Bounded Rationality and Use of Alternative Financial Services

The increasing pervasiveness of high‐cost alternative financial services (AFS) has captured the attention of policymakers, consumer educators, and financial counselors. Using data from the 2009 to 2012 waves of the National Financial Capability Study (NFCS), this article investigates AFS borrowing behaviors through the lens of a boundedly rational choice framework, with an emphasis on overconfidence. Through repeated testing of isolated samples of individuals with characteristics that make them less likely to objectively need such products, the roles of actual (objective) and perceived (subjective) financial knowledge in the decision‐making process are explored. Consistent results indicate that individuals with lower objective financial knowledge and those that are overconfident in their self‐assessed knowledge level are significantly more likely to utilize AFS instruments. These results suggest that a significant portion of AFS users may select these products without conducting adequate search, resulting in less than optimal financial decisions holding all else equal.     

穿越绩效管理盲区

如今,食业管理者掌握了各种各样的管理工具,包括预算、计划、质量控制等等。但是,很少有人能掌握一套系统的方法米履行他们最重要的职责之一--最大限度地激励员工。     

Explaining Eastern Germany's Wage Gap: The Impact of Structural Change

Since Eastern Germany's conversion to a market economy wages have remained considerably below the West German wage level. This article looks at the role of establishment-specific factors—such as sectoral affiliation and size of the labour force—in this process. A non-parametric decomposition that has played a prominent role in the gender wage gap literature is applied to breakdown the East–West wage gap into its constituent components. Using establishment data from German employment statistics, the article demonstrates that the catching-up process of Eastern Germany's wage level is hindered by the shift in its economic structure towards lower-paying types of companies, which has caused the lagging behind in the adjustment of wages.     

Sex equity in early childhood environments

Many children spend their days in day-care centres where they have the opportunity to learn about sex appropriate behaviours. The instrument Sex Equity in Early Childhood Environments (SEECE) was developed for use in promoting equiry. Field-tested and revised, the instrument addresses the areas of teaching behaviour, child awareness, centre and community, facilities and equipment and career awareness. The SEECE instrument can be used with relative ease in focusing on changes needed to achieve a more equitable environment.     

Improving performance through cost allocation*

Abstract. This paper considers an intrafirm resource allocation model with a single principal and n agents. Each agent represents a division manager who uses a centrally provided input together with other inputs, including effort, to produce and sell final products. The principal represents an owner who is responsible for providing an input to the divisions. It is assumed that each agent (division manager) knows the local profit function for the division and has disutility for effort. The principal seeks to maximize firm-wide profits net of the costs of the centrally provided input and compensation to the agents. In this setting, which incorporates divergence of preferences and asymmetric information, it is shown that the principal and the n agents can strictly improve their welfare by moving from a set of compensation functions that do not include any allocation of costs to compensation functions that are based on cost allocation. Résumé. Les auteurs se penchent sur un modèle de répartition des ressources intraentreprise en présence d'un seul mandant et de n mandataires. Chaque mandataire représente un directeur de division qui utilise un intrant, fourni par l'échelon central, en conjonction avec d'autres intrants, y inclus l'effort, pour fabriquer et vendre des produits finis. Le mandant représente un propriétaire à qui incombe la responsabilité de fournir un intrant aux divisions. L'on suppose que chaque mandataire (directeur de division) connaît la fonction de profit de sa division et a l'effort en aversion. Le mandant cherche à maximiser les profits globaux de l'entreprise, compte tenu des coûts de l'intrant fourni par l'échelon central et de la rémunération des mandataires. Dans cette situation, qui fait intervenir des préférences divergentes et de l'information asymétrique, l'on démontre que le mandant et les n mandataires peuvent strictement améliorer leur situation en passant d'un ensemble de fonctions de rémunération qui ne prévoient aucune ventilation des coûts à des fonctions de rémunération basées sur la ventilation des coûts.