THE GOVERNANCE OF PUBLIC ENTERPRISES: THE QUEBEC EXPERIENCE

ABSTRACT ** ** Résumé en fin d'article; Zusammenfassung am Ende des Artikels; resumen al fin del artículo.
: Have public enterprises become obsolete policy instruments? Should they be privatized or can their governance be radically transformed so that they could still be used as policy instruments? The world around them has changed and forced governments to move. After a discussion on the arguments in favour of privatization, this article suggests an analysis of three cases in the Canadian province of Quebec. Considering the pressures linked to the liberalization of trade resulting from NAFTA, this article suggests that the governance of public enterprises can be transformed and adapted and that consequently, it is not useful or necessary to privatize them. There is in reality a lot of room in the public enterprise governance to reform them, room that has been neglected over the last decades.     

Who Disciplines Management in Poorly Performing Companies?

Economic theory points to five parties disciplining management of poorly performing firms: holders of large share blocks, acquirers of new blocks, bidders in takeovers, nonexecutive directors, and investors during periods of financial distress. This paper reports the first comparative evaluation of the role of these different parties in disciplining management. We find that, in the United Kingdom, most parties, including holders of substantial share blocks, exert little disciplining and that some, for example, inside holders of share blocks and boards dominated by nonexecutive directors, actually impede it. Bidders replace a high proportion of management of companies acquired in takeovers but do not target poorly performing management. In contrast, during periods of financial constraints prompting distressed rights issues and capital restructuring, investors focus control on poorly performing companies. These results stand in contrast to the United States, where there is little evidence of a role for new equity issues but nonexecutive directors and acquirers of share blocks perform a disciplinary function. The different governance outcomes are attributed to differences in minority investor protection in two countries with supposedly similar common law systems. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: G3.     

Lessons from the global financial crisis – the case of Mainland China and Hong Kong

Abstract

The analysis of the intertwined reactions of Hong Kong and Mainland China to the 2008 Global Financial Crisis is considered in this study through the lenses of their stock markets. The GARCH-based analysis of stock market performance over the period December 2011–December 2014 shows that trade and equity sectors were the sectors most affected by the global recession; volatility was prevalent on the Shanghai stock market, whereas volatility persistence characterised the Hong Kong stock market. The results also show that the two stock markets recovered quite quickly. Tight controls applied by the financial authorities helped ensure some stability during the crisis.     

Evidence on the international evolution and convergence of corporate governance regulations

The issue of appropriate corporate governance framework has been a focal point of recent reforms in many countries. This study provides a comprehensive comparative analysis of corporate governance regulatory systems and their evolution since 1990 in 30 European countries and the US. It proposes a methodology to create detailed corporate governance indices which capture the major features of capital market laws in the analyzed countries. The indices indicate how the law in each country addresses various potential agency conflicts between corporate constituencies: namely, between shareholder and managers, between majority and minority shareholders, and between shareholders and bondholders. The analysis of regulatory provisions within the suggested framework enables us to understand better how corporate law works in a particular country and which strategies regulators adopt to achieve their goals. The 15-year time series of constructed indices and large country-coverage also allows us to draw conclusions about the convergence of corporate governance regimes across the countries.     

Short-run forecasting of the euro-dollar exchange rate with economic fundamentals

We propose a fundamentals-based econometric model for the weekly changes in the euro-dollar rate with the distinctive feature of mixing economic variables quoted at different frequencies. The model obtains good in-sample fit and, more importantly, encouraging out-of-sample forecasting results at horizons ranging from one-week to one month. Specifically, we obtain statistically significant improvements upon the hard-to-beat random-walk model using traditional statistical measures of forecasting error at all horizons. Moreover, our model obtains a great improvement when we use the direction of change metric, which has more economic relevance than other loss measures. With this measure, our model performs much better at all forecasting horizons than a naive model that predicts the exchange rate as an equal chance to go up or down, with statistically significant improvements.     

The ownership of ratings

We identify the optimal contract between a rating agency and a firm and the circumstances under which simple ownership contracts implement this optimal solution. We assume that the decision to obtain a rating is endogenous and the price of a rating is a strategic variable. Clients hiding their ratings can be an equilibrium only if they are ex ante uncertain of their quality and if the hiring decision is not observable. For some distribution functions, a competitive rating market is necessary for this result to obtain. In this context, competition between rating intermediaries will lead to less information in equilibrium.     

The price of ethics and stakeholder governance: The performance of socially responsible mutual funds

Do investors pay a price for investing in socially responsible investments (SRI) funds, or do they obtain superior returns? This paper investigates these under- and overperformance hypotheses for all SRI funds across the world. Consistent with investors paying a price for ethics, SRI funds in the US, the UK, and in many continental European and Asia-Pacific countries underperform their domestic benchmarks by − 2.2% to − 6.5%. However, with the exception of some countries such as France, Japan and Sweden, the risk-adjusted returns of SRI funds are not statistically different from the performance of conventional funds. We also find that the underperformance of SRI funds is not driven by loadings on an ethics style factor. There is mixed evidence of a smart money effect: SRI investors are unable to identify the funds that will outperform in the future, whereas they show some fund-selection ability in identifying funds that will perform poorly. Finally, corporate governance and social screens yield lower risk-adjusted returns.     

Using Real Activities to Avoid Goodwill Impairment Losses: Evidence and Effect on Future Performance

We examine whether managers postpone the recognition of goodwill impairment by manipulating cash flows and the consequences of such a strategy on future performance. According to SFAS 142, an impairment loss must be recognized if the reporting unit's total fair value to which goodwill has been allocated is less than its book value. A growing body of empirical evidence shows that managers delay the recognition of goodwill impairment in accounting books. However, past literature is silent on how managers convince various gatekeepers (e.g., auditors, financial analysts) that recognizing an impairment loss is unnecessary although it seems economically justified. SFAS 142 requires managers to forecast future cash flows to justify the decision to recognize, or not, an impairment loss. Therefore, we predict that managers manipulate upward current cash flows to support their choice to avoid reporting an impairment loss. We also test whether or not this real earnings management is detrimental to future performance. Based on a sample of US firms over the period 2003–2011, we document that firms suspected of postponing goodwill impairment losses exhibit significantly positive discretionary cash flows compared to various control groups. We also find that this real activities manipulation is detrimental to future performance.     

IT‐Based Technical Change and Job Instability

We investigate the impact of IT diffusion on the stability of employment. We document the evolution of different components of job instability over a panel of 348 cities in France, from the mid‐1970s to the early 2000s. The evidence goes against the view that the diffusion of IT has spurred job instability. Yet, analysing long‐term differences in the occupational structure, we find that IT diffusion has increased the share of high‐skill occupations at the expense of low‐skill occupations. This is consistent with French firms' reliance on their internal labour market to meet the new skill requirements associated with IT diffusion.