Financial Stress Regimes and the Macroeconomy

Some financial stress events lead to macroeconomic downturns, while others appear to be isolated to financial markets. We identify financial stress regimes using a model that explicitly links financial variables to macro‐economic outcomes. The stress regimes are identified using an unbalanced panel of financial variables with an embedded method for variable selection. Our identified stress regimes are associated with corporate credit tightening and with NBER recessions. An exogenous deterioration in our financial conditions index has strong negative effects in economic activity, and negative amplification effects on inflation in the stress regime. These results are obtained with a novel factor‐augmented vector autoregressive model with smooth‐transition regimes (FASTVAR).     

Testing Implications of Spatial Economics Models: Some Evidence from Food Retailing

Under certain conditions, spatial economics models predict an increase in product price after entry of new competitors in a market area. However, a review of spatial economics models suggests new competitors should cause lower prices in urbanized markets, although the effect is dependent on distance between the existing and new firms. An empirical analysis of entry in a local retail food market supports this hypothesis for food products but not nonfood products.     

The Response of Equity Prices to Movements in Long‐Term Interest Rates Associated with Monetary Policy Statements: Before and After the Zero Lower Bound

Monetary policy actions since 2008 have influenced long‐term interest rates through forward guidance and quantitative easing. I propose a strategy to identify the comovement between interest rate and equity price movements induced by monetary policy when an observable representing policy changes is not available. A decline in long‐term interest rates induced by monetary policy statements has a larger positive effect on equity prices prior to 2009 than in the subsequent period. This change appears to reflect the impact of the zero lower bound on short‐term interest rates.     

Indirect Incentives of Hedge Fund Managers

Indirect incentives exist in the money management industry when good current performance increases future inflows of capital, leading to higher future fees. For the average hedge fund, indirect incentives are at least 1.4 times as large as direct incentives from incentive fees and managers’ personal stakes in the fund. Combining direct and indirect incentives, manager wealth increases by at least $0.39 for a $1 increase in investor wealth. Younger and more scalable hedge funds have stronger flow‐performance relations, leading to stronger indirect incentives. These results have a number of implications for our understanding of incentives in the asset management industry.     

Do Managers of U.S. Defined Benefit Pension Plan Sponsors Use Regulatory Freedom Strategically?

We use historical particularities of pension funding law to investigate whether managers of U.S. corporate defined benefit pension plan sponsors strategically use regulatory freedom to lower the reported value of pension liabilities, and hence required cash contributions. For some years, pension plans were required to estimate two liabilities—one with mandated discount rates and mortality assumptions, and another where these could be chosen freely. Using a sample of 11,963 plans, we find that the regulated liability exceeds the unregulated measure by 10% and the difference further increases for underfunded pension plans. Underfunded plans tend to assume substantially higher discount rates and lower life expectancy. The effect persists both in the cross‐section of plans and over time and it serves to reduce cash contributions. We further show that plan sponsor managers use the freed‐up cash for corporate investment and that credit risk is unlikely to explain the finding.     

Why Does Return Predictability Concentrate in Bad Times?

We build an equilibrium model to explain why stock return predictability concentrates in bad times. The key feature is that investors use different forecasting models, and hence assess uncertainty differently. As economic conditions deteriorate, uncertainty rises and investors' opinions polarize. Disagreement thus spikes in bad times, causing returns to react to past news. This phenomenon creates a positive relation between disagreement and future returns. It also generates time‐series momentum, which strengthens in bad times, increases with disagreement, and crashes after sharp market rebounds. We provide empirical support for these new predictions.     

Optimal Transfer Pricing Method and Fixed Cost Allocation

Prior empirical research on transfer pricing only reported what firms do but seldom explained why. This study moves the research forward by introducing hypothesis testing.
Atkinson (1987) shows that pricing transfers at variable cost when capacity is in excess. as prescribed by economic theory. would induce the buying unit to overstate expected demand at the capacity planning stage and cause a waste of resources. To test whether the strategic issue affects transfer pricing decisions, the study compares pricing methods for long- term transfer situations. which were provided for at the capacity planning stage, and ad hoc transfers.
As well. while the two-step method of charging full cost -charging variable cost for each unit transferred and separately charging a flat fee each period for capacity on reserve -has many good control qualities, it remained just an academic curiosity: there was no evidence of its wide use among firms. This study finds that the two-step method is as widely in use as the one-step method -charging variable cost plus unit fixed costs for each unit transferred.     

German Employers’ Inputs to Employee Skills Development

Using organizational level survey data, this article analyzes larger German private employers’ inputs to employee skills development, to test the theory that unions and employers’ associations raise employer incentives for training. Large German employers maintained their overall contribution between 1995 and 1999. Indicative data for 2004 suggest that this has continued, yet neither membership of employers’ associations nor high union densities influenced it.     

Modesty May Pay!

Most noncooperative game theoretic models of international environmental agreements (IEAs) draw a pessimistic picture of the prospective of successful cooperation. In this paper, we consider the possibility that countries agree on modest instead of ambitious abatement targets. It is shown that this can be an explanation for higher participation and more successful treaties. Thus, modesty may well pay, though the first‐best optimum cannot be achieved. It is also demonstrated that our model extension makes it easier to relate the stylized model to actual negotiations.