中国制造业贸易模式变迁的工资差距效应

本文利用中国制造业27个细分行业的面板数据,采用固定效应不变系数的静态面板模型,考察了我国制造业从产业间贸易向产业内贸易的变迁对行业间工资差距的影响及其传导机制。研究结果表明：（1）在制造业贸易模式的变迁中,出口扩大了行业间工资差距,而进口缩小了行业间工资差距。（2）制造业贸易模式变迁主要通过价格机制扩大了行业间的工资差距,而技术机制和个体机制的影响则不显著。     

武汉城市圈生产性服务业对制造业效率提升作用的实证

采用武汉城市圈9个城市2000--2009年的面板数据,并结合影响制造业效率的其他经济变量,运用计量模型检验了武汉城市圈生产性服务业对制造业效率的提升作用。结果表明：生产性服务业的发展对武汉城市圈制造业生产率具有明显的正向提升效应,资本有机构成提高对武汉城市圈制造业生产率也有明显的促进作用,但劳动者素质和技能水平及外商直接投资作用不明显。最后,提出了进一步增强生产性服务业对武汉城市圈制造业效率提升作用的政策建议。     

Quotas and equilibrium relative prices in the trade restricting country

This paper is concerned with the effects of international trade restriction through quotas. It is shown that a casual relationship exists between the fraction of licences distributed domestically, the terms of trade, and the domestic relative price of the importable.     

BOT投资方式分析

BOT是国际上一种新兴的投资方式，它既缓解了东道国政府基础设施急需建设和资金困难的矛盾，同时也带动了资本输入国国民经济、科学技术和管理水平的提高。主要对BOT投资方式的含义、法律特征、法律性质以及我国BOT投资立法的完善问题进行分析，以期引起人们对BOT投资方式及其立法的更多思考。     

The Exchange Rate and its Fundamentals in a Complex World

We develop a nonlinear exchange rate model with heterogeneous agents. Some agents adopt a “fundamentalist” forecasting rule, while others use a “chartist” forecasting rule. We show that the model is capable of explaining the empirical puzzles relating to exchange rate movements. In particular, the model explains the “exchange rate determination” and PPP puzzles, the excess volatility, and fat tails in exchange rate returns.     

A Jump-diffusion Model for Exchange Rates in a Target Zone

We propose a simple jump-diffusion model for an exchange rate target zone. The model captures most stylized facts from the existing target zone models while remaining analytically tractable. The model is based on a modified two-limit version of the C OX , I NGERSOLL and R OSS (1985) model. In the model the exchange rate is kept within the band because the variance decreases as the exchange rate approaches the upper or lower limits of the band. We also consider an extension of the model with parity adjustments, which are modeled as Poisson jumps. Estimation of the model is by GMM based on conditional moments. We derive prices of currency options in our model, assuming that realignment jump risk is idiosyncratic. Throughout, we apply the theory to EMS exchange rate data. We show that, after the EMS crisis of 1993, currencies remain in an implicit target zone which is narrower than the officially announced target zones.     

Investment and technological choice in a right-to-manage model

We analyze the interactions between investment and local wage bargaining in a putty-clay model where the investment decision commits the firm to a particular capital intensity. This technological precommitment is used strategically in order to manipulate the bargaining outcome. We show that this strategic behavior induces a nonmonotonic relationship between the capital and labor demands of the firm and most of its environmental parameters (e.g., the bargaining power of the union, its minimum wage requirement, the capital cost). The results we obtain in our putty-clay framework thus contradict several conclusions of the standard literature on wage bargaining and investment.     

LIQUIDITY,MONEY CREATION AND DESTRUCTION,AND THE RETURNS TO BANKING*

We build on our earlier model of money in which bank liabilities circulate as a medium of exchange. We investigate optimal bank behavior and the resulting provision of liquidity under a range of central bank regulations. In our model, banks issue inside money under fractional reserves, facing the possibility of excess redemptions. Banks consider the float resulting from money creation and make reserve‐management decisions that affect aggregate liquidity conditions. Numerical examples demonstrate positive bank failure rates when returns to banking are low. Central bank interventions may improve banks' returns and welfare through a reduction in bank failure.     

Country asymmetry,trade agreements,and transfers

Using a standard 2 × 2 trade agreement model, I show that the welfare effects of a free trade agreement (FTA) depend on the asymmetry on supply and demand functions. When countries are sufficiently asymmetric with respect to the size or the demand functions, the small country tends to be better off, while the large country is worse off. Thus, the small country must compensate the large country for the FTA to be incentive‐compatible. However, in the presence of sufficient asymmetry in the supply functions, the small country is worse off, while the bigger is better off. In this case, the transfer must flow from the large to the small country. This last finding helps explain why some FTAs between rich and poor countries provide for adjustment transfers to the latter.