The Commercialization of Government's Departmental Accounting (AAS 29): Quasi Rents and Public Welfare

In the Australian public sector. departmental administrative reform is intent on producing lean. efficient. commercially orientated government entities. An accounting regulatory response is AAS 29. Financial Reporting for Governtizetzt Departments. which requires all government departments as reporting entities to adopt in principle much of the whole corpus of private sector accounting standards and statements including. importantly, current cost accounting. This paper explores the proposition that the commercialization of departmental accounting through AAS 29 or similar pronouncements is directly associated with a significant reduction in social and public welfare accountability. Accounting processes are powerful. value-laden agents of social change. Benston (1980) states that 'benefits (net of costs) of accounting standards to society' cannot be measured but can be specified for individuals. Here. accounting outcomes are identified to be the residuals of economic policies to eliminate quasi rents in government. Standardization in AAS 29 rests on the assumption that rights and obligations being equities of generations of participants can be periodically measured as A -L = E at current factor prices. This economic notion lacks cultural heritage in financial disclosure of continuing equities in government and may, for any generation of consumers. induce an excess of social costs over social benefits for the accounting standardization process under prevailing managerialist philosophies.     

Preemptive Bidding and the Role of the Medium of Exchange in Acquisitions

The medium of exchange in acquisitions is studied in a model where (i) bidders' offers bring forth potential competition and (ii) targets and bidders are asymmetrically informed. In equilibrium, both securities and cash offers are observed. Securities have the advantage of inducing target management to make an efficient accept/reject decision. Cash has the advantage of serving, in equilibrium, to “preempt” competition by signaling a high valuation for the target. Implications concerning the medium of exchange of an offer, the probability of acceptance, the probability of competing bids, expected profits, and the costs of bidders are derived.     

Compensation and Incentives: Practice vs. Theory

A thorough understanding of internal incentive structures is critical to developing a viable theory of the firm, since these incentives determine to a large extent how individuals inside an organization behave. Many common features of organizational incentive systems are not easily explained by traditional economic theory—including egalitarian pay systems in which compensation is largely independent of performance, the overwhelming use of promotion-based incentive systems, the absence of up-front fees for jobs and effective bonding contracts, and the general reluctance of employers to fire, penalize, or give poor performance evaluations to employees. Typical explanations for these practices offered by behaviorists and practitioners are distinctly uneconomic—focusing on notions such as fairness, equity, morale, trust, social responsibility, and culture. The challenge to economists is to provide viable economic explanations for these practices or to integrate these alternative notions into the traditional economic model.     

SPECIAL GOVERNMENT ASSISTANCE TO DEFENSE-DEPENDENT INDUSTRY WORKERS: THE CASE OF THE AEROSPACE INDUSTRY

The end of the Cold War brought profound changes to defense-dependent sectors of the civilian economy. The aerospace industry has been at the vortex of these contractions. Based on the assumption that aerospace workers suffered unique hardships, the federal government established special programs to assist them. This study tests that broad assumption using unique administrative data from California. Although some aerospace workers suffered substantially, their experiences were not appreciably different from those of non-aerospace durable goods workers, which calls into question the rationale for special assistance to workers in defense-dependent industries.     

Consumers’ Understanding of Privacy Rules in the Marketplace

Studies suggest the general structure of Web sites leads consumers away from demanding that online merchants take certain approaches to privacy as a condition for dealing with them. This article presents findings from a nationally representative survey showing that the absence of such a privacy marketplace can also be attributed to the public’s incomplete knowledge of privacy regulations. Most respondents correctly understood that regulations regarding merchants’ sharing information are domain specific. The respondents were only sporadically correct, however, regarding which domains have which rules. The study raises questions about the best approaches to education in the absence of a coherent national policy of privacy regulation.     

Do Initial Public Offering Firms Purchase Analyst Coverage with Underpricing?

We report that initial public offering (IPO) underpricing is positively related to analyst coverage by the lead underwriter and to the presence of an all‐star analyst on the research staff of the lead underwriter. These findings are robust to controls for other determinants of underpricing and to controls for the endogeneity of underpricing and analyst coverage. In addition, we find that the probability of switching underwriters between IPO and seasoned equity offering is negatively related to the unexpected amount of post‐IPO analyst coverage. These findings are consistent with the hypothesis that underpricing is, in part, compensation for expected post‐IPO analyst coverage from highly ranked analysts.     

On Stock Market Returns and Returns on Investment

This article presents general conditions under which it is possible to obtain asset pricing relations from the intertemporal optimal investment decision of the firm. Under the assumption of linear homogeneous production and adjustment cost functions (the Hayashi (1982) conditions), it is possible to establish, state by state, the equality between the return on investment and the market return of the financial claims issued by the firm. This result proves to be, in essence, robust to the consideration of very general constraints on investment and the inclusion of taxes.