Organization of production in a competitive economy

In the present paper we introduce a general equilibrium model of the organization of production and analyze the optimality and existence of an equilibrium. We introduce the production technology of the economy as a collection of production processes and allow each potential producer to choose the production processes to operate. We model organization and transaction costs by means of an organizational technology that determines the production set of a producer as a function of the production processes that the producer chooses to operate. For a competitive economy, we show the equilibrium organization of production is optimal and then prove a general existence theorem for an atomless economy.     

Dynamic monopoly pricing and herding

We study dynamic pricing by a monopolist selling to buyers who learn from each other's purchases. The price posted in each period serves to extract rent from the current buyer, as well as to control the amount of information transmitted to future buyers. As information increases future rent extraction, the monopolist has an incentive to subsidize learning by charging a price that results in information revelation. Nonetheless, in the long run, the monopolist generally induces herding by either selling to all buyers or exiting the market.     

Disclosure Interactions and the Cost of Equity Capital: Evidence From the Spanish Continuous Market

Abstract:  The purpose of this paper is to provide some new evidence on the relationship between disclosure and the cost of equity capital. We propose a new specification for the empirical test based on the idea that in the previous models one crucial variable was missing: accounting policy choice. We test our theoretical hypothesis using a sample of Spanish firms quoted on the Spanish continuous market from 1999 to 2002. We adopt the ex-ante approach to measure the cost of equity capital, taking analysts predictions as a proxy for expected earnings. As an explanatory variable we use an index measuring annual report disclosure quality. This measure of disclosure is combined with a proxy for the accounting policy choice of the firm. We measure firms' conservatism using the modified Jones model of Dechow et al. (1995) to estimate discretionary accruals. Our results confirm that the relationship between disclosure and cost of capital is affected by the choice of accounting policy.     

RELATIONAL GOODS, MONITORING AND NON-PECUNIARY COMPENSATIONS IN THE NONPROFIT SECTOR: THE CASE OF THE ITALIAN SOCIAL SERVICES

ABSTRACT ** :  This paper investigates the nonprofit wage gap suggesting a theoretical framework where, like in Akerlof (1984) , effort correlates not only with wages, but also with non-monetary compensations. These take the form of relational goods by-produced in the delivery of particular services. By paying higher non-pecuniary compensations, the nonprofit sector attracts intrinsically similarly skilled, but more motivated workers, able to provide in fact a similar (or potentially higher) level of effort than their counterparts in the forprofit sector. On an empirical ground, the paper provides a number of econometric tests that confirm the main predictions of the model in Italy's case. It adds to the available empirical literature by introducing in the analysis direct measures of non-pecuniary compensations and job satisfaction.     

Price Anomalies in the Used Car Market

Summary Using two different samples – one based on newspaper advertisements, the other Internet-based – we identify some price anomalies in the used car market in the Netherlands. First, prices of used cars depend on their age in calendar years rather than months. Second, there is some evidence that crossing 100,000 km induces a sudden additional price reduction. Third, a new license plate format, something with no intrinsic value whatsoever, increases a car’s price by about 4%. We discuss possible explanations for these results.     

Pricing the Credit Risk of Secured Debt and Financial Leasing

Abstract:  This paper presents closed form solutions to price secured bank loans and financial leases subject to default risk. Secured debt fair credit spreads always increase in the debtor's default probability, whereas financial leasing fair credit spreads may well decrease in the lessee's default probability and even be negative. The reason is that the lessor, unlike the secured lender, can gain from the lessee's default, especially when the leasing contract envisages initial prepayments or the lessee's terminal options to either purchase the leased asset or to extend the lease maturity. This result, which critically depends on contractual and bankruptcy code provisions, can explain some of the empirical evidence and the use of financial leases as an alternative to secured bank lending to finance small, risky and relatively opaque firms.     

Structural change decomposition through a global sensitivity analysis of input–output models

Sensitivity analysis has become an important tool to test the robustness of estimated economic models. In this paper we propose the use of simulation-based sensitivity analysis to identify the fundamental structure of the economy. To show the possibilities of this technique, we provide empirical evidence on the path of structural change occurring in the Chicago economy by running simulations for projected input–output tables over the period 1975–2010.     

Segmenting the Wine Market Based on Price: Hedonic Regression when Different Prices mean Different Products

Many economists have estimated hedonic price functions for red and white wine. However, estimating a single hedonic price function imposes the assumption that the implicit prices of the attributes are the same for any red or white wine. We argue that even within these two categories, wines are differentiated, and disregarding this heterogeneity causes an aggregation bias in the estimated implicit prices. By estimating hedonic functions specific to price ranges, we show that the wine market is segmented into several product classes or market segments. We find that a model accounting for the existence of wine classes has greater ability to explain the variability in the data and produces more accurate and interpretable results regarding the implicit prices of the attributes.     

Bank Mergers and Diversification: Implications for Competition Policy

This paper analyses competition and mergers among risk averse banks. We show that the correlation between the shocks to the demand for loans and the shocks to the supply of deposits induces a strategic interdependence between the two sides of the market. We characterise the role of diversification as a motive for bank mergers and analyse the consequences of mergers on loan and deposit rates. When the value of diversification is sufficiently strong, bank mergers generate an increase in the welfare of borrowers and depositors. If depositors have more correlated shocks than borrowers, bank mergers are relatively worse for depositors than for borrowers.