On the Impact of Innovation on the Marginal Abatement Cost Curve

When modeling the effects of innovation on the marginal abatement cost (MAC) curve, many studies in environmental economics have posited, implicitly or explicitly, a uniform downward shift. The purpose of this paper is to thoroughly investigate this claim in a simple theoretical framework by introducing innovation in the production function of a price‐taking, polluting firm in four economically meaningful ways. We establish that the effects of innovation on the MAC curve depend critically on the specific type of innovation, and that only innovation in end‐of‐pipe technology leads to a uniform downward shift of the MAC curve. A second class of results points to the fact that for other types of innovation in the overall production process, the scope for an upward shift of the MAC curve in response to innovation is easier to justify theoretically. These results call for a re‐appraisal of various results in environmental policy obtained in theoretical work relying on this postulate.     

Similitudes and Discrepancies in Post‐Keynesian and Marxist Theories of Investment: A Theoretical and Empirical Investigation1

There has been a substantial amount of convergence between post‐Keynesian and Marxist economics, the writings of Kalecki being common ground for both traditions. Still, some differences remain. While authors in both traditions seem to agree to a large extent on short‐period issues, long‐period matters relating to the role of saving, the rate of profit, inflation, crowding out, excess money supply, are still contentious. All this seems to depend on the exact form taken by the investment function, more specifically the role of capacity utilization. Four different equations are set up to be tested, two of which correspond to two variants of the Marxist view, while the other two equations correspond to a naive and a sophisticated Kaleckian view, the latter being based on hysteresis. The equations are tested on three sets of annual Canadian data. Various statistical tests are applied to all four equations in an effort to rank them, notably information and encompassing tests. The Kaleckian equation with hysteresis generally comes out empirically with the preferred statistical properties, when manufacturing data on actual rates of capital accumulation are considered separately or when both realized and intended rates of investment for the total industrial sector are used.     

INCOME REDISTRIBUTION AND PUBLIC GOOD PROVISION: AN EXPERIMENT

We experimentally investigate the impact of income redistribution on voluntary contributions by groups of four subjects. We compare equalizing and unequalizing redistribution. Our data are consistent with the neutrality theorem: Redistribution does not affect the amount of voluntarily provided public good at the group level. However, at the individual level, subjects tend to underadjust with respect to the Nash prediction. We also observe an insignificant adjustment asymmetry between the poor and the rich: Subjects who become poorer adjust their contribution by a larger absolute amount than subjects who become richer. Finally, poor subjects tend to overcontribute significantly more than rich subjects.     

Weak Moral Motivation Leads to the Decline of Voluntary Contributions

We develop a model that accounts for the decay of the average contribution observed in experiments on voluntary contributions to a public good. The novel idea is that people's moral motivation is “weak.” Their judgment about the right contribution depends on observed contributions by group members and on an intrinsic “moral ideal.” We show that the assumption of weakly morally motivated agents leads to the decline of the average contribution over time. The model is compatible with persistence of overcontributions, variability of contributions (across and within individuals), the “restart effect” and the observation that the decay in contributions is slower in longer games. Furthermore, it offers a rationale for conditional cooperation.     

The Optimality of Arbitrary Partial Equilibrium Welfare Analysis

This paper characterizes the general equilibrium foundation of arbitrary partial equilibrium welfare analysis in second‐best economies. While prior theory recognizes the importance of market distortions affected by relative price changes, it offers little guidance about the necessary scope of Marshallian partial equilibrium analysis. The paper determines necessary and sufficient conditions for optima of Marshallian total surplus functions to characterize second‐best Pareto‐optimal allocations. While these conditions confirm much of the traditional approach to applied welfare economics, they bring doubt about its reliability for public policy and concerns over its systematic use to build conventional economic wisdom.     

THE ECONOMIC EVALUATION OF A JOINT SUPPLY CHAIN INNOVATION

In this paper we discuss the economic evaluation of a supply chain innovation. We look at a situation in which a single manufacturer and a single distributor consider relocating assets and reengineering processes, in order to reduce total assets and total costs in the supply chain. The selling price between the manufacturer and distributor needs to be adjusted to reflect the new costs and asset levels. We investigate the price adjustment needed to maintain the ROA (Return on Assets) of both companies and to yield a nonnegative NPV (Net Present Value) for both companies. We identify conditions under which ROA and NPV yield the same results, such as the absence of implementation costs. We also demonstrate that the minimum price required by the manufacturer may lie above the maximum price acceptable for the distributor. Then the price range is empty and companies will not be able to find a price adjustment that results in a nonnegative NPV and nondecreasing ROAs for both companies.     

Sharing the Cost of a Public Good without Subsidies

We study the construction of a social ordering function for the case of a public good financed by contributions from the population. We extend the analysis of Maniquet and Sprumont (2004) to the case when cost shares cannot be negative, i.e., agents cannot receive subsidies from others. We adapt the Maniquet–Sprumont defense of public good welfare egalitarianism to this context. Weakening their Free Lunch Aversion axiom and adding a continuity requirement allows us to characterize the public good welfare maximin social ordering function.     

Help the Low Skilled or Let the Hardworking Thrive? A Study of Fairness in Optimal Income Taxation

In a model where agents have unequal wages and heterogeneous preferences, we study the optimal redistribution via an income tax, when the social objective is based on a combination of efficiency and fairness principles, and when incentive issues are taken into account. We show how some fairness principles entail specific features for the optimal taxes, such as progressivity or tax exemption for incomes below the minimum wage.     

THE STRATEGIC TIMING OF DIRECT DEMOCRACY

This paper focuses on the strategic timing of elections by agenda-setters in direct democracy settings. Because concurrent elections affect turnout, scheduling referenda for different elections will produce different median voters. I hypothesize that agenda-setters with power over the timing of a referendum will schedule the referendum in conjunction with the other set of races that produce a policy closest to their preferred outcome. Consistent with the theory, I show that Wisconsin school boards' use of special elections for school referenda are related to differences in the revealed preferences of voters in low- and high-turnout elections.