三峡外迁移民的社会适应性及其影响因素研究——对江苏227户移民的调查

通过实证调查的资料对三峡外迁移民的社会适应状况作了描述,对影响其社会适应性的因素进行了分析。就总的社会适应性而言,一半以上的移民已基本适应了迁入地的生活。与三峡外迁移民的社会适应状况密切相关的因素主要有搬迁前后经济收入的差异、当地居民的态度、语言适应性、政府关心状况、迁入地治安状况、住房条件的差异。     

Overeducation, regional labor markets, and spatial flexibility

For most workers, access to suitable employment is severely restricted by the fact that they look for jobs in the regional labor market rather than the global one. In this paper we analyze how macrolevel opportunities (regional market characteristics) and microlevel restrictions (the extent to which job searchers are restricted to the regional market) can help to explain the phenomenon of overeducation. We use a two-step procedure to control selective access to employment. The results show that the size of the labor market is an important factor in avoiding overeducation.     

Nonresponse Bias and Stimulus Effects in the Dutch National Election Study

Bias is a much-debated issue in survey research. Answer effects (respondents claim to have behaved differently than they did in reality), nonresponse bias (nonrespondents differ on important variables from the respondents) and stimulus effects (by participating in a previous wave of a study, respondents change their behavior or attitude) can seriously distort the results of survey research. By using data from the 1998 Dutch National Election Study the authors show that the results of election research can indeed be affected by bias. Not only are significant effects found in the distribution of political attitude and voting behavior variables as a result of both nonresponse bias and stimulus effects, it is also shown that relations between variables change as a result of bias.     

我国创业投资的回报率及其影响因素

基于1999年到2003年间我国56个本土创业投资退出项目的数据,本文对我国创业投资退出项目的投资回报率及其影响因素进行了实证研究。结果表明:(1)国有创业投资机构退出项目的平均投资回报率显著低于非国有创业投资机构;(2)创业投资机构的资本规模与回报率呈显著负相关关系;(3)上海、深圳两地创业投资机构退出项目的回报率显著高于其他地区;(4)本土创业投资机构的从业时间、投资规模、投资周期、退出方式均与回报率没有显著相关关系。本文在此基础上提出了相关的政策建议。     

THE PUBLIC SECTOR PAY GAP IN FRANCE, GREAT BRITAIN AND ITALY

We investigate public–private pay determination using French, British and Italian microdata. While traditional methods focus on parametric methods to estimate the public sector pay gap, in this paper, we use both non-parametric (kernel) and quantile regression methods to analyze the distribution of wages across sectors. We show that the public–private (hourly) wage differential is sensitive to the choice of quantile and that the pattern of premia varies with both gender and skill. In all countries the public sector is found to pay more to low skilled workers with respect to the private sector, whilst the reverse is true for high skilled workers. When comparing results across countries, we find that where pay formation is more regulated (i.e. as in France and Italy) the public sector pay gap is smaller; whilst where market factors play a larger role in pay determination (i.e. as in Great Britain) the public sector pay gap is larger—particularly in the lower part of the wage distribution—and females are much better off in the public sector as compared to the private sector.     

科学与实证——一个基于“神经元经济学”的综述

诞生于20世纪90年代中晚期的神经元经济学(Neuroeconomics)是经济学的最新分支和经济学前沿研究的最新领域,它运用现代神经科学的范式、方法和技术工具分析人类的经济行为以及脑组织(主要是神经元及其相关的神经突触联结和神经网络)在人类决策过程中的功能、作用和机制,把经济学的实证研究提升到一个前所未有的高度,对经济学传统理论提出一系列意义重大的修正,从而为经济学的发展深化开拓了一个全新的空间。     

Does seeing more deeply into a game increase one’s chances of winning?

The substantively rational value of the games studied in this paper does not help predict subject performance in the experiment at all. An accurate model must account for the cognitive ability of the people playing the game. This paper investigates whether the variation in measured rationality bounds is correlated with the probability of winning when playing against another person in games that exceed both players’ estimated rationality bound. Does seeing deeper into a game matter when neither player can see to the end of the game? Subjects with higher measured bounds win 63 percent of the time and the larger the difference the more frequently they win.     

Existence of a competitive equilibrium in a one sector growth model with heterogeneous agents and irreversible investment

Summary. We prove existence of a competitive equilibrium in a version of a Ramsey (one sector) model in which agents are heterogeneous and gross investment is constrained to be non negative. We do so by converting the infinite-dimensional fixed point problem stated in terms of prices and commodities into a finite-dimensional Negishi problem involving individual weights in a social value function. This method allows us to obtain detailed results concerning the properties of competitive equilibria. Because of the simplicity of the techniques utilized our approach is amenable to be adapted by practitioners in analogous problems often studied in macroeconomics. Received: September 13, 2001; revised version: December 9, 2002 RID="*" ID="*" We are grateful to Tapan Mitra for pointing out errors as well as making very valuable suggestions. Thanks are due to Raouf Boucekkine and Jorge Duran for additional helpful discussions. We also thank an anonymous referee for his/her helpful comments. The second author acknowledges the financial support of the Belgian Ministry of Scientific Research (Grant ARC 99/04-235 “Growth and incentive design”) and of the Belgian Federal Goverment (Grant PAI P5/10, “Equilibrium theory and optimization for public policy and industry regulation”). Correspondence to: C. Le Van     

Intertemporal market division:: A case of alternating monopoly

In this paper, we report on an equilibrium with market dominance that exists in a simple two-firm model that features neither entry barriers nor sophisticated punishment strategies. This equilibrium induces an intertemporal market division in which the two firms alternate as monopolists - despite the fact that the model also sustains a Cournot duopoly. Even when initially both firms are active in the market, the alternating monopoly reveals itself rather quickly. Moreover, it Pareto dominates the Cournot equilibrium - as it is close to the cartel outcome. Several examples of what well may be such alternating monopolies are presented.