LIQUIDITY,MONEY CREATION AND DESTRUCTION,AND THE RETURNS TO BANKING*

We build on our earlier model of money in which bank liabilities circulate as a medium of exchange. We investigate optimal bank behavior and the resulting provision of liquidity under a range of central bank regulations. In our model, banks issue inside money under fractional reserves, facing the possibility of excess redemptions. Banks consider the float resulting from money creation and make reserve‐management decisions that affect aggregate liquidity conditions. Numerical examples demonstrate positive bank failure rates when returns to banking are low. Central bank interventions may improve banks' returns and welfare through a reduction in bank failure.     

On wage- and profit-led demand regimes: learning from the evidence

Abstract

This paper contributes to the empirical research around the “wage-led” or “profit-led” demand regimes. It first reviews how Kalecki, and then Steindl, approached the relationship between economic growth and income distribution. Then, empirical analysis carried out under the probabilistic approach to econometric modeling shows statistical evidence, estimated through cointegration analysis, that in the long run, in three very open economies—Mexico, France, and Korea—the wage share is positively associated with demand and output. It finally discusses the macroeconomic dilemma that almost all countries have to face, i.e., a positive effect of a high-wage policy on demand and employment may diverge from a negative effect on output compatible with external equilibrium.     

Recent developments in EC USSR commercial and economic relations

Conclusion Trade with the Soviet Union represents only a small part of total Community trade (3.5 % of EC imports and 2.7 % of EC exports in 1990). EC imports from the Soviet Union increased moderately between 1989 and 1990 as well as between the first six months of 1990 and the corresponding period of 1991, whilst EC exports decreased sharply as a result of hard currency shortage in the Soviet Union.The CMEA and Soviet disintegration processes will lead to a substantial reorientation of trade flows. This development has already begun with large increases of trade between the EC and the Central and Eastern European countries.International assistance to the USSR mainly consists of export credits. Community assistance involves a large proportion of grants and technical assistance. The cost of assistance measures envisaged so far remains limited for Western countries.The economic effects of assistance would be enhanced if effective coordination was implemented among the providers. Adequate mechanisms such as triangular operations or the untying of assistance would be required in order to avoid crowding out traditional suppliers from Soviet markets.     

Announced layoffs: Their effect on corporate financial performance

Conventional wisdom holds that when a firm gets into trouble due to lagging sales and rising costs, cutting the size of the organization to reduce fat and waste is a normal and effective response. In this study, evidence was found to suggest that just the opposite might be true. The financial performance of Fortune 100 companies was tracked over a five-year period—two years prior to the announced layoff, the year of the layoff announcement, and two years following it. Contrary to expectations, the results indicate that financial performance worsened, rather than improved, following announced layoffs. Strategic and human resource implications for the management of corporate downsizing are provided.     

Risk and Capital Structure in the Regulated Firm

This paper studies the role of capital structure in a regulated firm. We show that it affects the prices set by the regulator, the expected price being lower the higher the proportion of debt finance. However, when debt is increased beyond a certain level, the benefit of lower expected prices is offset by their increased variability. We also study the socially preferred capital structure. This is such that consumers carry some risk, in the form of higher prices in adverse economic conditions.     

Specialisation,localisation, and trade value in the wake of cross-border production sharing. The Central Eastern European Countries' case

We focus on five among the sectors in which most of the CEECs’ trade in middle products with EU-15 is concentrated. Over the second half of the 1990s, we observe remarkable changes in both production and trade specialization as well as a significant relocation of industries within CEECs. Using jointly trade and production data we outline co-movements in the adjustment of specialisation patterns. We also show that the redistribution of activities at the regional level reflects the relocation of industries at the global level. Finally, we try to detect the scope of fragmentation of production characterizing each industry and the ways in which CEECs are moving along the “internationally sliced-up value chain”. (JEL: F10, F14, F15)     

The politics of redistributive social insurance

This paper analyses the political support for a social insurance that includes elements of redistribution when there exists an imperfect private insurance alternative. Individuals differ both in their income and risk. The social insurance is compulsory and charges an income-related contribution with pooling of risks. The private insurance is voluntary and charges a contribution based on individual risks. However due to the adverse selection problem, private insurance companies provide only partial insurance. Adopting a non-expected utility model, we show that there is a general majority support for social insurance and that this support is increasing with risk aversion. We also show that a mixed insurance is politically impossible, regardless of the degree of redistribution of social insurance and the joint distribution of risk and income in the population. Lastly, we analyse how the political support for social insurance is affected by any change in its redistributive component and the possibility of using genetic tests.     

Arrovian aggregation in economic environments: how much should we know about indifference surfaces?

Arrow's celebrated theorem of social choice shows that the aggregation of individual preferences into a social ordering cannot make the ranking of any pair of alternatives depend only on individual preferences over that pair, unless the fundamental weak Pareto and non-dictatorship principles are violated. In the standard model of division of commodities, we investigate how much information about indifference surfaces is needed to construct social ordering functions satisfying the weak Pareto principle and anonymity. We show that local information such as marginal rates of substitution or the shapes “within the Edgeworth box” is not enough, and knowledge of substantially non-local information is necessary.