Price Changes and Some Underlying Aspects of Measurement of Poverty

The paper deals with effects of price changes on measurement of poverty. It is shown that there are situations, when prices and nominal incomes change, a higher nutritional intake or an increase in commodity consumption of the poor can be associated with higher poverty gaps and a higher poverty index of the society. A positive relationship of this kind is quite counter-intuitive in the context of poverty measurement. This is caused by the adjustment of the poverty line and/or incomes of one situation by the prices of the other for the purpose of comparison.

     

The government revenue and government expenditure nexus: empirical evidence from nine Asian countries

The nexus between government revenue and government expenditure has been an important topic in public economics. In this paper, we investigate evidence for cointegration and causality between government revenue and government expenditure for nine Asian countries. We use the recently developed bounds testing approach to cointegration and the conventional F-test to examine Granger causality. Our empirical results suggest that for three out of the nine countries government revenue and government expenditure are cointegrated. Our results on the direction of causation are mixed: (a) for Indonesia, Singapore, Sri Lanka in the short-run and for Nepal in both the short- and long-run we find support for the tax-and-spend hypothesis; (b) Indonesia and Sri Lanka are in conformity with the spend-and-tax hypothesis in the long-run; and (c) for other countries there is evidence of neutrality.     

Lies,damned lies and statistics: the accuracy of survey responses

That survey research is error prone is not a new idea and different varieties of non-sampling error have been investigated in the literature as well as consideration being given in many statistics textbooks to the issue of sampling error. The paper here considers research upon corporate environmental reporting. It compares information provided by corporate environmental reports with information that survey respondents claim their organization’s environmental report contains. This enables the accuracy of the claims to be assessed. Consideration is given to two different industries the Water industry and the Energy industry. Errors due to inaccurate reporting by survey respondents are shown to be relatively infrequent and respondents appear just about as likely to claim they report information that they do not, in fact, report as to fail to indicate that they report information that is, in fact, actually reported.     

Environmental Taxation and Vertical Cournot Oligopolies: How Eco-industries Matter

This article specifies what an optimal pollution tax should be when dealing with a vertical Cournot oligopoly. Polluting firms sell final goods to consumers and outsource their abatement activities to an environment industry. It is assumed that both markets are imperfectly competitive. Thus, the tax is a single instrument used to regulate three sorts of distortions, one negative externality and two restrictions in production. Consequently, the optimal tax rate is the result of a trade-off that depends on the firms’ market power along the vertical structure. A detailed analysis of Cournot-Nash equilibria in both markets is also performed. In this context, the efficiency of abatement activities plays a key-role. It gives a new understanding to the necessary conditions for the emergence of an eco-industrial sector.      

Competition Policy: What are the Costs and Benefits of Measuring its Costs and Benefits?

Summary  Competition authorities are increasingly measuring the effects of their enforcement actions, seeking a robust justification for the proliferation of competition policy. We highlight the importance of identifying the right counterfactual against which to measure effects, and set out the relevant categories of costs and benefits. We then explore how a balance can be struck between the benefits and inherent limitations of these measurement exercises. Relatively crude analyses of cartel action benefits can be sufficient to achieve public legitimacy for competition policy. Assessing the effects of merger and conduct inquiries is often ambiguous, but could be used to improve decision-making processes. Director and Managing Consultant, respectively, at Oxera, Oxford and London. The valuable comments of Fod Barnes, Kerry Hughes and an anonymous referee are gratefully acknowledged. The opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors alone.