Over the Line: Managers' experience of a labour strike

The experiences of managers who continue to work through a labour stoppage is a largely overlooked question in industrial relations research and practice. Qualitative long interviews were conducted with managers who worked through a strike. A shared narrative for managers' strike experiences emerged. Managers perceived that their prestrike workplace was cooperative and characterized by positive labour‐management relationships. The strike was experienced as contentious and personalized with managers reporting that they and their families were targets of aggression from strikers. The managers envisioned a more formal poststrike workplace characterized by less collegial labour‐management interactions. We discuss the implications of these findings and call for further research on managers' experiences of industrial relations events. Copyright © 2014 ASAC. Published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Beyond the existence proof: ontological conditions, epistemological implications, and in-depth interview research

In-depth interviewing is a promising method. Alas, traditional in-depth interview sample designs prohibit generalizing. Yet, after acknowledging this limitation, in-depth interview studies generalize anyway. Generalization appears unavoidable; thus, sample design must be grounded in plausible ontological and epistemological assumptions that enable generalization. Many in-depth interviewers reject such designs. The paper demonstrates that traditional sampling for in-depth interview studies is indefensible given plausible ontological conditions, and engages the epistemological claims that purportedly justify traditional sampling. The paper finds that the promise of in-depth interviewing will go unrealized unless interviewers adopt ontologically plausible sample designs. Otherwise, in-depth interviewing can only provide existence proofs, at best.     

The influence of Taiwan’s stock market on Bitcoin’s price under Taiwan’s monetary policy threshold

ABSTRACT

This study uses a smooth transition autoregressive model with exogenous variables (STARX) to investigate whether there is a nonlinear relationship between Bitcoin and Taiwan’s stock market taking into account Taiwan’s monetary policy threshold during 2 February 2012 to 31 August 2019. The statistical results show there is a threshold effect and confirm a nonlinear relationship between Taiwan’s stock market and Bitcoin, with variations over time and across Bitcoin and Taiwan’s stock market. Specifically, we find that Bitcoin responds asymmetrically to Taiwan’s stock market according to the threshold value. Furthermore, the return on the closing price of TAIEX with a lag of two periods under Taiwan’s monetary policy threshold has a nonlinear impact on the return on the closing price of Bitcoin.     

Valuation structure in first-price and least-revenue auctions: an experimental investigation

In many auctions the valuation structure involves both private and common value elements. Existing experimental evidence (e.g. Goeree and Offerman in Am. Econ. Rev. 92(3):625–643, 2002) demonstrates that first-price auctions with this valuation structure tend to be inefficient, and inexperienced subjects tend to bid above the break-even bidding threshold. In this paper, we compare first-price auctions with an alternative auction mechanism: the least-revenue auction. This auction mechanism shifts the risk regarding the common value of the good to the auctioneer. Such a shift is desirable when ex post negative payoffs for the winning bidder results in unfulfilled contracts, as is often the case in infrastructure concessions contracts. We directly compare these two auction formats within two valuation structures: (1) pure common value and (2) common value with a private cost. We find that, relative to first-price auctions, bidding above the break-even bidding threshold is significantly less prevalent in least-revenue auctions regardless of valuation structure. As a result, revenue in first-price auctions is higher than in least-revenue auctions, contrary to theory. Further, when there are private and common value components, least-revenue auctions are significantly more efficient than first-price auctions.     

Language–Related Differences in a Contingent Valuation Study: English versus Spanish

To test the similarity of English– and Spanish–speaking households responses to a contingent valuation survey, phone interviews were conducted in both languages regarding two forest fire prevention programs. While there were similar response rates, there were significant differences in the most frequent reasons given for refusing to pay. In the pooled logit model, the language intercept and bid interaction variables were insignificant in both programs. The likelihood ratio test of separate logit equations showed no statistical difference between English– and Spanish–speaking households responses to either program. Mean benefits reported by Spanish–speaking households were about one–third lower than English–speaking households, although the difference is not statistically significant.     

The Economics of Controlling Insect-Transmitted Plant Diseases

A framework is developed to analyze a spatially dependent economically significant pest problem emanating from a source and spreading via a carrier such as an insect. Transmission and/or source control to combat the pest or disease problem are explored. Alternative assumptions about the effectiveness of transmission control and the feasibility and costs, both social and private, of reduction of the pest population at the source are examined in an application of the model to controlling Pierce's disease in California wine grapes.     

Efficiency of two sided investments in an equilibrium unemployment framework

This paper investigates the efficiency of investments by firms and workers in a matching model with high- and low-productivity jobs. Search is sector specific and random within sectors. Search frictions and ex-post bargaining imply that wage inequality arises as a result of the difference in investment costs between the sectors. The efficiency properties of the equilibrium are analyzed under the particular division in bargaining proposed by Hosios (1990). The conclusion is that the equilibrium is inefficient, with a too low fraction of workers and a too high vacancy-unemployment ratio in the high-productivity sector. The opposite happens in the low-productivity sector.     

Financial Uncertainty and Business Investment

The paper contributes to the empirical analysis of financial uncertainty and investment from a Post Keynesian perspective. The paper uses the volatility of the exchange rate, the volatility of the stock market index, and the real gold price as indicators for financial uncertainty. An increase in the volatility of a variable is a sufficient, but not a necessary condition for an increase in uncertainty regarding this variable. The effects of changes in uncertainty on investment are investigated econometrically for the United States, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Germany and France. Financial uncertainty, we find, has significant negative effects in the US and the Netherlands.     

An Extension and Further Validation of the Potential for Conflict Index

The Potential for Conflict Index (PCI) was developed to facilitate understanding and applicability of leisure, recreation, and human dimensions findings to managerial concerns. The PCI ranges from 0 (minimal potential for conflict) to 1 (maximum potential for conflict) and simultaneously describes a variable's central tendency, dispersion, and shape using a graphic display. This article (a) describes applications of the original formulation of the PCI (PCI₁) to illustrate the statistic's practical utility, (b) introduces the second generation of the PCI (PCI₂) and discusses enhancements incorporated in this version, (c) describes efforts to validate the PCI₂, and (d) offers suggestions for continuing the empirical validation process. Programs for calculating, graphing, and comparing PCI₂ values are freely available from http://welcome.warnercnr.colostate.edu/~jerryv.