Are semi-presidential constitutions bad for democratic performance?

Many countries since 1990 have adopted semi-presidential constitutions, which are often considered to be problematic, primarily because of the potential for conflict between the assembly-supported government and the popularly elected president. Such conflicts are said to lead to unstable governments, policy paralysis and the eventual undermining of the democratic regime. Using data for all parliamentary and semi-presidential democracies between 1946 and 2006, we examine the effect of semi-presidential constitutions on the duration of prime ministers’ tenure in office, government accountability with respect to economic outcomes, and democratic survival. We also examine (for a smaller sample of post-communist countries) the impact of these constitutions on the progress of structural reforms. We find that the observed higher instability of prime ministers in semi-presidential democracies is more due to the electoral system than to the presence of a popularly elected president. We also find that semi-presidential constitutions have little impact on the government’s accountability to economic outcomes and on the survival of democratic regimes. Finally, we find that neither a weak president nor a weak government is optimal for the progress of economic reforms in post-communist countries. Regarding economic reforms, the optimal allocation of constitutional powers between the president and the government grants both significant powers.     

End‐of‐pipe or cleaner production? An empirical comparison of environmental innovation decisions across OECD countries

While both fundamental types of abatement measure mitigate the adverse environmental impacts of production, cleaner production technologies are frequently more advantageous than end‐of‐pipe technologies for environmental and economic reasons. This paper analyzes a variety of factors that might enhance firms' propensity to implement cleaner production technologies instead of end‐of‐pipe technologies. On the basis of a unique facility‐level data set derived from a recent OECD survey, we find a clear dominance of cleaner production in seven OECD countries: 76.8% of the facilities report that they invest predominantly in cleaner production technologies, above all in new production processes, but not so much in new products. Based on a discrete choice model, our estimation results indicate that regulatory measures and the stringency of environmental policies are more important for end‐of‐pipe technologies, while cost savings, general management systems and specific environmental management tools tend to favor clean production. We conclude that improvements towards cleaner production may be reached by the continuous development and wider diffusion of these management tools. Improvements may also be stimulated by widening the cost gap between the two types of technology, for instance by additionally charging for waste and energy use. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment.     

Characteristics of Innovative Firms in the Brazilian Computer Industry

A number of studies have reported characteristics of innovative firms; however, these studies have typically been conducted in freely competitive markets. Angela da Rocha, Carl Christensen and Newton Paim have studied firms within the Brazilian computer industry. The Brazilian government regulates the entrance of foreign competitors to this market. Thus, the authors are able to ask whether the characteristics of innovative firms in a protected market differ from characteristics previously reported in competitive markets. With only a few minor exceptions, the reported profiles of innovative firms are quite similar. These results suggest that characteristics of innovative firms are generalizable across certain industry and environmental conditions, including protected markets.     

Sharing Wealth: Evidence from Financial Ratios in Spain

Firms are managed on the basis of relationships between mutually involved groups, not only because of market forces, but also due to the influence that each group can exert over distribution decisions at a given moment in time. On the basis of a value added statement, it is possible to analyse the ability a firm has to reward all agents and to consider how the residual income is to be distributed. In this paper we set out to establish the tensions that arise between productive agents in the distribution of generated wealth. We carry out a time analysis of the movements between relationships that provide information on the distribution of that wealth, using data drawn from the Spanish Transport Equipment Manufacturing Industry. We propose a new multivariate dynamic linear model that is capable of analysing the joint evolution of the value added distribution ratios, with our particular objective being to throw light on the factors underlying this evolution. This analysis results in one single factor that explains 92.88 per cent of the total variation present in the residuals of the model.     

LOCATION OF VERTICALLY LINKED OLIGOPOLISTS

This paper examines the geographical equilibrium of location of N vertically linked firms and its relation to the creation of an industrial cluster. In a two-region spatial economy, a monopolist firm supplies an input to N consumer goods firms that compete in quantities. When the transport cost of the input increases, downstream firms prefer to agglomerate where the upstream firm is located, to save in production cost. However, simultaneous increases in the transport cost of the input and of the consumer good or increases in the number of downstream firms lead to a relative dispersion of these firms, to reduce competition and locate closer to the local final consumer. In contrast to Mayer (2000) , when both transport costs increase, the location decision of downstream firms is based more on the geographical point that maximizes accessibility to the local final consumer than on the geographical point that minimizes the production cost.