PPP EXCHANGE RATE RULES,MACROECONOMIC (IN)STABILITY,AND LEARNING*

In order to maintain competitiveness, governments in developing economies seem to have pursued purchasing power parity (PPP) exchange rate rules, by adjusting the nominal devaluation rate in response to real exchange rate deviations from an intermediate target. This article shows that these rules are likely to induce macroeconomic instability, as they generate sunspot‐driven fluctuations that are in fact learnable by agents in the Expectational‐Stability sense. It finds that the existence of these “learnable sunspots” depends, among others, on open economy features, including the degree of openness and the degree of exchange rate pass‐through to consumer's import prices.     

Persistent gaps and default traps

We show how vicious circles in countries' credit histories arise in a model where output persistence is coupled with asymmetric information about output shocks. In such an environment, default signals the borrower's vulnerability to adverse shocks and creates a pessimistic growth outlook. This translates into higher interest spreads and debt servicing costs relative to income, raising the cost of future repayments, thereby creating “default traps”. We build a long and broad cross-country dataset to show the existence of a history-dependent “default premium” and of significant effects of output persistence on sovereign creditworthiness, consistent with the model's predictions.     

Pigouvian Taxes: A Strategic Approach

This paper analyzes the problem of designing mechanisms to implement efficient solutions in economies with externalities. We provide two simple mechanisms implementing the Pigouvian Social Choice Correspondence in environments in which coalitions can or cannot be formed.     

Promoting justice by treating people unequally: an experimental study

Which inequalities among individuals are considered unjust? This paper reports the results of an experiment designed to study distributive choices dealing with arbitrarily unequal initial endowments. In a three-person distribution problem where subjects either know or do not know their endowments, we find impartial behavior to be a stable pattern. Subjects either compensate for initial inequalities fully or not at all in both conditions, and they do so more often when they do not know their endowment than when they know it. Moreover, the type and the size of the good to be distributed also affect the frequency of impartial behavior.     

Foreign Direct Investment,Regulations and Growth

The paper explores the linkage between income growth rates and foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows. So far the evidence is rather mixed, as no robust relationship between FDI and income growth has been established. We argue that countries need a sound business environment in the form of good government regulations to be able to benefit from FDI. Using a comprehensive data set for regulations, we test this hypothesis and find evidence that excessive regulations restrict growth through FDI only in the most regulated economies. This result is robust to different specifications of the econometric model.     

Multivariate partial adjustment of financial ratios: a Bayesian hierarchical approach

In this paper we propose a multivariate extension of the partial adjustment model of financial ratios. To that end, we use a dynamic factor model which assumes that financial ratios measuring, essentially, the same economic–financial dimension of the firm evolve in a similar way, reflecting the evolution of the common factor. The proposed model is hierarchical with three levels. The first describes the relationship between each ratio and its common factor; the second describes the evolution of the common factors over time by means of Lev's ( 1969 ) partial adjustment model; and the third analyzes the similarity of firms' adjustment coefficients, taking into account their characteristics. The methodology is applied to the analysis of a set of financial ratios related to the business and financial structure of the firm. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Income inequality and colonialism

This paper proposes that colonialism is a major explanation behind today's differences in income inequality across countries. We argue that income inequality has been higher in the colonies where the percentage of European settlers to total population was higher, as long as Europeans remained a minority. The countries where Europeans became the majority of the population did not suffer from high inequality. These initial differences continue to hold today. The empirical evidence we provide strongly supports our thesis.     

A typology of de-coupling strategies in mixed services

A typology of a class of service systems is proposed. The typology links strategic operational objectives to the decision to de-couple work between the front and back offices of a service system. Four specific ideal types of a strategy/de-coupling mix are described; each of which has distinct operational, marketing and human resource ramifications. A type that has had significant representation in traditional literature is the “Cost Leader” type, where back-office activities are de-coupled from the front office for the purpose of lowering costs. Another traditional type representative of the craftsman legacy is the “Personal Service” type, which retains back-office tasks in the front office to pursue non-cost-oriented strategic goals. Theoretical and empirical evidence is also given for two non-traditional types: the “Kiosk” type, where all tasks remain in the front office to achieve lower costs, and the “Focused Professional” type, which de-couples front- and back-office activities to enable front-office workers to provide higher service, rather than to reduce costs. Empirically, retail bank lending systems are analyzed to support the typology.