The Information Content of Mutual Fund Print Advertising

The mutual fund industry has experienced tremendous growth in recent years. During this time period mutual funds have become somewhat of a commodity with many funds using advertising to attract investors. The current study uses content analysis to determine the informational content of fund advertising. The results indicate that while the average number of informational cues increased during the time period 1979 to 1989, there was no significant increase in the information content of mutual fund advertising between 1989 and 1999. Relatively few funds include information such as loads, 12b‐1 fees, and expense ratios in their advertisements, and fund ads rarely discuss risk.     

Measuring the Information Content of the Beige Book: A Mixed Data Sampling Approach

Studies of the predictive ability of the Federal Reserve's Beige Book for aggregate output and employment have proven inconclusive. This might be attributed, in part, to its irregular release schedule. We use a model that allows for data sampling at mixed frequencies to analyze the predictive power of the Beige Book. We find that the Beige Book's national summary and District reports predict GDP and aggregate employment and that most District reports provide information content for regional employment. In addition, there appears to be an asymmetry in the predictive content of the Beige Book language.     

Corporate Political Contributions and Stock Returns

We develop a new and comprehensive database of firm‐level contributions to U.S. political campaigns from 1979 to 2004. We construct variables that measure the extent of firm support for candidates. We find that these measures are positively and significantly correlated with the cross‐section of future returns. The effect is strongest for firms that support a greater number of candidates that hold office in the same state that the firm is based. In addition, there are stronger effects for firms whose contributions are slanted toward House candidates and Democrats.     

German Employers’ Inputs to Employee Skills Development

Using organizational level survey data, this article analyzes larger German private employers’ inputs to employee skills development, to test the theory that unions and employers’ associations raise employer incentives for training. Large German employers maintained their overall contribution between 1995 and 1999. Indicative data for 2004 suggest that this has continued, yet neither membership of employers’ associations nor high union densities influenced it.     

Modesty May Pay!

Most noncooperative game theoretic models of international environmental agreements (IEAs) draw a pessimistic picture of the prospective of successful cooperation. In this paper, we consider the possibility that countries agree on modest instead of ambitious abatement targets. It is shown that this can be an explanation for higher participation and more successful treaties. Thus, modesty may well pay, though the first‐best optimum cannot be achieved. It is also demonstrated that our model extension makes it easier to relate the stylized model to actual negotiations.     

Issues in the Drive to Measure Liabilities at Fair Value

This paper compares the discussion on liability measurement in Accounting The0y Monograph 10 with the liability measurement requirements in recent international proposals on accounting for financial instruments. Rather than conducting a detailed review of the Monograph, the paper examines three major issues which wawant amplifjing, extending or criticising: What is “fair value”? Why fair value liabilities? Should fair value include an entity's own credit risk? The focus is on financial liabilities such as “plain vanilla” debt; other financial liabilities, such as insurance obligations, pensions, wawanties and environmental damage restoration involve additional considerations and are therefore not considered.     

THE DETERMINANTS OF STATE‐LEVEL CAPS ON PUNITIVE DAMAGES: THEORY AND EVIDENCE

Under the standard economic model of torts, punitive damages correct for imperfect detection. Incorporating litigation costs into the model provides a justification for punitive damage caps. At the optimum, caps balance deterrence against the cost of litigation. Empirical testing of the model is performed via Cox proportional and parametric hazard analyses, using a panel dataset from 1981 to 2007. The results reveal a positive relationship between legal services employment (a proxy for legal costs) and cap enactment, and a negative relationship between state gross state product (a proxy for damages) and cap enactment. Cap enactment is also influenced by political ideology. (JEL K13, K41, L51)     

TARGETS IN THE TAYLOR RULE: INFLATION,SPEED LIMIT,OR PRICE LEVEL?

This paper explores the link between alternative targets in the Taylor rule and their empirical fit using real‐time U.S. macroeconomic data. We first study the stabilizing properties of the classical Taylor rule (inflation targeting, IT) and add either a price‐level target (PLT) or output gap quasigrowth target (speed‐limit targeting, SLT) in the context of the standard New Keynesian model. We demonstrate that, although only SLT has the same functional form as the optimal interest‐rate reaction function, both PLT and SLT stabilize the model macroeconomy against a cost‐push shock for a wide range of parameter values better than IT. We then estimate all three specifications using the Greenbook data. We find much stronger support for SLT than PLT and discuss pitfalls in estimating the latter that are present in existing literature. (JEL E52, E58)     

Indirect Incentives of Hedge Fund Managers

Indirect incentives exist in the money management industry when good current performance increases future inflows of capital, leading to higher future fees. For the average hedge fund, indirect incentives are at least 1.4 times as large as direct incentives from incentive fees and managers’ personal stakes in the fund. Combining direct and indirect incentives, manager wealth increases by at least $0.39 for a $1 increase in investor wealth. Younger and more scalable hedge funds have stronger flow‐performance relations, leading to stronger indirect incentives. These results have a number of implications for our understanding of incentives in the asset management industry.