Suffer the little children: Measuring the effects of parenthood on well-being worldwide

This paper investigates the relationship between parenthood and well-being in a large sample of individuals from 94 countries worldwide. We find that having children is negatively related to well-being. Conditioning on economic and socio-demographic characteristics can only partially help to explain this finding. We show that the negative effect of parenthood on well-being is explained by a large adverse impact on financial satisfaction, that dominates the positive impact on non-financial satisfaction. The results are robust to the use of alternative empirical specifications and to the inclusion of the reported ideal number of children as a proxy variable to account for the endogeneity of parenthood decisions.     

Do minimum quality standards bite in polluting industries?

We investigate the introduction of a minimum quality standard in a vertically differentiated duopoly where production is polluting. We examine the alternative frameworks with quality-dependent fixed or variable costs, under both price and quantity competition. Under Bertrand behaviour, the introduction of a binding MQS regulation reduces product differentiation, which causes an increase in the output and pollution. Hence its adoption must rely on the increase in consumer surplus generated by the increase in output and average quality. Conversely, in the Cournot setting, a binding MQS decreases output and pollution, and its adoption is driven by the fact that the balance between these effects and the associated increase in average quality yields a welfare improvement.     

The codetermined firm in a Cournot duopoly: A stability analysis

This paper aims to study the stability issue in a Cournot duopoly with codetermined firms. We show that when both firms codetermine employment together with decentralised employees' representatives, a rise in wages acts as an economic (de)stabiliser when the wage is fairly (high) low, while under profit maximisation a rise in wages always acts as a stabilising device because the parametric stability region monotonically increases with the wage in such a case. Moreover, a rise in the union's bargaining power has a de-stabilising effect, except when the wage is low and the firm power is already high. Therefore, under codetermination a change either in the wage or firm power in the Nash bargaining plays an ambiguous role on stability. We also show with numerical simulations that complex dynamics can also occur.     

The international risk sharing puzzle is at business cycle and lower frequency

Abstract We decompose the correlation between relative consumption and the real exchange rate in its dynamic components at different frequencies. Using multivariate spectral analysis techniques, we show that, at odds with a high degree of risk sharing, in most OECD countries the dynamic correlation tends to be quite negative, and significantly so, at frequencies lower than two years – the appropriate frequencies for assessing the performance of international business cycle models. Theoretically, we show that the dynamic correlation over different frequencies predicted by standard open economy models is the sum of two terms: a term constant across frequencies, which can be negative when uninsurable risk is large; a term variable across frequencies, which in bond economies is necessarily positive, reflecting the insurance intertemporal trade provides against forecastable contingencies. Numerical analysis suggests that leading mechanisms proposed by the literature to account for the puzzle are consistent with the evidence across the spectrum.     

The refoundation of the symmetric equilibrium in Schumpeterian growth models

We provide a refoundation of the symmetric growth equilibrium characterizing the research sector of vertical R&D-driven growth models. We argue that the usual assumptions made in this class of models leave the agents indifferent as to where targeting research: hence, the problem of the allocation of R&D investment across sectors is indeterminate. By introducing an “?-contamination of confidence” in the expected distribution of R&D investment, we prove that the symmetric structure of R&D investment is the unique rational expectations equilibrium compatible with ambiguity-averse agents adopting a maxmin strategy.     

Courts of Law and Unforeseen Contingencies

We study a contracting model with unforeseen contingencies inwhich the court is an active player. Ex ante, the contractingparties cannot include the risky unforeseen contingencies inthe contract they draw up. Ex post, the court observes whetheran unforeseen contingency occurred and decides whether to voidor uphold the contract. If the contract is voided by the court,the parties can renegotiate a new agreement ex post. There aretwo effects of a court that voids contracts. The parties' incentivesto undertake relationship-specific investment are reduced, andthe parties enjoy greater insurance against the unforeseen contingenciesthat the ex ante contract cannot account for. In this context,we fully characterize the optimal decision rule for the court.The behavior of the optimal court is determined by the trade-offbetween the need for incentives and the gains from insurancethat voiding in some circumstances offers to the agents.     

The Bertrand Paradox,the Useless Auctioneer and the Launhardt Model

We revisit the Cournot–Bertrand debate in the light of Cournot, Edgeworth and Launhardt, tracing back to Launhardt the origin of price competition in duopoly models with constant returns to scale. Then, we discuss the formalisation of consumer utility function for differentiated products, first appearing in Launhardt and then in Bowley. This allows us to point out that assuming that firms know the demand function(s) is equivalent to assuming that they know the structure of consumer preferences. Therefore, we argue that there is no role for the auctioneer, either in Cournot or in Walras.     

ENDOGENOUS TIMING IN QUALITY CHOICES AND PRICE COMPETITION

We modify the price‐setting version of the vertically differentiated duopoly model by Aoki (2003) by introducing an extended game in which firms noncooperatively choose the timing of moves at the quality stage. Our results show that there are multiple equilibria in pure strategies, whereby firms always select sequential play at the quality stage. We also investigate the mixed‐strategy equilibrium, revealing that the probability of generating outcomes out of equilibrium is higher than the probability of playing one Nash equilibria in pure strategies. In the alternative case with full market coverage, we show that the quality stage is solved in dominant strategies and therefore the choice of roles becomes irrelevant as the Nash and Stackelberg solutions coincide. With full market coverage and corner solution, the results show that the game has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium in pure strategies, where the high‐quality firm takes the lead in the quality stage.     

Ethnic discrimination in hiring,labour market tightness and the business cycle - evidence from field experiments

Several studies using observational data suggest that ethnic discrimination increases in downturns of the economy. We investigate whether ethnic discrimination depends on labour market tightness using data from correspondence studies. We utilize three correspondence studies of the Swedish labour market and two different measures of labour market tightness. These two measures produce qualitatively similar results, and, opposite to the observational studies, suggest that ethnic discrimination in hiring decreases in downturns of the economy.