Market novelty, competence-seeking and innovation networking

Studies of innovation networking have frequently been concerned with the occurrence of dyadic relationships and with their apparent impact on simple measures of firm-level innovation outputs. This paper takes a more detailed look by analyzing the connection between different types of innovation and forms of networking. Based on the market novelty of innovation outcomes and the extent to which innovation activities require new competences, four types of innovation are identified. It is proposed that these types correlate with various innovation network dimensions, including the volume of networks, the strength and content of ties, and the specificity of ties. Drawing on survey data of 594 innovations realized by Dutch small firms, it is observed that the requirement to access new competences for innovation correlates positively with the number of network partners involved. We also note more subtle connections between types of innovation and networking, including that novel innovation outputs correlate with using network partners as a source of inspiration, whilst new competences associate with networking for knowledge capital. In the latter case, these activities also draw on new and intended ties relatively often, i.e. network partners which are actively sought out for the specific contributions they may make to the innovation process. Finally, innovation which is simultaneously new-to-the market and requires new competences uses strong ties relatively often. Implications for innovation policy and practice are discussed.     

Do parents,teachers and children use the SDQ in a similar fashion?

Few studies have investigated whether parents’, teachers’ and children’s responses to the strengths and difficulties questionnaire (SDQ) have equivalence. In this study, data from 854 matched questionnaires collected in Malaysia were subjected to tau equivalence confirmatory factor analysis, to assess if all three groups responded to the same target (the child) similarly. We first fitted Goodman’s (Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry, 38, 581–586, (1997a); Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry, 40, 791–801, 1997b) five factor model, but found that this did not fit the model despite attempts to improve and rectify model fit. We thereafter attempted to fit Dickey and Blumberg (Journal of the American Academy of Child Adolescent Psychiatry, 43, 1159–1167, 2004) three factor model, but similarly found a lack of fit. We then undertook an exploratory model with a random half of the data, obtaining a three factor solution, and tested this in a confirmatory tau equivalence model. The Unconstrained Model provided a fit to the data, revealing a similar structure across the three informant groups. As this fit was for the Unconstrained Model, it reveals that groups differ in the value they place on each of the variables but overall that held a similar underlying factor structure. The findings are discussed in relation to the possible cultural issues involved and the use of the SDQ.     

Dividend timing and behavior in laboratory asset markets

Summary. This paper investigates the effect of dividend timing on price bubbles and endogenous expectations in twenty-six laboratory asset markets. In ten "A1" markets, a single dividend is paid at the end of the trading horizon. In nine "A2" markets, dividends are paid at the end of each trading period. In seven "A3" markets, some of the dividends are paid at the end of the trading horizon, and the rest are paid on a per-period basis. The results indicate that price bubbles are most likely in A2 markets, less likely in A3 markets, and least likely in A1 markets. Six distinct hypotheses are considered. The data suggest that the concentration of dividend value at a single point in time helps to create common expectations, and thus significantly reduce the incidence of bubbles. Also, the results underscore the difficulty facing econometric tests on field data where fundamental value has to be approximated.     

Stores

Summary There is scope and incentive for stores to endogenously arise in an exchange economy when agents possess different levels of bargaining power and coalition formation is costly. In the absence of stores, agents face a trading lottery where the expected outcome for an individual agent depends upon his relative bargaining strength. By setting appropriate, preannounced prices, a store can profitably offer relatively weak bargainers trading opportunities which they prefer to the trading lottery. While relatively weak bargainers are attracted to the store, relatively strong bargainers prefer the trading lottery to the store. Thus, the simultaneous existence of barter and mediated trade is explained.The work reported here was conceived while both authors were visiting the University of Southern California. We thank Martine Quinzii and two anonymous referees for helpful comments.     

Collective Virtuosity in Organizations: A Study of Peak Performance in an Orchestra

abstract    The purpose of this paper is to build theory on peak performance at the group level. Peak performance transcends ordinary performance and is associated with a subjective experience in which one loses a sense of time and space as well as feels great joy and bliss. We chose to study this phenomenon at the group level through a methodology of participant observation in an orchestra. We found that groups can be transformed by their own performance in a reflexive process in which virtuosity, or individual peak performance, becomes collective. We offer a propositional model of collective virtuosity in organizations, and offer directions for further research.     

When haste makes sense: Cracking down on street markets for illicit drugs

This paper presents an analytical approach to the tactical question: ‘What level of enforcement over time allows one to eliminate a street market for illicit drugs while expanding the least possible total effort?’ The analysis is done in the context of Caulkins' model [6] which predicts the rate of change of dealers as a function of enforcement level and several market parameters. Our analysis suggests that the simple strategy of using the maximum available enforcement intensity until the market has been eliminated minimizes the total enforcement effort required.