South Africa's economics of education: A stocktaking and an agenda for the way forward

This paper reviews some of the existing economics of education literature from the perspective of South Africa's education policymaking needs. It also puts forward a suggested research agenda for future work. The review is arranged according to five areas of research: rates of return, production functions, teacher incentives, benefit incidence analysis and cross-country comparisons. Production functions, especially if translated to cost-effectiveness models, can point to important policy solutions. Teacher incentives is a policy area that is in need of a better theoretical and empirical basis. Rates of return are difficult for policymakers to interpret, but suggest a need for a qualification below the Grade 12 level. While benefit incidence analysis can demonstrate large improvements in the equity of public financing, cross-country comparisons reveal that not only is the distribution of schooling outcomes particularly unequal, on average it is well below what the country's level of development would predict.     

The first Sterling Area†

Between the eleventh century and mid‐thirteenth century a Sterling Area evolved in the British Isles, with a common currency based upon the English silver penny and equivalents of it produced in Scotland and Ireland. This Sterling Area began to contract in the second half of the fourteenth century, when reductions in the bullion content of Scottish coins ended the equivalence of the English and Scottish currencies, and in the fifteenth century Ireland developed its own coinage. Estimates of the currency of the Sterling Area are provided, taking the chronology of its growth and contraction into account. Estimates of the sterling currency are not estimates of the currency of England, and they cannot be combined with data relating exclusively to England in economic modelling, without qualification. Per capita currency estimates and values of coin hoards and single coin finds are at a high level around 1400, falling in the second half of the fifteenth century, indicating that the European ‘bullion famine’ of the 1390s to c. 1415 had less effect on the currency than the second late medieval bullion crisis, from the 1430s to the 1460s.     

Network topology of the interbank market

We provide an empirical analysis of the network structure of the Austrian interbank market based on Austrian Central Bank (OeNB) data. The interbank market is interpreted as a network where banks are nodes and the claims and liabilities between banks define the links. This allows us to apply methods from general network theory. We find that the degree distributions of the interbank network follow power laws. Given this result we discuss how the network structure affects the stability of the banking system with respect to the elimination of a node in the network, i.e. the default of a single bank. Further, the interbank liability network shows a community structure that exactly mirrors the regional and sectoral organization of the current Austrian banking system. The banking network has the typical structural features found in numerous other complex real-world networks: a low clustering coefficient and a short average path length. These empirical findings are in marked contrast to the network structures that have been assumed thus far in the theoretical economic and econo-physics literature.     

Shaping online consumer choice by partitioning the Web

This research explores how partitioning attributes in online search interfaces changes the valuations of those attributes—and impacts subsequent choice—such that attributes that are displayed as separate categories tend to receive greater decision weight than attributes grouped under umbrella categories. Across several choice domains—cars, dates, and hotels—we show that different attribute partitions impact the importance assigned to attributes (Studies 1 and 2), as well as consumer choices (Studies 3 and 4). We argue that these effects are due in part to users' willingness to use the implicit recommendations of interface designers to determine the importance of attributes, a willingness that extends to following explicit recommendations of online agents based on those attributes (Study 5). © 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

Executive Compensation: A Model of Disclosure Choice

Recent public policy debates have led to increased calls for full transparency of executive compensation. However, in practice, many firms are reluctant to disclose the full details of how they link executive compensation to performance. One possible reason for lack of full disclosure is that managers use their power to hide the details of their compensation plan in order to disguise opportunistic rent extraction. If this is the reason for secrecy, then public policy designed to force firms to provide full disclosure is unlikely to be resisted by shareholders. However, another possible explanation for less than full transparency is that some degree of secrecy about executive compensation may be in the interest of the company and its shareholders. If this explanation is correct, then public policy moves to increase transparency may be met by counter moves designed to protect managers and shareholders from such policies. In this paper we investigate if full disclosure of executive compensation arrangements is always optimal for shareholders. We develop a model where optimal executive remuneration solves a moral hazard problem. However, the degree to which the moral hazard problem affects the shareholders depends on hidden information, so that disclosure of the executive compensation scheme will typically reveal the hidden information, which can be harmful to shareholders. The model derives, therefore, the optimal disclosure policy and the optimal remuneration scheme. We find that the shareholders are better off pre‐committing not to disclose the executive compensation scheme whenever possible. Executive directors are shown to be better off too in the absence of disclosure of executive compensation schemes. An argument for mandating disclosure is that it provides better information to shareholders but our analysis demonstrates that disclosure does not necessarily achieve this objective. The results suggest that less than full disclosure can be in the interest of shareholders, the reason for this being that disclosures cannot be made selectively to shareholders but will also be made to strategic opponents. This will be the case if the board of directors and the remuneration committee includes enough independent directors. Whether or not non‐disclosure to shareholders is in their interest is however an empirical matter involving a trade‐off between the proprietary costs associated with disclosure to shareholders and the costs of potential collusion between executive and non‐executive directors associated with non‐disclosure.     

Consumption, Aggregate Wealth, and Expected Stock Returns

This paper studies the role of fluctuations in the aggregate consumption–wealth ratio for predicting stock returns. Using U.S. quarterly stock market data, we find that these fluctuations in the consumption–wealth ratio are strong predictors of both real stock returns and excess returns over a Treasury bill rate. We also find that this variable is a better forecaster of future returns at short and intermediate horizons than is the dividend yield, the dividend payout ratio, and several other popular forecasting variables. Why should the consumption–wealth ratio forecast asset returns? We show that a wide class of optimal models of consumer behavior imply that the log consumption–aggregate wealth (human capital plus asset holdings) ratio summarizes expected returns on aggregate wealth, or the market portfolio. Although this ratio is not observable, we provide assumptions under which its important predictive components for future asset returns may be expressed in terms of observable variables, namely in terms of consumption, asset holdings and labor income. The framework implies that these variables are cointegrated, and that deviations from this shared trend summarize agents' expectations of future returns on the market portfolio.     

Reproducibility investigation of elicitation techniques in risk assessment for hydraulic turbines

Abstract

Certain elicitation techniques exert some control on expert opinions by leading them to a consensus or to a specific choice. In the absence of such guidelines, experts rely on their own knowledge to formulate opinions. This can result in large dispersions and affects the decision maker’s judgment. In this situation, we wonder what the relevant elicitation techniques are and how we can help experts to express their knowledge. From literature review, it is hard to decide if elicitation techniques are equivalent or not, which justifies the reproducibility analysis that we carry out in this paper. In this study, multiple experts have been involved in order to predict the defect size in hydraulic turbines, according to four proposed elicitation techniques. The comparison between these techniques was performed based on a suggested algorithm using the area metric concept. Our Findings show that elicitation techniques with ‘support’ tend to limit variations between experts and might be suitable only when prior knowledge on the expected elicited variable is available. Otherwise, we can end up with a distorted opinion of the elicited variable and an erroneous risk assessment.     

Reconciling Gray and Hotelling

A bstract .   Early exhaustible resource economics provides an important foundation for recent suggestions that firm-level economic modeling plays a larger role in the analysis of resource scarcity. The lack of empirical support for Hotelling's r -percent rule, introduced in 1931, and recent suggestions that industry behavior may not be reducible to firm behaviors are the primary motivating factors for examining the relative value of Gray's contribution to the field of exhaustible resource economics relative to Hotelling's contribution. Specifically, Gray's papers that appeared in the 1910s provide insight into the heterogeneity of deposits and their spatial dimensions, and offer the possibility that firms will be subject to fixed costs carried over between periods. In this paper, the arguments presented by Gray are formalized in a dynamic model, which allows the differences between Gray's and Hotelling's assumptions to be more fully explored. The results of the paper illustrate that by considering spatially identifiable heterogeneous deposits, fixed costs, and entry costs, in general Hotelling's r -percent rule is not a sufficient condition for firm-level decision making and that firms' extraction behavior cannot be linearly aggregated to describe industry behavior.