Integrating decomposition approaches for the analysis of temporal changes in economic structure: an application to Chicago's economy from 1980 to 2000

This paper presents an attempt to integrate two flow decomposition methods to analyse temporal changes in a region's economic structure. The two methods of structural analysis are push–pull decomposition analysis and structural Q-analysis. Push–pull analysis presents a quasi-optimization decomposition of a set of matrices with actual intersectoral economic flows into a weighted set of matrices, while structural Q-analysis provides a form in which the structure of these decomposed flows can be considered. The paper provides an expository application to Chicago's economic structure over the period of 1980 to 2000, to reveal a complementary perspective of hollowing-out the production process in the Chicago economy that was identified in previous studies.     

企业BPR实施过程中的风险分析

企业实施业务流程重组(BPR)是一个南风险高收益的项目。针对目前国内企业BPR风险性高,成功率低的情况,我 们有必要对实施BPR过程中的各种风险因素进行分析研究,并找出解决方案,以期对我国企业顺利进行企业流程再造有所帮 助。     

基于感官效应的地铁车站“舒适”品牌研究

"舒适"是人文地铁核心价值的重要因素之一,地铁车站人文品牌的"舒适度"内涵建设必须能够持续获得目标乘客的好感,致力于不断提升乘客满意度。一个品牌必须要转化为一种感官体验,而不仅仅是眼见的。视觉塑造地铁人文品牌第一印象,声音调动乘客的情绪情感,嗅觉和触觉维系人文地铁品牌的独特性。     

国内外轨道交通换乘枢纽项目开发模式之研究

通过分析研究国内外轨道交通换乘枢纽项目的建设经验,提出轨道交通换乘枢纽与配套商业综合开发,并创新思路,对建设实施过程中出现的规划、土地、建设模式等问题进行分析,以创新的方式提出解决方案。     

论无尺度网络与互联网安全

文章从系统的角度对互联网安全问题进行了分析和讨论,指出互联网是一个复杂性网络和无尺度网络。互联网的无尺度特征,应该促使我们改变制定安全策略的思路,加强对无尺度网络的研究,对互联网安全问题具有重要的指导意义。     

交通基础设施建设与企业融资约束——基于高铁开通的准自然实验

本文基于信息不对称视角,以2009～2017年中国沪深A股上市公司为样本,考察了高铁开通对企业融资约束的影响及内在机理.研究发现:高铁开通有助于缓解企业的融资约束.机制检验发现,高铁开通对于企业融资约束的缓解作用在盈余管理程度更高的企业、规模更小的企业、位于较低经济水平城市的企业中更加明显,说明高铁的开通带来的信息不对称下降是缓解企业融资约束的重要原因.考虑了产权性质和外部利益相关者的影响后发现,高铁开通对企业融资约束的影响在非国有企业、媒体关注度较低和机构投资者实地调研较少的企业中更显著.本文的研究拓展了高铁研究的视角,为重大基础设施建设对微观企业行为的影响提供了新的经验证据.     

变压器绕组温升试验及其不确定度分析

本文介绍了变压器正常加载时的温升试验过程和相关事项,并对试验数据进行变压器温升的不确定度分析。     

Rewriting China’s Recent History: Fluctuations in State Economic Control, 1949–1984

China's political and economic systems are often discussed in combination. It is generally believed that under the political system of centralization, the economic system had to be a state monopoly. This article challenges that view by providing an economic perspective. The period 1949–1984 is selected to explore the causes of successive periods of strengthening and weakening of the state's monopoly power over the economy. Scholars have generally assumed that the period of state monopoly originated from socialist ideology or the personal will of the leaders. But economic conditions severely limited the options available. After the new China was established, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) did not try to create a fully socialist economy in the short run. Instead, the CCP formulated a New Democracy platform that pragmatically allowed many types of enterprise to function side by side, including private industry, household ventures, and state‐owned enterprises. The original plan of the CCP was to allow private enterprise to develop in order to build up capital to rebuild the war‐damaged economy so that a strong foundation could be established for creating a socialist economy. But the Korean War from 1950 to 1953 and an influx of Soviet capital caused a shift from a mixed economy to state capitalism by 1956. From that point on, Mao Zedong and other Chinese leaders had to change course again and again as fiscal crises limited available options. A reversal occurred in 1958 when the Soviets withdrew both their advisors and their capital subsidies, leaving the state capitalist system weakened. The crisis in the Chinese economy from 1959 to 1961 required decentralization of economic authority and efforts to promote rural capital formation. The next shift occurred after 1963 as the economy was organized to prepare for a possible military invasion. The required mobilization of industrial resources in remote regions of China inevitably reinforced state management of the economy. The final reversal occurred in the late 1970s, when imports of Western technology and equipment created another fiscal crisis for the central government, which then had to shift the burden of capital formation from the state to private entities. The reform of the rural household contract system, the adjustment of economic structures, and an increase in exports to gain foreign exchange all took place as part of “de‐monopolization” reforms. The reforms that occurred after 1979 were not an aberration or a radical break from the past. They were part of a pattern that evolved from 1949 to 1984, with fluctuations dependent on the weakening and strengthening status of state finances. The shifts that occurred during this period have either been ignored by observers, or they have been misinterpreted as being motivated by ideology. In fact, new policies were created to enable the government to adjust to changes in the internal and external environment.     

Financial factors and company investment decisions in transitional China

We investigate the propensity of Chinese publicly listed firms to invest in response to financial factors, according to the a priori degree of a firm's information problems: industry sector, ownership structure and firm size. The firms in primary and tertiary industries are found to be liquidity‐constrained in their investment decisions. The investment‐cash flow sensitivity of the firms in secondary industry indicates that they lost privileged access to credit in the course of China's market transition. However, we find no evidence that financial liberalization resulted in an easing of financing constraints for small‐ and medium‐sized firms. Our result indicates that agency problems, stemming from a state‐controlling pyramidal ownership structure, are responsible for the misallocation of internal funds. The importance of bankruptcy and agency costs in relation to debt finance for certain types of borrowers reflects the transitional nature of the financial environment facing Chinese firms. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

浅析上市公司管理层股权激励类型及其对企业绩效的影响

管理层股权激励已经在各国的管理实践中得到广泛的运用,企业委托人为了解决与代理人之间的矛盾,对管理层采取了这种长期激励的方式。同时,管理层股权激励的效用可以用企业绩效来测度,因此,管理层股权激励应与企业绩效挂钩。本文分析了上市公司中的股权激励类型及优缺点,并对各种股权激励模式对企业绩效所产生的影响进行了研究。