Discretion in bank loan loss allowance,risk taking and earnings management

We study whether banks use the allowance for loan losses (ALL) for efficiency or for opportunistic reasons. We find that banks that had higher abnormal ALL during the period prior to the 2007–2009 crisis engaged in less risk taking during the pre‐crisis period and had a lower probability of failure during the crisis period. In testing earnings management to meet or beat earnings benchmarks, we find that abnormal ALL is unrelated to next period's loss avoidance and just meeting or beating the prior year's earnings. Our results suggest that banks use ALL for efficiency and not for opportunistic purposes.     

Do Investors Pay Sufficient Attention to Banks’ Unrealized Gains and Losses on Available-for-sale Securities?

Abstract

Unrealized gains and losses on available-for-sale securities (AFSGL) are included in Other Comprehensive Income (OCI) and directly affect shareholders’ equity but are not included in earnings. We investigate whether unrealized AFSGL help predict future earnings and whether analysts and investors incorporate the information conveyed by unrealized AFSGL in a timely manner. We conduct our investigation on a sample of banks because unrealized AFSGL are material in the banking industry. First, we show that unrealized AFSGL are material and help in predicting next period realized AFSGL and future earnings change. Second, we document that financial analysts are slow to react to unrealized AFSGL and update their forecasts after AFSGL are realized in earnings. Third, we find that investors are also slow to react to unrealized AFSGL and do so only after AFSGL are included (realized) in earnings and after financial analysts update their forecasts. We document an annual difference of 5% in future abnormal returns between banks in the top and bottom quintiles of past unrealized AFSGL. A zero-cost trading strategy that relies on public information about unrealized AFSGL generates a sizeable monthly alpha that ranges between 1.8% and 1.9%.     

Institutional monitoring through shareholder litigation

This paper investigates the effectiveness of using securities class action lawsuits in monitoring defendant firms by institutional lead plaintiffs from two aspects: (1) immediate litigation outcomes, including the probability of surviving the motion to dismiss and the settlement amount, and (2) subsequent governance improvement such as changes in board independence. Using a large sample of securities lawsuits from 1996 to 2005, we show that institutional investors are more likely to serve as the lead plaintiff for lawsuits with certain characteristics. After controlling for these determinants of having an institutional lead plaintiff, we show that securities class actions with institutional owners as lead plaintiffs are less likely to be dismissed and have larger monetary settlements than securities class actions with individual lead plaintiffs. This effect exists for various types of institutions including public pension funds. We also find that, after the lawsuit filings, defendant firms with institutional lead plaintiffs experience greater improvement in their board independence than defendant firms with individual lead plaintiffs. Our study suggests that securities litigation is an effective disciplining tool for institutional owners.     

Auditor reputation and earnings management: International evidence from the banking industry

We examine the relation between auditor reputation and earnings management in banks using a sample of banks from 29 countries. In particular, we examine the implications of two aspects of auditor reputation, auditor type and auditor industry specialization, for earnings management in banks. We find that both auditor type and auditor industry specialization moderate benchmark-beating (loss-avoidance and just-meeting-or-beating prior year’s earnings) behavior in banks. In addition, we find that once auditor type and auditor industry specialization are included in the same tests, only auditor industry specialization has a significant impact on constraining benchmark-beating behavior. In separate tests related to income-increasing abnormal loan loss provisions, we find that both auditor type and auditor expertise constrain income-increasing earnings management. Again, in joint tests, only auditor industry expertise has a significant impact on constraining income-increasing earnings management.     

Asymmetric Effects of Interest Rate Changes on Stock Prices

This study examines the stock price adjustment process around announcements of changes in the federal funds rate target in the 1990s using an asymmetric autoregressive exponential GARCH model (ASAR‐EGARCH). We find that target change announcements convey new information to the stock market. Risk aversion increases before the announcement of a rate change, and especially before the announcement of a joint target and discount rate change. The volatility estimates suggest that such joint rate changes send a clearer signal to the stock market about monetary policy objectives relative to unilateral target changes. Our findings are consistent with overreaction in the wake of bad news (rate hikes), and point to a shift in volatility from before to after the rate change announcement since the adoption of the immediate disclosure policy of the Federal Open Market Committee in February 1994.     

A Simple Test for Convergence of Metropolitan Income in the United States

The prevalent test for income convergence used in many recent studies of convergence across spatial economic units in the United States is to use a regression equation in which income growth is regressed against the initial level of income (this is known as β convergence). That method, however, has been crtiticized as an instance of Galton's fallacy of regression. We devise a simple test for the income β-convergence hypothesis which does not suffer from “Galton's fallacy” and apply it to all of the metropolitan areas of the United States for the period 1969–1995. For the test we use two income measures: per capita personal income and average wages. Our results conclusively support convergence of per capita personal income and of wage per worker for metropolitan areas in the United States. We also test for σ convergence, the hypothesis of diminishing dispersion in income among places over time, and find no support for the hypothesis.     

Impact of Adoption of Long-Term Performance Plans on Financial Analysts' Long-Term Forecasts

Prior research demonstrates that firms adopting long-term performance plans experience increased capital investment, earnings, and risk in the post-adoption period. However, these results are subject to distortions that may result from exogenous factors over the long time period examined. To avoid these potential distortions we examine financial analysts' forecasts in the periods immediately preceding and following the adoption of the performance plan. We find that projected long-term capital expenditures per share, earnings per share and cash flow per share are revised upward in the post-adoption period. These results are consistent with the premise that the adoption of long-term performance plans is expected to favorably affect managers' decisions. In addition, we find that the revisions are primarily attributable to firms that were performing poorly in the period prior to plan adoption and in greatest need of change. This finding has not been documented in previous studies.     

Interest Rate Surprises and Stock Prices

This paper examines the impact of unexpected changes in the federal funds target on stock prices from 1988 to 2001. Measures of interest rate surprises are constructed from survey data and changes in the 3-month T-bill yield. I find that surprises associated with decreases in the target cause stock prices to rise significantly. Surprises associated with increases in the target increase stock market volatility on the announcement day, with volatility reverting to pre-surprise levels on the day after the announcement. This volatility pattern is only evident since 1994. An implication is that concerns about immediate disclosure causing persistent and heightened stock market volatility might be misplaced.