Selecting Social Goals: J. M. Keynes and the Emergence of Ontological Rationality in Economics

In this paper we discuss the fundamental inconsistency that results from employing the two traditional concepts of rationality as the basis of selecting social goals. We then consider the possibility that the selection of social goals must be based on explicitly ethical criteria. To do so a third concept of rationality namely, ontological rationality, should be adopted. Moreover, we argue that J. M. Keynes in A Tract Monetary Reform based his public policy recommendations on a modified version of ontological rationality, thereby introducing ontological rationality into economics as the basis for selecting social goals.A previous version of this paper was presented at the Fifty-Eighth International Atlantic Economic Conference, October 7–10, 2004. The authors are grateful to session participants for their helpful suggestions, though the authors alone are responsible for the contents of the paper.     

An Austrian Theory of the Firm

The modern Theory of the Firm uses the concept of rent and makes implicit assumptions about equilibrium. An Austrian (Market Process) Theory of the Firm should have something to say about each of these. Two strategic perspectives are analyzed, the neoclassical microeconomic perspective (using the Ricardo-Marshall approach to rent) and the Market Process perspective (using the Fetter approach to rent). In a neoclassical world, rents indicate unsolved or unexploited inefficiencies as every hypothetical outcome is viewed against the standard of perfect competition. By contrast, in the Market Process world there is no single ideal standard by which to measure any particular outcome. All action takes place in an open ended universe in which the future is continually being created, in which competition is a discovery process.     

Essentiality,Efficiency, and the Efficient Component-Pricing Rule

The determination of interconnection charges to essential facilities is an important problem in regulated telecommunications markets in the wake of the Telecommunications Act of 1996. This paper defines mathematical conditions for the essentiality of upstream productive inputs and examines their implications for efficient interconnection pricing. The paper shows conditions under which the efficient component-pricing rule (ECPR) can be derived as a special case of a Ramsey pricing rule. The paper also shows how efficient pricing differs from the ECPR for a number of interesting cases.     

The Valuation of the IJmeer Nature Reserve using Conjoint Analysis

This paper describes an application of conjointanalysis. The subject of the valuation study isthe IJmeer nature reserve, which will be partlydestroyed when the new residential area IJburgis built. This paper addresses the followingquestion: ‘What is the extent of the loss ofgreen and recreational values?’. In this study,the conjoint analysis consists of threedifferent analyses based on a three-piecevaluation question. The respondents are askedto subsequently rank, mark and indicate theacceptability of a set of six cards.     

Competition in Payphones: State Regulations and Independent Providers' Shares

Independent payphone providers in 1995 held a 17.4 percent national share of payphones. Their shares and state regulators' policies vary greatly by state. We test the determinants of IPPs' shares in 1996, finding that they increase with the allowed local-call rate, with "dial-round compensation," and with the degree to which regulators have removed LEC competitors' incentives to carry inflated payphone investments. Weak evidence suggests that regulation of intrastate long-distance rates may help to solve the IPP's problem of committing not to overcharge. Under the Telecommunications Act of 1996, states' policy differences and interstate differences in IPPs' shares will likely narrow.     

Choosing Among Regulatory Options in the United States Telecommunications Industry

We examine the determinants of the choice between rate-of-return regulation and incentive regulation in the United States telecommunications industry. We find that a state is more likely to select incentive regulation in any year: (1) when it has employed incentive regulation in the past; (2) when the Republican party controls both the executive and the legislative branches of the state government, but the Democratic party has controlled these branches historically; and (3) as the firms earnings under rate-of-return regulation increase toward the industry average. We also find that appointed regulators are more likely than their elected counterparts to revert to rate-of-return regulation.     

Provision Point Mechanisms and Field Validity Tests of Contingent Valuation

Past field validity tests of contingent valuation have relied on voluntary contribution mechanisms to elicit actual willingness to pay, and may overestimate hypothetical bias because of free riding in the actual contributions. This paper argues that provision point mechanisms are a preferred alternative for field validity tests of contingent valuation because they increase the proportion of demand revealed in cases in which public goods can be provided in a step function. The results of a contingent valuation validity study of participation in a green electricity pricing program that uses a provision point mechanism are reported, and hypothetical open-ended and dichotomous choice responses are compared to actual participation. Calibration of hypothetical responses is also explored.     

On optimal control of income generating activities, and the value of flexible production design

The paper provides a closed form solution for the value of a firm which costlessly can change its mode of operation between two activities. The technology is such that production is zero from the inactive production line. In addition we assume that the production potential on any production line is idle when not operated, else the production follows a geometric Brownian motion. Although this framework is rather general, it is motivated by the problem to produce a natural resource located in two separate wells/ores, using a single (flexible) production unit. For what seems to be reasonable parameter values, the flexible unit is seen to achieve a surprisingly large value relative to the value achievable by a comprehensive unit, producing both alternatives simultaneously. In addition it is interesting to note that switching might occur even if the active production line gives the highest immediate income.     

A maximum likelihood approach to estimating dynamic models with unobserved independent variables

A maximum likelihood method to estimate the parameters of dynamic models containing unobserved independent variables is proposed. The approach is to maximize the likelihood of the residuals produced by the recursive Kalman filter equations applied to the model in state-space form. A simulation study is presented comparing the proposed method to the instrumental variable approach. An example using real data is given which estimates models of the Permanent-Income Hypothesis.