Modelling the Allocation of Australian Bilaterial Aid: A Two-Part Sample Selection Approach*

This paper focuses on the allocation of Australian bilateral aid to developing countries. It simultaneously models the determination of potential recipients' eligibility for Australian aid and the amounts of aid that eligible countries receive. A variant of the econometric technique developed by Lee and Maddala (1985) is utilized. The results obtained indicate that the decisions underlying the allocation of Australian bilateral aid generally seem consistent with the humanitarian, commercial, political and strategic motives underlying the aid program as a whole.     

Recognition v. Disclosure, Auditor Tolerance for Misstatement, and the Reliability of Stock-Compensation and Lease Information

We examine whether information in footnotes might lack reliability because auditors permit more misstatement in disclosed, as opposed to recognized, amounts. In both the stock‐compensation and lease settings, audit partners require greater correction of misstatements in recognized amounts than in the equivalent disclosed amounts. Debriefing questions indicate that the partners make these decisions knowingly, even though they expect greater client resistance to correcting recognized amounts, because they view recognized amounts as more material. Partners also spend more time on correction decisions for recognized information. While prior literature suggests that amounts are often relegated to footnotes because they are less reliable, our results suggest that the actual choice to disclose versus recognize can also reduce information reliability. These results have implications for the interpretation of prior research on the reliability of recognized and disclosed numbers, for financial‐accounting standard setters who may want to consider the reliability effects of their recognition versus disclosure decisions, and for auditing standard setters who may wish to clarify auditors' responsibilities for preventing misstatements in disclosed amounts.     

Why Don't U.S. Issuers Demand European Fees for IPOs?

We compare fees charged by investment banks for conducting IPOs in the United States and Europe. In recent years, the “7% solution,” as documented by Chen and Ritter (2000) , has become even more prevalent in the United States, and is now the norm for IPOs raising up to $250 million. The same banks dominate both markets, but European IPO fees are roughly three percentage points lower, are much more variable, and have been falling. We review explanations for the gap in spreads and find the evidence consistent with strategic pricing. U.S. issuers could have saved over $1 billion a year by paying European fees.     

Tax-Induced Trading and the Turn-of-the-Year Anomaly: An Intraday Study

This study tests the tax-induced trading hypothesis as an explanation of the turn-of-the-year anomaly using Canadian and U.S. intraday data. Since the Canadian tax year-end precedes the calendar year-end by five business days, tax effects may be isolated. We find the anomaly is related to the degree of seller-and buyer-initiated trading and depends upon the incidence of the taxation year-end. Seller-initiated transactions (at bid prices) dominate until the tax year-end after which buyer-initiated trades (at ask prices) dominate. The anomaly is a function of bid-ask prices.