Welfare comparisons with bounded equivalence scales

The paper considers the problem of comparing income distributions for heterogeneous populations. The first contribution of this paper is a precise dominance criterion combined with a simple algorithm for implementing the criterion. This criterion is shown to be equivalent to unanimity among utilitarian social planners whose objectives are compatible with given intervals of equivalence scales. The second contribution of the paper is to show that this criterion is equivalent to dominance for two different families of social welfare functions, one inspired by Atkinson and Bourguignon (in: G.R. Feiwel (Ed.), Arrow and Foundation of the Theory of Economic Policy, Macmillan, London, 1987), in which household utility is a general function of income and needs, and a second family inspired by Ebert (Soc. Choice Welfare 16 (1999) 233), in which household utility is a function of equivalent incomes. Finally, we extend our results to the case where the distributions of needs differ between the two populations being compared.     

The link between board composition and board objectives: an empirical analysis on Flemish non‐profit schools

Flemish non‐profit schools have no legally imposed composition rules with respect to their board of directors. Hence, large variation exists in their size and composition. We argue that these differences in board composition can result in different policies followed by the board. To empirically test this hypothesis we question the board's chairpersons of Flemish non‐profit schools about the objectives set forward by the board. Ordered probit regressions on the importance attached to different educational objectives provide support for our hypothesis and thus alert policy makers to account for the linkages between objectives and board characteristics when formulating legislation with respect to school board composition. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Migrants as second-class workers in urban China? A decomposition analysis

In urban China, urban resident annual earnings are 1.3 times larger than long-term rural migrant earnings as observed in a nationally representative sample in 2002. Using microsimulation, we decompose this difference into four sources, with particular attention to path-dependence and statistical distribution of the estimated effects: (1) different allocation to sectors that pay different wages (sectoral effect); (2) hourly wage disparities across the two populations within sectors (wage effect); (3) different working times within sectors (working time effect); and (4) different population structures (population effect). Although sector allocation is extremely contrasted, with very few migrants in the public sector and very few urban residents working as self-employed, this has no clear impact on earnings differentials, because the sectoral effect is not robust to the path followed for the decomposition. The second main finding is that the population effect is robust and significantly more important than wage or working time effects. This implies that the main source of disparity between the two populations is pre-market (education opportunities) rather than on-market.     

Consumer@Protection.EU. An Analysis of European Consumer Legislation in the Information Society

The Internet and electronic commerce have emerged as the emblems of a worldwide virtual economy. Although it is yet difficult to grasp all the repercussions of the borderless world of the Internet, it is certain that to shop in this world is different from shopping in the world as we knew it ten years ago. Obviously, the new developments affect the traditional framework of European and national consumer law and the perspectives that underpin this body of law, for most consumer law was established at a time when the Information Society was an unknown phenomenon. Underlining the importance of this issue, the European Council asked the Commission to examine existing consumer law in the Community in the light of the new conditions created by the Information Society and to identify potential problems and loopholes. A report on background research for this examination was submitted to the Commission in August 2000. The present article is based on this report and provides an account of the main findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the report.     

Do binding agreements solve the social dilemma?

We investigate experimentally whether “binding agreements” can provide a solution to the social dilemma that arises in the presence of pure public goods. Signing a binding agreement can prevent players from free riding on the contributions to the public good. However, a well known theoretical result is that the outcome of the endogenous formation of agreements is not necessarily efficient. Our setting is a bargaining game in which agreements form sequentially. The individual level of contribution to the public good increases with the size of the coalition reaching an agreement and the global agreement is always the socially optimal structure. There are two equilibrium outcomes, the global agreement and an asymmetric structure, which consists of two coalitions of different sizes, the small one free riding on the contributions of the larger one. We run an experiment which lends force to the theoretical result that outcomes may be inefficient. However, subjects do not play Nash and the experimental outcome is, on average, even more inefficient than the theory predicts. Our analysis leads to the conclusion that different types of behaviour co-exist.     

The value of delays: market- and policy-induced adjustment processes as a motivating factor in dynamic entrepreneurship

Reaching societal consensus on how to deal with new issues, e.g. agreeing on commercial law for e-commerce, takes time. Traditional economics has considered such anomalies as market imperfections. By contrast, this paper suggests perceiving such “delays” as windows of opportunity for entrepreneurs. These considerations from evolutionary economics and entrepreneurship will be explored in a case study on disease management services in Germany. It will become clear that detailed ex ante legal regulation restricts entrepreneurial room for variation. To avoid this loss of knowledge generation, the government should abstain from introducing such premature intervention without having to challenge existing meta-rules.     

Stages of Organizational Transformation in Transition Economies: A Dynamic Capabilities Approach

How do organizations previously dominated by the state develop dynamic capabilities that would support their growth in a competitive market economy? We develop a theoretical framework of organizational transformation that explains the processes by which organizations learn and develop dynamic capabilities in transition economies. Specifically, the framework theorizes about the importance of, and inter‐relationships between, leadership, organizational learning, dynamic capabilities, and performance over three stages of transformation. Propositions derived from this framework explain the pre‐conditions enabling organizational learning, the linkages between types of learning and functions of dynamic capabilities, and the feedback from dynamic capabilities to organizational learning that allows firms in transition economies to regain their footing and build long‐term competitive advantage. We focus on transition contexts, where these processes have been magnified and thus offer new insights into strategizing in radically altered environments.     

Contingent Claims and Market Completeness in a Stochastic Volatility Model

In an incomplete market framework, contingent claims are of particular interest since they improve the market efficiency. This paper addresses the problem of market completeness when trading in contingent claims is allowed. We extend recent results by Bajeux and Rochet (1996) in a stochastic volatility model to the case where the asset price and its volatility variations are correlated. We also relate the ability of a given contingent claim to complete the market to the convexity of its price function in the current asset price. This allows us to state our results for general contingent claims by examining the convexity of their "admissible arbitrage prices."