The legislative reform of union government 1979–94

This article outlines Conservative legislation on union government, documenting extensive regulation in place by 1994. It looks at the major objectives of government policy, including the twin themes of encouraging individualism and reducing union power. The degree of success achieved is examined and a framework in terms of competing rationalities outlined.     

Executive Compensation: A Model of Disclosure Choice

Recent public policy debates have led to increased calls for full transparency of executive compensation. However, in practice, many firms are reluctant to disclose the full details of how they link executive compensation to performance. One possible reason for lack of full disclosure is that managers use their power to hide the details of their compensation plan in order to disguise opportunistic rent extraction. If this is the reason for secrecy, then public policy designed to force firms to provide full disclosure is unlikely to be resisted by shareholders. However, another possible explanation for less than full transparency is that some degree of secrecy about executive compensation may be in the interest of the company and its shareholders. If this explanation is correct, then public policy moves to increase transparency may be met by counter moves designed to protect managers and shareholders from such policies. In this paper we investigate if full disclosure of executive compensation arrangements is always optimal for shareholders. We develop a model where optimal executive remuneration solves a moral hazard problem. However, the degree to which the moral hazard problem affects the shareholders depends on hidden information, so that disclosure of the executive compensation scheme will typically reveal the hidden information, which can be harmful to shareholders. The model derives, therefore, the optimal disclosure policy and the optimal remuneration scheme. We find that the shareholders are better off pre‐committing not to disclose the executive compensation scheme whenever possible. Executive directors are shown to be better off too in the absence of disclosure of executive compensation schemes. An argument for mandating disclosure is that it provides better information to shareholders but our analysis demonstrates that disclosure does not necessarily achieve this objective. The results suggest that less than full disclosure can be in the interest of shareholders, the reason for this being that disclosures cannot be made selectively to shareholders but will also be made to strategic opponents. This will be the case if the board of directors and the remuneration committee includes enough independent directors. Whether or not non‐disclosure to shareholders is in their interest is however an empirical matter involving a trade‐off between the proprietary costs associated with disclosure to shareholders and the costs of potential collusion between executive and non‐executive directors associated with non‐disclosure.     

Structure,Clearinghouses and Symmetry

We introduce and justify a taxonomy for the structure of markets and minimal institutions which appear in constructing minimally complex trading structures to perform the functions of price formation, settlement and payments. Each structure is presented as a playable strategic market game and is examined for its efficiency, the number of degrees of freedom and the symmetry properties of the structure     

What Drives the Consequences of Intentional Misstatements? Evidence from Rating Analysts’ Reactions

This paper aims to identify the mechanisms through which intentional misstatements adversely affect firms by analyzing rating analysts’ reaction to misstatements. In order to identify the mechanisms through which the misstatement affects firms’ credit ratings, we analyze the content of rating reports. Rating analysts are concerned about seven different mechanisms. They are most concerned about misstatement‐related violations of debt covenants that increase a firm's liquidity risk. We find that, subsequent to an intentional misstatement becoming publicly known, credit ratings of misreporting firms are adversely affected for up to seven years. The adverse impact of an intentional misstatement on a firm's credit rating is most pronounced in cases in which rating analysts mention concerns about misstatement‐related violations of covenants. Our results suggest that these covenant violations are the most severe mechanism through which misstatements adversely affect firms’ creditworthiness.     

Finite Sample Correction Factors for Panel Cointegration Tests*

In this paper we present finite T mean and variance correction factors and corresponding response surface regressions for the panel cointegration tests presented in Pedroni (1999, 2004) , Westerlund (2005) , Larsson et al. (2001) and Breitung (2005) . For the single equation tests, we consider up to 12 regressors and for the system tests vector autoregression dimensions up to 12 variables. All commonly used specifications for the deterministic components are considered. The sample sizes considered are T ∈ {10,20,30,40,50,60,70,80,90,100,200,500}.     

Building from Scratch: New Cities,Privatized Urbanism and the Spatial Restructuring of Johannesburg after Apartheid

By the start of the twenty‐first century, the once dominant historical downtown core of Johannesburg had lost its privileged status as the center of business and commercial activities, the metropolitan landscape having been restructured into an assemblage of sprawling, rival edge cities. Real estate developers have recently unveiled ambitious plans to build two completely new cities from scratch: Waterfall City and Lanseria Airport City (formerly called Cradle City) are master‐planned, holistically designed ‘satellite cities’ built on vacant land. While incorporating features found in earlier city‐building efforts, these two new self‐contained, privately‐managed cities operate outside the administrative reach of public authority and thus exemplify the global trend toward privatized urbanism. Waterfall City, located on land that has been owned by the same extended family for nearly 100 years, is spearheaded by a single corporate entity. Lanseria Airport City/Cradle City is a planned ‘aerotropolis’ surrounding the existing Lanseria airport at the northwest corner of the Johannesburg metropole. These two new private cities differ from earlier large‐scale urban projects because everything from basic infrastructure (including utilities, sewerage, and the installation and maintenance of roadways), landscaping, security services, the regulation of common spaces, and selling and branding the city are firmly in the hands of private profit‐making corporate entities and outside the mandate of public authorities.     

Economic modeling to evaluate the impact of chronic myeloid leukemia therapy management on the oncology care model in the US

Abstract

Objective: To develop an economic model to evaluate changes in healthcare costs driven by restricting usage of branded tyrosine kinase inhibitors (TKIs) through substitution with generic imatinib among chronic myeloid leukemia (CML) patients in a typical Oncology Care Model (OCM) practice, and examine the impact on Performance-Based Payment (PBP) eligibility.

Methods: An Excel-based economic model of an OCM practice with 1,000 cancer patients during a 6-month episode of care was developed. Cancer types and proportions of patients treated in the practice were estimated from an OCM report. All-cause healthcare costs were obtained from published literature. It was assumed that if a practice restricts usage of branded TKIs for newly-diagnosed CML patients, 80% of the market share of branded imatinib and 50% of the market shares of 2^nd-gen TKIs would shift to generic imatinib. Among established TKI-treated patients, it was assumed that 80% of the market share of branded imatinib and no patients treated with 2^nd-gen TKIs would shift to the generic.

Results: Four CML patients were estimated for a 1,000-cancer patient OCM practice with a total baseline healthcare cost of $51,345,812 during a 6-month episode. If the practice restricts usage of branded TKIs, the shift from 2^nd-gen TKIs to generic imatinib would reduce costs by $12,970, while shifting from branded to generic imatinib lowers costs by $25,250 during a 6-month episode. Minimum reductions of $3,013,832 in a one-sided risk model and $2,372,010 in a two-sided risk model are required for PBP eligibility; the shift from 2^nd-gen TKIs to generic imatinib would account for 0.4% and 0.5% of the savings required for a PBP, respectively.

Conclusions: This analysis indicates that the potential cost reduction associated with restricting branded TKI usage among CML patients in an OCM setting will represent only a small proportion of the cost reduction needed for PBP eligibility.     

Persistence of Shocks to Output in Austria and Theories of Economic Growth

The paper analyzes the degree of output persistence in GDP in order toempirically discriminate between the Solow growth model, the perfect competition endogenous growth model and the imperfect competition endogenous growth model for the case of Austria. Wefind that a shock in the growth rate of output induces a permanent and larger effect on the level of GDP. This leads us to refute the Solow growth model and the perfect competition model of endogenous growth.We may not reject the imperfect competition growth model.