Transparency in monetary policy

The paper examines different aspects of transparency. Transparency serves democratic accountability by promoting public control. Specifically, the degree of transparency conditions inflation expectations, hence the central bank's scope for stabilization. Recent studies have put doubt on the notion that complete transparency is socially desirable. Here it is pointed out that the conclusion critically depends on an asymmetric modelling of stochastic preferences. The paper also reviews the pros and cons of revealing individual voting. A conclusion is that secrecy is to be prefered in monetary unions in order to shield governors from pressure by home governments. Presidential Address presented at the Fifty-Third International Atlantic Economic Conference, March 13–17, 2002, Paris, France.     

Management of dispersed product development teams: the role of information technologies

In recent years, international corporations such as IBM are increasingly relying on dispersed R&D teams in order to keep pace with resource availability and the demands of global markets. The advantages of this approach arise mainly from the utilization of differences in personnel costs and gaining access to a broader knowledge base to satisfy the demands of international clients. The disadvantages of teams of this kind are obvious: geographic distances, differences in culture and work habits as well as the necessity to bridge time zones place greater demands on communication, synchronization and management.
The application of specific project management methods and the intensive use of information technology (IT) lessens the disadvantages in transnational development projects. Recently completed projects involving large-scale commercial software development at IBM demonstrate the potentials of IT in transnational development. The authors advocate the application of IT adapted to specific situations. The central fields of application of IT in dispersed R&D teams are the development of a personal network, the promotion of creativity, the exchange of technical information, and the coordination of decentralized project activities.     

Shocks, Policy Reforms and Pro-Poor Growth in Bolivia: A Simulation Analysis

This paper analyzes how major external shocks and policy reforms affect Bolivia’s ability to achieve pro‐poor growth. Employing a recursive‐dynamic CGE model, it considers three different scenarios: an optimistic baseline scenario; a more realistic scenario that accounts for two important negative external shocks (declining capital inflows and El Niño); and a scenario that captures the combined effect of the shocks and two major reform projects (development of the gas sector and deregulation of the urban labor market). It turns out that the shocks are likely to impair Bolivia’s medium‐term development prospects, leading to marked increases in both urban and rural poverty. If the reform projects were implemented, the poverty increase caused by the shocks would be more than offset for urban households, but reinforced for rural households.     

Rezensionen

Ohne Zusammenfassung     

Rezensionen

Ohne Zusammenfassung     

Successive Oligopolies,Vertical Downstream Integration and Foreclosure

Vertically integrated firms have repeatedly been accused of abusing a dominant position by refusing to sell the intermediate product to non-integrated downstream producers and thus to practice foreclosure. To evaluate the merit of such an accusation requires an adequate theory of vertical integration which allows to decide whether a refusal to sell follows straightforwardly from profit maximization or is driven by an intent to monopolize. We investigate whether in the case of successive oligopolies vertical integration is profitable for the participating firms and to what extent cross deliveries between integrated and non-integrated firms can be expected to arise. By contrast to the previous literature where at the downstream level Cournot competition has been assumed to prevail between integrated firms and non-integrated downstream producers, we propose a model where integrated firms and non-integrated upstream suppliers meet in Cournot competition and take as given the inverse demand function for both the final and the intermediate product. Game theory is invoked to examine whether an integrated firm will participate in the intermediate market. If marginal costs at the downstream level are constant and identical as between integrated and non-integrated firms, integrated firms will never wish to sell to non-integrated downstream producers they can, however, be expected to buy from non-integrated upstream suppliers. Utilizing theoretical implications regarding pass through of changes in marginal costs we find empirical evidence supporting the applicability of our model to the gasoline industry in Germany. We finally examine to what extent issues of competition policy and public regulation arise.JEL classification: D43, L1, L22, L42, L71*We gratefully acknowledge helpful suggestions from Horst Albach, Alexandra Gross-Schuler, Otto Hass, Michael Niederalt, Felix Schuler, Achim Wambach, Christian Winkler, and unknown referees of the JICT. The usual disclaimer applies.