THE EFFECT OF GATE REVENUE SHARING ON SOCIAL WELFARE

This paper provides a theoretical model of a team sports league based on contest theory and studies the welfare effect of gate revenue sharing. It derives two counterintuitive results. First, it challenges the "invariance proposition" by showing that revenue sharing reduces competitive balance and thus produces a more unbalanced league. Second, the paper concludes that a lower degree of competitive balance compared with the noncooperative league equilibrium yields a higher level of social welfare and club profits. Combining both results, it concludes that gate revenue sharing increases social welfare and club profits in our model. ( JEL L83)     

Thinking about Prices versus Thinking about Returns in Financial Markets

Prices and returns are alternative ways to present information and to elicit expectations in financial markets. But do investors think of prices and returns in the same way? We present three studies in which subjects differ in the level of expertise, amount of information, and type of incentive scheme. The results are consistent across all studies: asking subjects to forecast returns as opposed to prices results in higher expectations, whereas showing them return charts rather than price charts results in lower expectations. Experience is not a useful remedy but cognitive reflection mitigates the impact of format changes.     

INSTITUTIONALISED JUSTIFICATION OF CORPORATE ACTION: INTERNATIONALISATION AND THE EU IN CORPORATE REPORTS

This paper provides an institutional analysis of the way a set of Finnish firms have used the concept of internationalisation and the EU in justifying major strategic decisions. They have used internationalisation, and in particular the then new possibility of Finland joining the EU, as an argument in support of radical change. An analysis of their annual reports reveals a number of institutional arguments which are strong because they are generally accepted, a priori, as being important not only to firms but indeed to Finland as a whole. In using institutional arguments firms are aligning their own interests with those of the country, and in so doing are able to justify radical changes in most parts of their own organisations. We are not claiming that Finnish firms should not react to the challenges which EU represents. Rather, we suggest that by using institutional arguments they are borrowing legitimacy from a wider public. The arguments used are typically very broad, invoking very general visions of the role of Finland in the EU. We call these arguments “easy rides” because, even if they are only partially explicated, it is generally assumed that they will become accepted without questioning by public and employees alike. Certain specific patterns of “easy rides” can be distinguished: i) The mobilisation of a “national mission”, ii) “Sacrifice now, reap the benefit later”, and iii) “Bigger is better”. The paper concludes with a methodological discussion about the difficulty of distinguishing between the technical/functional and the institutional arguments.     

Hedge Funds and the Technology Bubble

This paper documents that hedge funds did not exert a correcting force on stock prices during the technology bubble. Instead, they were heavily invested in technology stocks. This does not seem to be the result of unawareness of the bubble: Hedge funds captured the upturn, but, by reducing their positions in stocks that were about to decline, avoided much of the downturn. Our findings question the efficient markets notion that rational speculators always stabilize prices. They are consistent with models in which rational investors may prefer to ride bubbles because of predictable investor sentiment and limits to arbitrage.     

The Maturity Rat Race

Why do some firms, especially financial institutions, finance themselves so short‐term? We show that extreme reliance on short‐term financing may be the outcome of a maturity rat race: a borrower may have an incentive to shorten the maturity of an individual creditor's debt contract because this dilutes other creditors. In response, other creditors opt for shorter maturity contracts as well. This dynamic toward short maturities is present whenever interim information is mostly about the probability of default rather than the recovery in default. For borrowers that cannot commit to a maturity structure, equilibrium financing is inefficiently short‐term.     

Geographic Cross-Sectional Fiscal Spending Multipliers and the Role of Local Autonomy: Evidence from European Regions

Using a panel of 268 European regions during 1990–2014, we document that the degree of local government's autonomy, measured with the “Local Autonomy Index,” has a significant positive effect on the fiscal spending multiplier. The estimated geographic cross-sectional fiscal spending multiplier is on average close to zero in countries with the lowest degree of local autonomy, and around unity in countries with the highest degree of local autonomy. Multipliers are state-dependent: larger when gross domestic product is below trend and when there is slack in the labor market; in those states, local autonomy has a particularly large positive effect on the multiplier. To interpret the empirical findings, we build a Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model where both local and central government spending contribute to a public good that enhances private labor productivity. Local governments are more efficient in producing the public good and the multiplier is higher in countries where local government spending has a larger share in the production of the public good.