Longitudinal analysis of entrepreneurship and competitiveness dynamics in Latin America

This study analyzes the relationship between entrepreneurial dynamics in Latin-American countries and the level of competitiveness these countries show. Based on the research conducted by Wennekers et al. [Small Business Economics, 24(3):293–309, 2005] that demonstrates a U-shaped relationship between the country’s rate of entrepreneurship and its level of competitiveness and economic development, we hypothesize that Latin-American countries have a descending behaviour under the U-shaped curve approach. The results from three regression models support this hypothesis and suggest that competitiveness and economic growth deter entrepreneurial dynamics on Latin-American countries. We discuss that Latin-American countries need to improve some structural factors to achieve a high level of entrepreneurial dynamics.

美国大学生就业指导体系构建对我们的启示

深入探析美国大学生就业指导体系,积极探索有益的启示,为我国大学生就业指导工作的开展提供有意义的借鉴和参考。     

假日经济的营销创新策略

假日经济是在国家扩大内需、刺激消费政策下发展起来。它反映了现代消费的特点和市场经济的客观要求。通过分析假日经济的本特征,提出了影响假日经济发展的制约因素,从文化、市场、观念、手段等几个方面研究假日经济营销的创新策略。     

Technical efficiency analysis correcting for biases from observed and unobserved variables: an application to a natural resource management project

This article brings together the stochastic frontier framework with impact evaluation methodology to compare technical efficiency (TE) across treatment and control groups using cross-sectional data associated with the MARENA Program in Honduras. A matched group of beneficiaries and control farmers is determined using propensity score matching techniques to mitigate biases stemming from observed variables. In addition, possible self-selection arising from unobserved variables is addressed using a selectivity correction model for stochastic frontiers recently introduced by Greene (J Prod Anal 34:15?C24, 2010). The results reveal that average TE is consistently higher for beneficiary farmers than the control group while the presence of selectivity bias cannot be rejected. TE ranges from 0.67 to 0.75 for beneficiaries and from 0.40 to 0.65 for the control depending on whether biases were controlled or not. The TE gap between beneficiaries and control farmers decreases by implementing the matching technique and the sample selection framework decreases this gap even further. The analysis also suggests that beneficiaries do not only exhibit higher TE but also higher frontier output.     

The optimal multi-stage contest

This paper investigates the optimal (effort-maximizing) structure of multi-stage sequential-elimination contests. We allow the contest organizer to design the contest structure using two instruments: contest sequence (the number of stages, and the number of contestants remaining after each stage), and prize allocation. When the contest technology is sufficiently noisy, we find that multi-stage contests elicit more effort than single-stage contests. For concave and moderately convex impact functions, the contest organizer should allocate the entire prize purse to a single final prize, regardless of the contest sequence. Additional stages always increase total effort. Therefore, the optimal contest eliminates one contestant at each stage until the finale when a single winner obtains the entire prize purse. Our results thus rationalize various forms of multi-stage contests that are conducted in the real world.     

高阶梯队理论视角下控制权对不同背景领导者与研发投入间关系的调节机制

从高阶理论和委托-代理理论出发,利用2007—2015年中国沪深两市上市公司公开披露的数据,考察了实际控制人的控制权、具有不同专业背景的领导者与研发投入的关系,厘清了控制权对具有不同专业背景的领导者对研发投入影响的作用机制。实证结果表明,控制权是具有不同专业背景的领导者与研发投入之间的调节变量。具体而言:具有技术背景的领导者对研发投入的影响随着实际控制人控制权的增大而减小;具有社科背景的领导者对研发投入的影响随着实际控制人控制权的增大而增大。     

Anarchy, efficiency, and redistribution

This paper develops a contractarian theory of the state and the existence of redistribution. The existence of rules of redistribution is explained without any recourse to the risk-aversion of agents. No veil of ignorance is needed. This avoids obligational problems inherent in most other contractarian theories of justice. Hence, this paper departs from the standard legitimization of redistribution as fundamental insurance and interprets it as stemming from a principle of reciprocity in trade. Since this paper deals with an anarchic society, the implementation of redistributional rules is constrained by the assumption of self-enforcement. We show that this assumption changes the interpretation of the state: the state is characterized by a particular design of equilibrium strategies, not by the existence of enforcement agencies.     

Time-Varying Leverage and Basel III: A Look at Canadian Evidence

Why did the conventional leverage indicators not pick up any meaningful signal of the mounting systemic risk before the subprime crisis? They remained almost unchanged in recent decades, whereas the banking landscape underwent a tremendous metamorphosis. Market-oriented banking is characterized by a new type of systemic risk, a risk which essentially evolves off the radar screen, i.e., off-balance sheet (OBS) (Calmès and Théoret Journal of Banking and Finance 34 (7): 1719–1728, 2010, 2011). In this article, we argue that the standard leverage indicators are not fitted to capture this kind of new banking risk. We introduce a new empirical framework which enables us to exploit the cyclical properties of elasticity leverage measures, while at the same time controlling for the noisy information they usually deliver. In a nutshell, thanks to the Kalman filter, we are able to compute optimal levels of bank leverage. This methodology delivers cyclical, forward-looking measures signalling systemic risk bubbles years before their burst. By properly accounting for all activities, including market-oriented banking, these time-varying leverage measures tend to systemically capture regulatory capital arbitrage and the OBS risk it entails.