控的最关键手段之一，已在各国抗疫中发挥积极影响。疫苗研发、生产、注射意愿以及全球分配的公平性与可及性等一系列问题日益受到世界关注。分析全球治理改革中，疫苗作为一种全球公共产品的创新治理问题，讨论疫苗产业发展特征与创新规律演化，剖析西方国家疫苗产业创新治理困境以及“竞争丛林”逻辑，阐释中国行动方案及对全球治理改革的贡献。最终提出疫苗产业创新治理机制对推动全球治理改革的政策含义。     

中国高端装备制造业自主技术创新效率稳定性及影响因素研究

在全面实施创新驱动发展战略的时代背景下，揭示中国高端装备制造业自主技术创新效率稳定性，测度相关因素的影响强度与方向，对揭示中国高端装备制造业自主技术创新规律，制定其发展策略具有重要指导意义。聚焦中国高端装备制造业自主技术创新效率稳定性及影响因素，采用DEA-Malmquist指数方法和Tobit回归模型进行实证研究，结果表明，中国高端装备制造业自主技术创新效率存在一定波动性，且各细分行业技术创新效率内部稳定性较差，产业自主技术创新效率整体稳定性不高；自主技术创新投入因素和环境影响因素对产业自主技术创新效率的影响具有较高的异质性，其中创新资金投入和人力资源投入对自主技术创新综合效率、纯技术效率及规模效率具有正向影响，而新产品开发投入和企业规模对自主技术创新综合效率、纯技术效率和规模效率的影响具有异质性，政策因素与市场因素分别具有显著和非显著负向影响，外源性创新因素具有显著正向影响，且影响强度较大。在此基础上，提出调整政府对高端装备制造业创新支持模式、加强外源性创新与智力引进等策略建议。     

韩国总统文在寅来渝访问 “大韩民国临时政府是我们的根,是我们的精神所在。”

正2017年12月16日,韩国总统文在寅一行访问重庆。一天时间,他参观大韩民国临时政府旧址陈列馆,探寻中韩在渝共同抗击日寇的历史足迹,出席中韩产业合作重庆论坛,参观考察北京现代重庆工厂,为中韩经贸合作加油鼓劲。位于渝中区七星岗莲花池38号的大韩民国临时政府旧址陈列馆,是目前中国境内规模最大的涉朝鲜半岛遗址地。1940年至1945年,著名韩国独立运动家金九领导韩国临时政府在这里开展民族独立运     

Banks’ deferred tax assets during the financial crisis

Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting - Prior studies have demonstrated that the net deferred tax liabilities of industrial firms are valued by market participants in a manner consistent...     

Operational risk quantified with spectral risk measures: a refined closed-form approximation

The quantification of operational risk has become an important issue as a result of the new capital charges required by the Basel Capital Accord (Basel II) to cover the potential losses of this type of risk. In this paper, we investigate second-order approximation of operational risk quantified with spectral risk measures (OpSRMs) within the theory of second-order regular variation (2RV) and second-order subexponentiality. The result shows that asymptotically two cases (the fast convergence case and the slow convergence) arise depending on the range of the second-order parameter. We also show that the second-order approximation under 2RV is asymptotically equivalent to the slow convergence case. A number of Monte Carlo simulations for a range of empirically relevant frequency and severity distributions are employed to illustrate the performance of our second-order results. The simulation results indicate that our second-order approximations tend to reduce the estimation errors to a great degree, especially for the fast convergence case, and are able to capture the sub-extremal behavior of OpSRMs better than the first-order approximation. Our asymptotic results have implications for the regulation of financial institutions, and may provide further insights into the measurement and management of operational risk.     

New Evidence on Housing Wealth and Consumption Channels

The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics - This paper provides new evidence on the effect of housing wealth on consumption by focusing on the impact of home-equity extraction. We develop a...     

政策不确定性、财政扩张与区域商业银行风险——基于中国地方官员变更和银行业的证据

文章利用2007-2017年我国93家区域商业银行的面板数据，并结合省级宏观经济数据和地方官员变更数据，实证考察了中国地方官员变更引起的经济政策不确定性对区域商业银行风险的重要影响。研究结果表明：（1）地方官员变更引起的政策不确定性增大了区域商业银行风险；（2）地方官员变更引起的政策不确定性，通过提高银行的资产收益率降低了商业银行风险；而不确定性时期的财政扩张，通过降低银行资产收益率增大了商业银行风险；并且财政扩张的负面影响大于政策不确定性的正面影响；（3）各省的市委书记发生职位更替引起的政策不确定性对区域商业银行风险的影响更大。文章研究为新时代背景下的金融供给侧结构性改革、政府宏观经济政策的制定以及财政体制与金融体制之间的联系提供参考。     

Economic Impacts of the Possible China–US Trade War

This article uses a multi-country global general equilibrium (GE) model to numerically simulate the effects of possible China–US trade wars. We introduce an endogenous trade imbalance structure with trade cost into the model which helps to explore both tariff and non-tariff trade war effects. Our simulation results show that China will be significantly hurt by the China–US trade war, but negative impacts are affordable. The US can gain under unilateral sanction measures to China, but will lose if China takes retaliation measures. Comparing the effects under mutual trade war, China will lose more than the US. Introducing non-tariff barrier trade wars will intensify the negative effects, and comparatively negative effects to China are larger than to the US. Mexico’s involvement in trade war with the US will strengthen the negative effects and comparatively hurt the US more. Under non-cooperative and cooperative Nash bargaining equilibrium, the US can gain more than China in trade war negotiation, which means the US has stronger bargaining power than China. Additionally, trade wars between China and the US will hurt most countries and the world especially in GDP and manufacturing employment, but benefit their welfare and trade.